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THE CONSTRUCTION AND NEGOTIATION OF MEANING IN SCOTTISH  
POLITICAL DISCOURSE: A CASE STUDY OF THE 2003 SCOTTISH  
PARLIAMENT ELECTIONS

By

DANIEL P. J. SOULE

A Thesis Submitted in Fulfilment of the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy

Department of English Language  
University of Glasgow  
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## SUMMARY

This study is concerned with the nature of political discourse in the 2003 devolved Scottish elections. The investigation explores the potential effects of the new constitutional arrangements and electoral system on the campaign discourse of Scottish political parties.

The four weeks of election campaigning are studied, from the 1<sup>st</sup> April to the 1<sup>st</sup> May 2003. Analysis focuses on many of the main texts produced during the election campaign, including manifestos, party election broadcasts and newspaper articles.

Conducted in the Critical Discourse Analysis tradition, this investigation combines insights from Fairclough's social focus and three dimensional analysis of discourse and van Dijk and Chilton's cognitive approaches. This synthesis of approaches is an attempt to produce an analysis that can explicate both social and cognitive aspects of ideological discourse production. In so doing, the study reappraises van Dijk's original conception of the 'ideological square' (1998) as a description of competitive discourse. The thesis explores the dynamics of party political competition and ideological negotiation in devolved Scottish politics, with particular attention paid to the discourse of coalition and nationalist politics.

The thesis begins by outlining the following: the need for this investigation; initial background information on the events leading up to Scottish devolution; preliminary methodological detail; and a structural outline of the thesis. Discussion then focuses on the ideological character of Scottish politics, both in terms of public opinion and the positions of political parties, as represented by the content of their manifestos. Continuing the analysis of party manifestos, chapter 3 explores discursive strategies used by political parties to construct identities and negotiate relationships in light of actual or potential coalition government. The following chapter then moves the analysis onto party election broadcasts, taking particular interest in the rhetorical methods employed in the positive and negative presentation of policies. Chapter 5 then analyses the press reception of party election broadcasts. Looking at the recycling of political messages, chapter 5 uses metaphor analysis to investigate representations of elections in press coverage. Having established the importance of a nationalist

agenda in Scottish politics during previous sections, Chapter 6 investigates representations of Scottish national identity in election discourse. The final chapter summarizes results, discusses the strengths and weaknesses of the thesis' design and suggests avenues for future research.



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## CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION: NEW SCOTTISH POLITICS, NEW DISCOURSE?

The coming of devolution and the first Scottish Parliament elections in 1999 heralded a new era in both Scottish and British politics. Since the first elections there has been, predictably, a rash of academic work focusing on post devolutionary Scotland, its politics and culture. Numerous works have appeared, such as *The new Scottish politics* (Hassan and Warhurst, 2000), *New Scotland, New Politics?* (Paterson et al, 2001), *New Scotland, New Society?* (Curtice et al, 2002), *The Scottish Electorate* (Brown et al, 1999), *Understanding Scotland: the sociology of a nation* (second edition) (McCrone, 2001), *Break-Up: Twenty-Five Years On* (Nairn, 2004), *Scottish Government and Politics* (Lynch, 2001), *Dislocating the Nation: Political Devolution and Cultural Identity on Stage and Screen* (Jackson, 2004), *Anatomy of the New Scotland* (Hassan and Warhurst, 2002) and *Claiming Scotland: National Identity and Liberal Culture* (Hearn, 2000). This is by no means an exhaustive list but an impression of the intellectual energy exploring post devolutionary Scotland. Many of these titles either explicitly or implicitly express newness and change; and it is newness and change that give this investigation its focus. The starting point for this thesis is that given there are new systems of governance in Scotland there are also, potentially, new ways of communicating in those systems: in effect new discourses.

The inquisitorial spotlight of this study falls on the 2003 elections, the second balloting for the Scottish Parliament. Elections are a locus of frenetic political and media activity and they are also bounded, given the limited time in which to campaign and advocate political arguments. As such, an election provides an opportunity to see competing political arguments in action and an occasion to observe if the 'new politics' (Paterson et al, 2001: 17) has given rise to new political discourses. If there are new discourses, one can investigate how they are constituted by the new politics, how they are ordered and operate in the new environment. In turn, if there are new discourses one can investigate how they represent and negotiate relationships between the various competing political parties. Evidence is drawn from a corpus of texts composed of party political materials, such as manifestos, party election broadcasts, and media texts, drawn from the Scottish press. In this way, the study may investigate many of the phenomena of contemporary democratic elections, as constituted directly through the texts of the party political campaigns and indirectly through the mediated



texts of mass media coverage. One such phenomenon might be the strategically planned and implemented nature of party messages, producing consistency across different modes of communication and at different times; messages, therefore, are not limited to their immediate context of production.

The remainder of this introductory chapter will lay out some of the recent historical and political background which led to devolution, introduce the investigative methodology and indicate the structure of the forthcoming exposition.

## 1.1 Background to Devolution

This section will not attempt to recount the numerous and complex debates concerning Scotland's changing constitutional arrangements with the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland (UK). Such discussions have occurred in greater detail than could possibly be afforded here (e.g. Bogdanor, 1999, 2001; Brown et al, 1996; Devine, 1999; Devine and Finlay, 1996; Finlay, 1997; Linklater and Denniston, 1992; Paterson, 1994). Drawing on the aforementioned work, a brief précis of the arrangements of governing Scotland before devolution and the main issues which led to devolution in the last 30 years will be given.

Before devolution, Scotland occupied a unique position in relation to its system of governance in the world of democratic nations. It was the only nation to have its own legal and educational systems and 'separate arrangements for the handling of executive business, but no separate legislature to which the Scottish Executive could be held responsible' (Bogdanor, 2001: 117). Instead, Scotland's laws were made in a parliament outwith its borders, where its elected representatives occupied a minority of the legislative seats.

For much of Scotland's political union with England, party political representation north and south of the border remained comparable in terms of the number of votes parties received per head of population. Across the UK, government proportionately represented its constituent parts; no one area, with the exception of Northern Ireland, voted significantly differently to other parts. However, with the dawn of the 1960s, the distribution of votes in England and Scotland began to change. From 1959 the Labour Party dominated the political scene in Scotland, winning a majority of seats in every election. This supremacy would reach its zenith with the decimation of Conservative party support in the 1997 general election, where the



party failed to win a single seat in Scotland. Therefore, whenever a Conservative government occupied Downing Street a democratic deficit existed between the Scottish nation and its political masters. For 27 out of 38 years, between 1959 and 1997, Scotland's elected will was under-represented in Westminster government.

The 1960s also witnessed the rise in the electoral fortunes of the Scottish National Party (SNP), and their ascent would continue until they became the second party of Scottish politics, rivalling Labour. The SNP's incursion introduced an overtly nationalist flavour into politics north of the border, which further differentiates the nature of Scottish politics from its southerly neighbour (McCrone, 2001). Scotland's constitutional relationship with the rest of the UK is brought into sharp focus when the two main parties of Scotland are divided over support for the Union. Therefore, with an asymmetrical relationship between representation of executive power and the growth of a nationalist-separatist vote, the constitutional status quo has been under significant threat since the 1970s (Bogdanor, 2001; Budge et al, 2004).

It is not the case that nationalist support grew from nowhere. Before the democratic deficit arose, 'agitation for reform in Scotland [had] resulted in increased, responsibilities accruing to the Scottish Office' (McCrone, 2001: 45). Brown et al (1996), McCrone (1992; 2001), Paterson (1994) and others have commented that the powers of the Scottish office both reflected a sense of Scottishness and helped to reinforce that identity through the institutions of civic democratic administration. McCrone comments,

As democracy slowly made its way into the governing structures of these islands in the nineteenth century, so it helped to consolidate Scottish civil society. The remarkable growth of separate political administration for Scotland since 1886 has undoubtedly helped to reinforce the sense of 'Scotland'. It is easier to visualise what a separate Scotland would look like precisely because by the 1980s the Scottish Office had become a Scottish semi-state with powerful administrative apparatus. (2001: 44)

The administrative arrangements supporting and administering Scotland lent weight to calls for devolution once the political climate had altered.

The general elections of 1974 brought key shifts in the tides of party political support, resulting in devolution climbing up the political agenda. In the two elections of that year the Conservatives lost 13 per cent of their vote in Scotland and a total of eight seats to the SNP (Bogdanor, 2001: 137). The scene was now set for the



introduction to Parliament of Labour's devolution proposal, the 1976 Scotland and Wales Bill. The Scottish Labour Party from its inception had found appeal in home rule, but calls for devolution had been tempered by greater political forces of the times. From the 1930s the Scottish Labour Party perceived more benefit for Scotland in a centralised, UK based model for administering social welfare and economic policies. However, the success of the SNP by the mid 1970s meant that the Labour Party could no longer ignore devolution (Devine, 1999). Due to its minority status, Harold Wilson's first Labour government in 1974 had to rely on support from nationalist and Liberal MPs who supported devolution. In addition, the report of a Royal Commission on the UK Constitution in 1973 recommended a directly elected parliament with legislative powers for Scotland, (Brown et al, 1996) adding to the strength of the prevailing political wind. However, while the previous Conservative leader and then prime minister, Ted Heath, had been more in favour of devolution, the new leader Margaret Thatcher was less well disposed to the idea, later commenting in her autobiography 'As an instinctive Unionist, I disliked the Devolution commitment' (1995: 322). Against renewed Conservative opposition to the Bill, as well as some of their own 'sceptics' (Brown et al, 1996: 20) Labour could only get the legislation through Parliament with significant amendments: restricted powers for the assembly and 40 per cent of the total voting population needed to support devolution in the referendum vote.

If timing is everything, then the 1979 referendum campaign had little in its favour. James Callaghan's Labour government had been dealing with an economic crisis and growing industrial unrest from the unions. The wind had changed and now the referendum campaign had to be steered through a hostile political climate. The campaign would prove ultimately unsuccessful. Devine recounts,

A number of factors combined to cause the failure of the 1979 [devolution campaign]... The electorate were mainly concerned with strikes, industrial relations and unemployment, and a mere 5 per cent of those interviewed gave any priority to devolution. Equally significantly, the Tories were doing well in these surveys and, alone among the major parties, were committed to opposing devolution. At a time when the country seemed to lurch from crisis to crisis, people appeared to be more concerned with jobs and living standards than with constitutional reform. 1978-9, saw the notorious 'Winter of Discontent', when Britain was rocked by a series of industrial disputes and the big unions smashed through the government's pay norms. Television images of uncollected rubbish piled high on the streets and hospital workers out on strike



conveyed an image of public anarchy. At one point even the dead went unburied. A government which had demonstrated such incompetence was hardly in a position to convince the Scots of the merits of the Scotland Act. (1999: 589)

Not only was the political context unfavourable but the 'yes' campaign itself was severely divided with Labour and SNP refusing to cooperate with each other. Unionist Labour argued, as they would in the late 1990s, that devolution would strengthen the union, while the SNP suggested devolution would eventually lead to independence. While the Welsh devolution result was a clear 'No', Scotland's vote produced a 'Yes' win but failed to meet the 40 per cent threshold. Callaghan's minority Labour government then had to deal with the political fall out, which would taint the affections of supportive minority parties. Labour were unable to implement devolution, resulting in both the SNP and the Conservatives motioning for a vote of no-confidence. The Liberal and SNP votes against the government would produce a twist of political irony. In helping to defeat Labour, the Liberals and SNP, on the back of the devolution issue, ushered in eighteen years of anti-devolution Conservative rule. The Scotland Act was repealed by the incumbent Conservative government in May 1979, despite 43 out of 71 Scottish MPs voting against repeal. Devolution would remain off the political agenda of Westminster government for nearly the next 20 years, but would be rejuvenated with the eventual return of a Labour government.

Conservative rule at Westminster, with the decline of its vote in Scotland would act as a fulcrum against which the case for devolution could be persuasively levered. While England moved ideologically to the right during the 1980s, Scotland moved in the opposite direction (Curtice et al, 2002). The Thatcher government's firmly unionist tendencies, coupled with its 'policies of competitive individualism' (Bogdanor, 2001: 196) would see the Scottish Office as an obstacle to those objectives. These factors would also come to be seen as running counter to Scotland's elected will. With the unpopular poll tax being introduced in Scotland before England, it was easy for opposition parties to paint the Conservatives as anti Scotland (Paterson, 2002). As successive Conservative governments and the Scottish electorate seemed to grow even further apart during the 1980s and 90s, the political conditions were laid in which devolution could achieve popular support.

During this period some of the pro-devolution opposition parties and interested civic agents began to build some of the machinery that would eventually



support another bid for home rule. Precisely a year after the failed referendum a cross party group formed a Campaign for a Scottish Assembly, its Constitutional Steering Committee producing a Claim of Right for Scotland (Bogdanor, 2001: 196). The Claim of Right (Scottish Constitutional Convention, 1995) called for the establishment of a Scottish Constitutional Convention and proclaimed 'the right of the people of Scotland to decide their own constitution, and indicated that the UK state had become too centralised' (Brown, McCrone and Paterson, 1996: 63-4). The Convention, which would eventually come to fruition and meet for the first time in March 1989, was made up of the Labour, Liberal Democrat, Green and Communist parties and representatives from various civic groups. The Conservatives refused to take part and the SNP withdrew from the Convention just as it began, claiming independence was not up for serious consideration (Brown, McCrone and Paterson, 1996: 64). Bogdanor comments of the political role of the Constitutional Convention within the political climate of the time,

Devolution was not a high priority at Westminster, even for Labour, and there were fears that a Labour government might not be willing to prepare new devolution legislation only to see it once again destroyed by hostile English back-bench MPs, as had occurred in 1977 with the Scotland and Wales Bill. Since Scottish issues were subsidiary to United Kingdom matters, there seemed no way in which the Scots could make known their support for devolution other than by voting SNP, and that would be regarded as a vote for separation. There was, therefore, a gap in the Scottish representative system. The Convention was intended to fill that gap. Its role was to draw up a specific scheme which could then be adopted by an incoming government sympathetic to devolution; and also to promote its chosen scheme. (2001: 197)

The Scottish Constitutional Convention, therefore, functioned as a vehicle with which to galvanise and express support for devolution, keeping it on the political agenda in Scotland while it was off the agenda at Westminster. In addition the Convention sought to give an outlet to Scottish public opinion's disquiet with Conservative government, an outlet which did not have to manifest itself as a separatist protest vote.

The Convention can be seen to have been successful, as its recommendations were largely taken on board by the UK Labour Party leadership. Come the Labour general election landslide of 1997 the stage was set for the enactment of devolution legislation. The leader of the Labour Party, Tony Blair, had insisted in 1996 that there must again be a referendum. This move was much criticised in Scotland but it proved



important in terms of circumventing criticism from English back-benchers (Bogdanor, 2001: 198), who could hardly argue against the popular will of the people of Scotland. The referendum took place on September 11<sup>th</sup>, 1997, asking two questions: should there be a Scottish Parliament; and should that parliament have tax-varying powers? Seventy four per cent of voters supported the first question and 63 per cent supported the second. This time there was no 40 per cent threshold in place; if there had been the first question would still have stood, while the second would have failed. Nevertheless, Scotland would have a devolved assembly.

Paterson et al (2001) comment of the first election campaign that, although the pro home rule parties, including the SNP had been more cooperative during the referendum campaign, cordiality did not survive to polling day. They note,

With some opinion polls in 1998 putting the SNP ahead of Labour... there was significant nervousness in Labour's ranks, and old rivalries between the two parties surfaced. Prominent players in the Labour Party, including Donald Dewar, used the occasion of the Scottish conference in March 1999 to attack the SNP and to warn of the dangers of a costly 'divorce' from the rest of Britain. In such a climate the 'new politics' associated with the Scotland Forward referendum campaign were no longer in evidence. (Paterson et al, 2001: 17)

This 'divorce' motif in Labour's electoral discourse will be further scrutinised later, as it was manifest in the 2003 campaign as well. Despite the new electoral system the parties seemed to follow adversarial habits in this first election. However, it will be argued later that the 2003 campaign exhibited a more complex rhetoric.

The first Scottish Parliament elections took place on May 6<sup>th</sup>, 1999, electing 129 Members of the Scottish Parliament (MSPs). Labour obtained the most seats (56) but failed to obtain an overall majority, the SNP received the next largest share of seats (35), the Conservatives came third (18), the Liberal Democrats fourth (17), and the Greens, the SSP and an independent candidate received one seat each. Labour and the Liberal Democrats decided to enter into a coalition, the first ever on peacetime British soil. By the 14<sup>th</sup> May Labour and the Liberal Democrats had signed the first Partnership Agreement (Hassan and Warhurst, 2000: 10).

The above result was produced by a new mixed form of electoral system, based on both proportionality and a Single Member Simple Plurality (SMSP alternatively known as First Past the Post) system. This Additional Member System



gives electors two votes 'one for a constituency member and a second for a party list' (Paterson et al, 2001: 67). The majority of seats, 73 in total, come from the constituency SMSP vote; the remaining 56 seats are accrued from the proportional regional list system.

### *1.1.1 Researching Scottish Politics*

The next election would be fought on the same mixed electoral system; however, the 2003 vote would now occur after four years of stable coalition government. This produced new quandaries as to how election campaigns would be conducted. Now on a second run through of the electoral system, interested parties would be well aware that a majority led by either one of the two big Scottish Parties, Labour and SNP, was unlikely. Instead, a coalition was the likely outcome and, as will be discussed in the next chapter, for reasons of ideology the minority Liberal Democrats would probably hold the balance of power, whether they chose to sit in or outside the Executive. As it turned out the Liberal Democrats again decided to sit in the Executive with Labour<sup>1</sup>. Also, for the first time ever in British politics, two parties, Labour and the Liberal Democrats, would be campaigning on separate agendas but arguing from the same policy record in office. The devolved elections also mark a new dynamic in the makeup of electoral power, with three centre-left parties dominating the Scottish political scene. As the Conservatives are the only right wing party in the devolved parliament, there is a pervading centre-left hegemony in the governance of Scotland. How these relationships are to be negotiated in what Pritcher (2002a) refers to as a traditionally adversarial media environment is unknown and unexplored. This thesis will attempt to address these issues of how competing Scottish party political ideologies and the new constitutional arrangements affect the construction and negotiation of political discourse in Scotland's devolved elections. In particular, much

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<sup>1</sup> Results for the 2003 election were as follows, Labour 50 seats, SNP 27, Conservative 18, Liberal Democrats 17, Green 7, SSP 6, and independent candidates 4. The positions of the parties, therefore, remained much the same. However, while the Liberal Democrats and Conservatives won the same number of seats, Labour lost 6 and the SNP 8 seats from their 1999 totals. The big parties' losses were the gains of the smallest minority parties and independent candidates: the Greens were up from 1 to 7, the SSP up from 1 to 6, and three extra independent candidates up to 4 from 1999 levels. For a more comprehensive breakdown of election results see: <http://www.scottish.parliament.uk/msp/elections/analysis/index.htm> (24/07/2006) or The Electoral Commission (2003) 'Scottish elections 2003: The official report on the Scottish Parliament and local government elections 1 May 2003'.



of the focus of this analysis will fall on the three dominant centre-left parties as the new dominant matrix of party political power in Scotland.

To date much of the analysis of Scottish politics has been conducted in the traditions of political science, sociology and history. The first two disciplines have been particularly concerned with the empirically measurable assessment of political events and social structures (Hassan and Warhurst, 2002; Linklater and Denniston, 1992; McCrone, 1992, 2001; and Paterson, 1994), voting results (Bennie, Brand, and Mitchell, 1997; and Paterson et al, 2001) and public opinion (Bromely and McCrone, 2002; Curtice et al, 2002; and McCrone, 2001). It would be an over simplification to state that this was the sum of what is in reality a rich and varied study of Scotland's politics. The pervading paradigm for studying what McCrone (2001) calls 'politics in a cold climate' is the empirical one, but strongly supported by a canon of constitutional theory (Bogdanor, 1999, 2001; Dicey and Rait, 1920; Kellas, 1975; and Nairn, 1977, 2004) and studies of nationalism (Coupland, 1954; Harvie, 1994; Heath and Kellas, 1998; and Kellas, 1991). This thesis by no means wishes to discount this previous work; on the contrary it embraces many of its insights and practices, while questioning a few. Coming from a CDA perspective, this study values the analysis of the social and historical, and as such will at times draw on these methods of analyses. However, while supporting the aforementioned work, this thesis does hope to add something to it both in terms of methodological approach and its resulting insights. It is hoped the methodological framework discussed in the following section will be able to add to the study of Scottish politics, particularly the neglected area of political discourse in Scotland.

## 1.2 A Critical Discourse Methodology

This thesis stems from the critical discourse analysis tradition. The CDA approach, as developed in the last several decades, has been predominantly the domain of linguistics, as typified by the work of Fairclough (1989; 1992; 1995a; 1995b), Fowler (1991; 1996), Kress (1996), van Dijk (1993; 1994; 2006a; 2006c), van Leeuwen (1996) and Wodak (2001; 2006). Fewer non linguists work in the tradition, exceptions being Chouliaraki (1999; 2000; Chouliaraki and Fairclough, 1999) and Billig (Billig and Macmillan, 2005), for example. As a mode of study, however, CDA aims to be multidisciplinary, pulling together insights from a range of the social sciences,



humanities and arts. Though there are variations, or parallel paradigms, operating in the tradition they all share some common methodological assumptions. There are three main traditions that broadly fit into three categories: social, cognitive and historical. Though approaches to analysis differ in certain respects, all three view language as a social resource, which stands in a dialectic relationship to society. By this assessment, language is both a product of society and a productive resource which influences it. Seen here is the theoretical influence of Western European Marxism, that of Bakhtin (1981), Habermas (1984; 1989), Voloshinov (1973) and Gramsci (1971), which began to see language as part of productive power. In addition to the economic and physical capital of industrialised society, language or discourse is also able to be used as a tool of domination and of resistance. Also significantly influential was the work of other European critical social theorists, such as Bernstein (1968; 1990), Bourdieu (1977; 1990; 1991) and Foucault (1972; 1984). Through these theorists CDA inherits its focus on ideology and its behaviours of social dominance and resistance. Ideologies are operated, in addition to physical means, through language. Ideology can, therefore, be seen in language; and to study language in use can be to study ideology and, in turn, the operation and resistance of power. Fairclough comments,

As well as being determined by social structures, discourse has effects upon social structures and contributes to the achievement of social continuity or social change. It is because the relationship between discourse and social structures is dialectical in this way that discourse assumes such importance in terms of power relationships and power struggles. (2001: 30-31)

What can also be found in the above theorists is that the meanings of ideologies (particularly powerful and dominant ones) are not always transparent. The traditional Marxist 'false consciousness' influences the concept of 'hegemony', where dominant ideologies (those of the dominating elite groups of a society) are reproduced as representations of the natural order or common sense (Fairclough, 1989). Such representations dialogically reinforced and encode the constitution of social structures, such as educational, legal, religious, industrial, economic and governmental institutions, which are ordered in terms of the interests of powerful social groups. Pardo explains further,



A dialectal relationship is assumed between particular discursive facts and the situations, institutions and social structures in which they are embedded. On the one hand, situational contexts, institutional and social, delineate and affect discourse; on the other, discourse influences political and social reality. In other words, discourse constitutes a social practice and social practice is, at the same time, constructed by discourse. (2001: 91)

This relationship between discourse and society is a key one for the validation of the use of language to explore socio-cultural issues, and the use of social issues to explore language.

At this point it may be useful to discuss the differences between the dominant paradigms of CDA. It is important to explore methodological nuances as this thesis attempts to productively marry two of those approaches. The social (more sociologically driven) tradition, as seen in the work of Fairclough (1989; 1992; 1995a; 1995b), Kress (1989; 1996), Hodge (Hodge and Kress, 1979; 1988) and van Leeuwen (1996), has been significantly influenced by Foucault's theory of discourse and, as such, has retained a strong sociological focus. Wodak et al (1999) points out these theorists tend to be British. Additionally, Halliday's social semiotic theory (1978) and his systemic functional linguistic analysis (1985; Halliday and Matthiessen, 2004) feature prominently in social critical discourse analytical practice (Wodak et al, 1999: 7). The social tradition uses a tripartite description of discourse: discourse, orders of discourse/discourse practices, and culture practices. The dialogic relationship between language and society is reflected in this three dimensional analysis. As language relates to society, the analyst considers discourse from three perspectives: the language (or text) itself; the means and social conventions governing the production of that language; and the social and cultural practices from which the discourse emanates. This is the theoretical point at which social and linguistic theories are married together. Crudely put, in Halliday's social semiotic, language is a system of choices and that system is at least in part governed by social context. Different social contexts produce different linguistic choices, which Halliday (1985) encodes as three metafunctions: ideational, interpersonal and textual. Fairclough observes of his use of systemic functional linguistics,

I have followed systemic linguistics... in assuming that language in texts always simultaneously functions ideationally in the representation of experience and the world, interpersonally in constituting social interaction between participants in discourse, and textually in tying parts of a text together



into a coherent whole (a text, precisely) and tying texts to situational contexts (e.g. through situational deixis). This multifunctionality of language in texts can be used to operationalize theoretical claims about the socially constitutive properties of discourse and text... Texts in their ideational functioning constitute systems of knowledge and belief... and in their interpersonal functioning they constitute social subjects (or in different terminologies, identities, forms of self) and social relations between (categories of) subjects. (1995b: 6)

However, this dense linguistic terminology should not lead the reader to conclude that critical discourse analysis is only concerned with discrete levels of analysis, with text or discourse being the linguist's prime or only concern. One must remember the dialogic links made by theorists between discourse and the context and means of its production. In this view, discourse and its production is a form of social practice (Fairclough, 1995b). Therefore, to study discourse is an essential part of studying society, and Halliday's contributions supply much of the tools for performing linguistic analysis, for example grammatical transitivity and modality analysis.

The second main paradigm in CDA orientates toward cognitive studies. Most notably developed by Teun van Dijk (1998) and Paul Chilton (2004), this approach also uses a three dimensional model to investigate discourse and society<sup>2</sup>. This time the triadic method explores 'how personal and social cognition mediates between social structures and discourse structures' (Wodak et al, 1999: 7). The cognitive approach is particularly helpful in viewing discourse participants as social and individually motivated agents. Ideology is, by definition, a group phenomenon: a system of beliefs common amongst a collective (van Dijk, 1998). The cognitive CDA paradigm, in addition to the above social thinkers, borrows from cognitive linguistics (Fauconnier, 1997; Lakoff, 2002, 1987; Lakoff and Johnson, 1981; Sperber and Wilson, 1995; and Turner, 1991) and cognitive scientists (Abrams and Hogg, 1990; Billig, 1982, 1990; and Tajfel, 1981, 1982) to examine the relationships between language, group identity and the maintenance or resistance of social structures, roles and institutions.

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<sup>2</sup> A note on George Lakoff should be made here as his work will be drawn on. Some theorists (e.g. Hart, 2005) refer to Lakoff as a critical discourse analyst but he is not. He has, provided CDA theorists with a valuable tool kit with which to explore discourse with a cognitive inflexion. Analysts with an interest in cognition naturally draw on his work as a cognitive linguist. Some of Lakoff's activity has been bound up with neo-conservative discourse in the U.S. (2004), but this is hardly done from either the methodological or ideological standpoint of CDA.



The third significant paradigm in CDA is the historical, typified by the Vienna School of Discourse Analysis. Ruth Wodak is the most prominent proponent of this approach. Wodak et al (1999) assert that Bernstein's theory strongly influences their methodology. The Viennese method in analysing political topics and texts puts emphasis on 'the historical dimension' (Wodak et al, 1999: 7). Wodak et al explain this has a two pronged approach,

Firstly, the discourse-historical approach always attempts to integrate as much available information as possible on the historical background and the original historical sources in which discursive events are embedded. Secondly, a number of investigations... have traced the diachronic change, which particular types of discourse undergo during a specified period of time. (1999: 7-8)

Still important are the aspects of critically questioning power and ideology. Again they employ a three dimensional approach, this time between the historical, socio-political and the discursive. This final methodology is briefly drawn on in the workings of this investigation (see chapter six). However, the social and cognitive models are more important to the present study.

This thesis combines the social and cognitive approaches to CDA in several ways. In particular, Fairclough's triadic social methodology roots an analysis in the explication of socio-cultural practices as productive in accounting for manifestations of discourse, and vice versa. So for example, in this study, understanding the political context that led to devolution, as outlined above, provides the analyst with insights to the political and social background of Scottish politics. Similarly, understanding the characteristics of the current constitutional arrangements, i.e. the mixed electoral system for Scottish elections, provides explanations for social and institutional pressures on discourse participants. Where the social approach is lacking is in providing a detailed model for explaining the motivation for individuals to act in groups.

The social explanation for group motivation stops at the operation and resistance of power (which includes accessing resources); and it does not give an account of how and why discourses are structured in particular ways, other than it is in the interests of the group. Where the cognitive approach has its strength is in



addressing these issues. For example, van Dijk (1998) provides an explanation of group behaviour which he formulates into the 'ideological square', which is discussed further in chapters 3 and 4. In brief, the ideological square reduces to positive representation the in-group's actions, attributes and achievements and negative representation of the out-group. Van Dijk draws on work in social psychology, particularly Social Identity Theory (SIT) and Self Categorisation Theory (SCT). These theories, exemplified by the work of Abrams and Hogg (1990), Billig (1982; 1990) and Tajfel (1981; 1982), explain that 'groups only exist if members identify themselves with the group' (Billig, 1995: 66). This membership inevitably involves making categorical distinctions between one group and another. The motivation for being a member of a group and thus making such distinctions is that group membership adds to positive conceptions of self (Tajfel, 1981). Therefore, an important aspect to the operation of ideological groups is not only the obtaining or maintenance of access to power or scarce resources but also the construction and maintenance of a positive in-group identity. Groups are not, therefore, merely agglomerations of individuals in pursuit of power and at the behest of social pressures, but responsive collectives actively engaged in both internal and external dialogues. Ultimately, the pursuit of power for scarce resources is bound up with the maintenance of positive identity for the group and correspondingly the individual. Van Dijk's ideological square is a model based on understandings of group behaviour that describes the cognitive framework used to order ideological discourse.

For the purposes of this study, van Dijk's ideological square begins to give a framework for understanding the structuring of group (in this case, that is the party) discourse, in relation or response to external pressures, namely the conditions of the electoral campaign and its potential outcomes. Groups are positively and negatively categorised; discourses are then ordered to reproduce those meanings in advocating group interests, in the competitive environment of the election.

Chilton's (2004) cognitive discourse analysis allows the analyst to then investigate further the construction of in and out-groups in discourse. His deictic method illustrates how in-groups are plotted proximal to the speaker in terms of space, time and modality (which equates to a moral and truthful rightness). Out-groups are then manifest as distal coordinates with respect to the in-group who is producing the discourse. Through the use of these three dimensions of deixis one can investigate who is plotted as antithetical to the in-group and how out-groups and their



members are characterised. These representations are understood through a spatial metaphor that equates to their cognitive representation, where out-groups are spatially and morally distal to the in-group. Therefore, van Dijk's ideological square provides a cognitive model that accounts for ordering of discourse based on the representation of positive in-group interests; while Chilton's method then allows in and out-group categorisation to be mapped in special terms (which related to cognitive representations) in discourse.

Applying these cognitive approaches to this thesis means that the study can regard party political discourse from the perspective of group behaviour operating in response to both internal and external social pressures. Parties will be expected to try to represent themselves positively and their opponents negatively, therefore constructing different positions in political discourses like manifestos and party election broadcasts (PEBs). However, as will become apparent, such a clear bifurcation of discursive strategies is not the complete picture. In light of evidence from the Scottish election van Dijk's model requires some alteration.

### *1.2.1 A definition of discourse*

The word 'discourse' has already been used quite extensively in this discussion and, therefore, requires some clarifications as to its usage in this thesis. The term 'discourse' is widely used in scholarly work today and its meanings vary depending on where it is used. Functionalist studies of language and critical social theory, both of which find their nexus in CDA, define discourse in the manner used by this study. As should be evident from the earlier part of the discussion of CDA, it is the functional view of discourse 'language in use' (Brown and Yule, 1983) or language in social context (Halliday, 1978) which is important here. Discourse should be understood as language not just as serving some social function but as a social act in and of itself. In the systemic functionalist account different social functions are inherent in the structuring and use of language. And in the CDA paradigm language is both action and social behaviour, where language stands in a dialectal relationship with social practice. The triadic approaches to analysis in CDA most strongly indicate how discourse is to be understood. Discourse is not just instances of language or text (for example a manifesto); e.g. text is at one and the same time an instance of discourse practice and social action. Critical discourse analysts sometimes refer to



different types of discourse, such as ‘media discourse’, ‘court room discourse’ or ‘political discourse’. This further communicates the social function of language in use and can also be understood in terms of ‘genre’, where features of texts are said to encode aspects of their social context. Therefore, the definition of discourse used here is language rooted in social context and as social practice, dialectically shaping and being shaped by social action.

### 1.3 A Structure for Exploring Scottish Electoral Discourse

Now that a domain and method of analysis have been defined, the structure of the forthcoming investigation will be indicated. Chapter 2 explores electoral discourse from the perspective of party manifestos, which are the main party documents of an election, providing the most comprehensive and unmediated account of parties’ prospective policy programmes. In exploring these texts, the argument is situated within a discussion of the ideological centre ground of Scottish politics. A centre ground defined in terms of both the political ideologies of parties and voters. And where appropriate comparisons are made between Scottish and English and UK politics. It is important to understand this centre ground because it is generally where the majority of public opinion resides and from where elections are fought and won. The centre ground of devolved Scottish politics is mapped and the distinctive nature of Scottish politics indicated. The importance to Scottish political culture of centre-left and nationalist ideological agendas is highlighted. In identifying the dominant ideological similarities and differences, this investigation will lay the foundations for a wider discussion of the discursive strategies used to negotiate relationships in devolved electoral politics. This is in line with CDA triadic methodological practice: investigating the socio-cultural context of discourse (text) and discourse practices (orders of discourse).

Chapter 3 then goes on to further examine manifestos, this time from the perspective of the discursive strategies employed in them to negotiate the ideological field of the Scottish election. This chapter addresses the issues of how a political system with several parties occupying similar ideological ground on the centre-left is negotiated. How parties discursively construct and negotiate their differing identities and relationships – bearing in mind the likelihood of coalition government – are explored. In doing this, how parties discursively label and position opponents is



scrutinized. Again the importance of the nationalist agenda and the contextual pressures of the likely outcome of the election, due to the electoral arrangements, are shown to affect discursive strategies in ideological competition. Both Scotland's relationship with the UK and potential coalition relationships characterise the discourse practices of Scotland's political parties. The electoral arrangements produce less adversarial discourses, alongside adversarial discourses, shaped by ideological differences between Labour and the SNP over the Union. This investigation is conducted by introducing a synthesis of the two approaches of Chilton (2004) and van Dijk (1998). These approaches are the three dimensional deixis analysis and the ideological square. The former indicates how ideological agents and actions are constructed in terms of proximity to the utterer; while the latter provides a cognitive account of the ideological structuring of discourse. However, evidence presented in this chapter questions the adequacy of the ideological square's descriptive powers; as such, a reformulation of the square is recommended.

Subsequently, chapter 4 moves the investigation to another mainstay of political campaigning: party election broadcasts. Whereas the previous chapters looked at how ideological opponents are labelled and positioned in Scottish political discourse, chapter 4 investigates strategies for rhetorically structuring and presenting arguments for and against policies. Focusing once more on Holyrood's centre-left parties, the chapter again employs the ideological square. Of particular interest is how parties negotiate actual or potential coalition partnerships in adversarial elections. As such the following issues are explored: how Labour and the Liberal Democrats claim responsibility for a shared policy programme while maintaining individual identities; correspondingly, how Labour and the Liberal Democrats negotiate pressures to criticise each other in an adversarial election, while leaving open the possibility of future collaboration; the strategies used by the main opposition, the SNP, and the Liberal Democrats to mediate a potential coalition, again while maintaining separate identities; and how the two main parties of Scotland, Labour and SNP, argue against each other's position. This analysis further supports the assertions of the previous chapter: that while adversarial discourses persist, less adversarial discourse strategies are in evidence in devolved Scottish politics. These observations also lend weight to the assertion that van Dijk's ideological square requires some modification to account for competitive circumstances that produce potential and actual compromises and



coalitions between adversaries. Also, the prominence of the nationalist agenda is again shown to be important in Scottish electoral discourse.

The analysis of the 2003 elections then moves, in chapter 5, to investigate political discourse in the media: specifically the Scottish press. In this chapter the effects on the representation of political elections of pervasive metaphors and their associated cognitive schemata are analysed. Through a study of a corpus of newspaper articles, which covered the PEBs of the election, metaphors of war, pugilism and argument are shown to be integral to the representation of political elections by politicians and journalists. It is suggested that these three metaphors are intimately related cognitively, forming an overarching 'conflict schema' for the discursive representation of politics. As such, elections and politics are represented as competition between two sides. This then privileges, in the production of discourse, representations and meanings that fit the schema, i.e. two party adversarial politics, where the winner takes all, as in Westminster SMSP elections. Meanings associated with non-adversarial politics are less likely to be represented in the news media. The appropriateness of this metaphorical representation of devolved Scottish politics is then questioned. The evidence of less adversarial discourse strategies, demonstrated in previous chapters, leads one to suspect that representations of politics that do not reproduce a two party hegemony would be more appropriate. Chapter 5 goes on to further explore the nature of press reception in the reproduction of specific policy messages contained in PEBs within the schematic representations of politics just mentioned. This focuses specifically on Labour and SNP messages because their PEBs were the only ones to receive coverage, probably because of their role as protagonists in the aforementioned conflict schema.

As the nationalist agenda is shown in previous chapters to be conspicuous in the discourse of devolved Scottish electoral politics, chapter 6 investigates the discursive construction of Scottish national identity in electoral discourse. Taking manifestos and PEBs together, chapter 6 studies what discursive representations of Scotland and Scottish national identity look like in the locutions of the nation's politicians. This analysis is placed against previous political science and sociological work on Scottish national identity (Brown et al, 1999; Curtice et al, 2002; and McCrone, 2001), and against Billig's (1995) conceptions of banal national identity. Both approaches are found to be useful but in need of revision in light of observations made here and elsewhere (e.g. Higgins, 2004a, 2004b; Law, 2001). Within this

framework two main issues are studied. Firstly, what forms of national identity are reproduced and whether the discursive evidence from this investigation tallies with previous work on Scottish national identity. And secondly, the discussion addresses the conflation of state and national identities in Billig's (1995) discursive account of banal national identity. On the first issue the distinction between what Brown et al (1999), Curtice et al (2002) and McCrone (2001) call civic and non-civic national identity is supported by the evidence presented. This distinction equates to the differentiation of *Staatsnation* and *Kulturnation* made by Wodak et al (1999) in their critical discourse study of Austrian national identity. The two forms of identity are shown to be simultaneously deployed in the language of Scottish politics of all political hues; this questions some of the conclusions of previous work on Scottish national identity. On the second issue, Scottish national identity and British state identity are shown to be clearly differentiated by all parties in Scottish politics. Chapter 6, therefore, recommends that Billig's theory be adapted to accommodate the negotiation of state and national identities in a sub-state nation like Scotland.

The final chapter summarises results, draws together the observations of this thesis and indicates its unique contribution. Chapter 7 also takes the opportunity to discuss the strengths and weaknesses of the study; before, finally, suggesting possible avenues for future research.



## CHAPTER 2: A MANIFESTO ANALYSIS OF THE IDEOLOGICAL CENTRE OF SCOTTISH ELECTORAL POLITICS

### 2.1 Introduction

The 2003 election manifestos are the focus of analysis in the following two chapters. Manifestos are the most comprehensive publicly available documents produced by political parties in the UK. They are the major location of extensive accounts of both individual policy detail and extensive proposed policy programmes for campaigning parties<sup>3</sup>. It is not only the comprehensiveness of manifestos which makes them of interest to researchers of ideology and political discourse; it is also the salience they are afforded in election campaigns and beyond. These are documents intended for public consumption, but very few of the electorate actually read manifestos (Brack, 2000: 1); however, manifestos are extensively covered by the media (Rosenbaum, 1997: 212). Because the political debate which develops around them occurs in the nation's mass media, a party's manifesto is their best known document to the electorate (Cooke, 2000: 1). The manifesto is representative of the party in general, whatever its internal disputes, with the content often discussed and influenced by the wider membership (Budge et al, 2004). If elected, a party (or parties in a power-sharing government) will claim to have a mandate for the implementation of its policies and ideology on the basis that the electorate voted for its manifesto. Journalists will cross-question politicians during and after election campaigns on the statements made in these documents. Pressure groups and opposition politicians will refer to pledges made and promises broken in the government's manifesto (Kavanagh, 2000). Discursively, manifestos serve as a centripetal force on a party's activists and spokesmen. Pulling the party's discourse to its centre these documents function as the hub of policies and beliefs around which a party's electoral campaign revolves. That is to say, manifestos define the areas and boundaries of their party's electoral debate. Manifestos are a major, if not the major, source of policy and ideological record for the public, politicians and journalists alike; they are the textual centre-piece of contemporary electoral campaigning.

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<sup>3</sup> For a brief history of the development of post-war manifestos in Great Britain see Rosenbaum (1997: 210-212).



The Manifesto Research Group (MRG) and the Comparative Manifesto Project (see Budge et al, 2004, Budge, Robertson and Hearl, 1987, Budge and Farlie, 1983)<sup>4</sup> have built up a body of analysis investigating general election manifestos. There is limited work available on Scottish editions of British general election manifestos (Leith, 2006). Emanating from political science, this research is generally rooted in the quantitative and qualitative research methodologies of that discipline and its focus thus far has been entirely on Westminster elections. Compared with other areas of political enquiry such as psephology, constitutional theory or party histories, manifestos have received far less attention. Within the CDA tradition manifestos have not received a great deal of attention, with the exception of Charteris-Black (2004). Critical discourse studies have investigated a range of text types from a variety of perspectives: and as discussed in the introduction there has been a significant interest in political subjects from the field's researchers. A strong interest in political texts and discourses is hardly surprising in a discipline whose *raison d'être* is the investigation and de-mystification of ideologies and ideological conflict. What is surprising is that in a well established body of research, with specific interests in political discourse, there is a notable lack of work on what are the core political documents of Western democracies. This neglect is still more surprising given that the majority of CDA has occurred over the last twenty years, at a time which saw significant shifts by the main UK parties to the ideological right and centre. The following two chapters, therefore, intend to begin filling this gap in current research.

There is, evidently, an opportunity for more analysis of manifestos in the newly devolved Scottish political context, and for that to be done from a CDA perspective. What the above political science research (with the exception of Leith, 2006) does, is to consider manifestos as texts which are a record of policies which are involved in a political dialogue with the electorate and the media, neglecting that manifestos also form part of the dialogue between political parties. This inter-party dialogue is even more relevant in a political system likely to yield a coalition government, as in Scotland. Under such conditions co-operative dialogues become a necessity of acquiring and managing power. As the textual site of comprehensive and detailed policy programmes, manifestos are ideal locations to investigate ideological negotiation in the political realm. As the main documents of party political

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<sup>4</sup> Though work by these research groups has not just focused on British manifestos, taking a broader view of European democracies.



competition in elections, they are in the vanguard of ideological competition in modern liberal democracies. From a discourse analysis perspective, one can therefore:

- Compare constructions of parties' ideological statements
- Identify discursive trends and ideological characteristics of Scottish political discourse at a particular time
- Investigate the construction of parties' 'in' and 'out-groups'
- Attempt to draw conclusions concerning the negotiation of inter-party relationships within a specific political context
- And thereby assess the effects of the political context on the actions and discourses of political agents within that political context

These are some of the reasons why election manifestos for the devolved Scottish parliament are investigated in this thesis. This chapter and the one that follows will attempt to address these potential areas of analysis: chapter 2 deals with the first two of the above points, while chapter 3 concerns itself specifically with the third point. Taken together these chapters address the final two points.

A distinction is made in this methodology between the content of ideologies and the rhetorical strategies used in their discursive competition – though in reality the two are intimately connected. Chapter 2 investigates the content of the ideologies in the Scottish political centre, whereas chapter 3 is more concerned with the rhetorical strategies used to persuade voters in devolved elections. In layman's terms one might make the distinction between style and substance in political discourse: substance being content and style the methods of presenting content to a public audience. However, rhetorical strategies can encompass more than mere presentational finesse. It will be illustrated in chapter 3 that an important part of ideological competition is the construction of competing perceptions of 'in' and 'out-groups'.

### *2.1.1 Investigating ideological content*

Brown et al assert that 'any academic analysis which failed to look at policies themselves... would be failing to address the actual discourses of politicians and of everyday discussions of politics' (1999: 93). Thus far this thesis has discussed ideologies in quite non-specific and abstract terms, laying a descriptive framework



and methodology for the forthcoming investigation. This investigation will now attempt to move from a general to a more specific discussion of ideologies. As such, the ideological landscape of Scottish politics will be the focus of what follows here. In discussing this, the ideologies of Scotland's people and the political parties that are elected to represent them are discussed.

Labour, Liberal Democrat and SNP policies and beliefs form the ideological centre of Scottish party politics. This research has contended that the Liberal Democrats are ideologically compatible coalition partners for the Scottish Labour Party and the SNP – a fact borne out, at least in part, by the Labour-Liberal Democrat executive partnership prior to and after the 2003 election. This is because all three parties occupy similar political ground on the centre-left of the political spectrum (Brown et al, 1999, Brown, McCrone and Paterson, 1996 and Paterson, 2002). As these three parties are currently the most likely parties of power in Scotland their political positions demarcate the centre of Scottish political debate. This chapter will therefore examine how the so called 'centre ground' is defined in Scottish politics i.e. what policies and other expressions of ideology occupy the centre of political debate in a devolved Scottish election. Mapping the ideological centre is important because it forms the basis for potential power-sharing and provides a context for discussing features of Scottish devolved election discourse. In turn, this will indicate any change in the manner in which the political field is discursively negotiated. Therefore, it should be possible to begin to explore Bogdanor's assertion that 'Devolution requires, and may conceivably help create, new relationships of consensus and co-operation' (2001: 286). It will be argued that Scotland does have a definably distinct political culture which is reflected in its centre-left standing. However, Scottish national identity plays a central role in explaining the character of mainstream political ideology in Scotland: that is the primacy of the interests of 'the Scottish nation' within the context of United Kingdom – or the removal of Scotland from that context, as the case may be.

Analysis in this chapter is not linguistic in character, as grammatical, pragmatic or semantic analysis does not feature when comparing manifesto statements. However, as this thesis is an analysis of 'discourse' as a social product, rooted in social practice, it is necessary to engage with the content of policy, considered as articulations of group beliefs. This approach is consistent with CDA methodology, which explicitly roots discursive aspects of ideological investigation in



the institutional content, background and production of ideologies (Fairclough, 1995a). Analysis would be inadequate if it failed to compare the detail of party policy, as it is integral to discourse practices of the political field, and is a product of party ideology.

## 2.2 What is an 'ideological centre'?

The most commonly held conception of political ideologies in the UK is that of the left-right dichotomy, where parties' political beliefs are described as being left or right wing in nature. The left is defined in terms of policies which reflect a socialist position, such as the centralised redistribution of wealth to alleviate poverty and the nationalisation of industries and public utilities: whereas the right is associated with more laissez-faire economic policies, the privatisation of public utilities and the introduction of free market principles into the welfare state and public services. In terms of values, crudely put, the left is more collectivist than the individualist right. These values in turn are realised by the above left/right policy preference. However, 'left' and 'right' do not provide a complete descriptive framework of political ideologies. The other main descriptive dichotomy is between libertarian and authoritarian positions, where liberal policies reflect more individual autonomy, freedom and entitlements, and prohibitive policies on individual freedoms represent an authoritarian standpoint. These positions (left-right and libertarian-authoritarian) form imaginary clines or axes upon which parties' relative positions to each other can be mentally mapped. And these positions are metaphorical descriptions that conjure spatial denotations to make meaningful otherwise abstract beliefs (Lakoff and Johnson, 1980). On both of these metaphorical clines one can envisage ideological positions which have varying degrees of distance or proximity, and as such some point in between two extremes is the centre. Left-right and libertarian-authoritarian clines do not necessarily run in parallel with each other. Thatcherism, for example, combined policies of the neo-liberal right with authoritarian ideologies to produce a brand of so called neo-conservatism, with similarities to its transatlantic contemporary in Reaganism. Thatcher's governments were off the centre of public opinion in terms of UK attitudes to public services but were in the centre of English (but not Scottish) attitudes on the libertarian-authoritarian scale (McCrone, 2001). One nation conservatism, however, is more centrist on both left-right and libertarian-authoritarian



clines. On the other hand the far left of the Labour Party historically could find much agreement with the right of the Tory Party in terms of their authoritarianism, but disagreed profoundly on economic policy.

However, it is the left-right distinction that is often the focus of UK politicians (Curtice et al, 2002: 199) and will be largely the focus of this chapter. The centre is where the groundswell of public and elite opinion can be found, as well as the median from which the extremes of political opinion lie. The centre is of importance to politicians and their parties because the centre ground is where elections are fought and won, as it attracts the highest number of votes. Paterson comments that successfully seeking the centre for the purpose of winning elections is a matter of 'whether and how party thinking corresponds to the thinking of that broad block of electors who are not at either end of the left-right spectrum' (2002: 197-198). For example, Labour Party reformers of the 1980s and 90s moved the party to the centre ground to win elections because they saw the majority of voters occupying that ideological position (Paterson, 2002). There are instances of parties winning elections and governing from off centre positions – the 1980s governments of Margaret Thatcher being a case in point (Heath, Jowell and Curtice, 2001). As this chapter is written the UK Conservative Party is currently seeking the centre ground again under David Cameron, their fourth leader since losing office in 1997. In doing so they are undertaking numerous policy reviews to determine where their policies should lie in order to win elections – this is inevitably a process to find policies which can be supported by both a majority of party supporters and non-affiliated voters who occupy the centre ground in public opinion.

It must be stressed, though, that the centre is a relative position. One country's centre may be to the right or left of another country's. As mentioned above, Scotland's centre is roughly described as centre-left; this is particularly clear when viewed in comparison with England. Bennie, Brand and Mitchell (1997), Brown et al (1999), Curtice et al (2002), and McCrone (2001) all point to differences at the level of social beliefs between Scottish and English electors, which correspondingly produce different policy preferences from elected representatives. What follows is an investigation which relates the policies and other ideological statements of Scotland's centrist parties to the wider research field and evidence of public opinion. By relating evidence of public and political belief with explicit ideological statements found in manifestos this chapter combines analysis of socio-cultural context with discourse



practices, in accordance with the CDA methodological framework. In terms of the overall analytical goals of this thesis, a more detailed explication of the ideological landscape of devolved Scottish politics is necessary because it provides for:

- An analysis of both socio-cultural and discourse practices
- The gathering of specifically Scottish features of public ideological negotiation
- The development of a more general theoretical framework and analysis of ideological negotiation in public discourse

## 2.3 The centre ground of Scottish politics

One may ask why Scotland has political values that are different to those South of the border? Why should the Scottish people and their politicians currently look in a more left and libertarian direction than their English counterparts? And what then are the values and accompanying policy preferences of a centre-left Scotland, i.e. what does the ideological centre of the Scottish electorate look like? Many authors have stressed that Scotland retained a distinct civic-culture after the Treaty of Union of 1707 (Brown, McCrone and Paterson, 1996, McCrone, 2001 and Paterson, 1994) and this thesis discussed Scotland's socio-cultural distinctiveness within the UK in chapter one. This distinctive culture, with its different legal system, religious make-up, educational traditions and party politics inevitably informs and is informed by the attitudes held by those people who now inhabit Scotland, but how?

### *2.3.1 Social structure and national identity*

It may be that Scotland has a significantly different social structure, for example with more working class and levels of religious participation than England, and that these differences affect mass public political values. Brown et al (1999) note that Scotland has a higher proportion than the rest of the UK of people who identify themselves as 'working class', some 71 per cent. Therefore one explanation as to why the Conservatives fare less well at elections in Scotland and correspondingly Labour do much better is that traditionally Labour benefits from proportionally more 'working class' votes in Scotland. In the past religion has also played a significant role in Scottish politics, where the Catholic-Protestant split is more telling than in England

which is overwhelmingly Anglican. The Conservatives had to be able to dominate general elections and used to command the working class Protestant vote (McCrone, 2001: 114-115); however, post World War II their share of the working class vote of any religious persuasion has been in decline. Brown et al (1999) discount social class and religion as the only significant explanations as to why Scotland feels and votes differently to England. Therefore, there must be some other explanation for the topographic differential in political values and voting behaviour between Scotland and England.

There is a clear relationship in Scotland between voting behaviour and national identity. The explanation for Scottish voting behaviour, therefore, appears to be the strength of national identity, or, to be more specific, a Scottish national identity as opposed to or superior to a British state identity. The same relationship, between national identity and domestic politics, does not exist in England where Englishness is not as politicised as Scottishness is in Scotland. More than 50 per cent of Scots consider themselves either 'Scottish and not British' or Scottish more than British' (Brown et al, 1999). Paterson confirms this, noting that 'All ideological groups in Scotland are predominantly Scottish in their allegiance, while in England Britishness is stronger' (in Curtice et al, 2002: 211). Such conclusions reinforce previous work (Brown, McCrone and Paterson, 1996) which proposes that parties in Scotland which are seen to best represent the interests of Scotland within the UK context are those which reap the electoral rewards. Brown et al (1999: chapter 3) also indicate that Scottish national identity translates into support for parties such as Labour and the SNP, which are perceived as being pro-Scotland, and weak support for the Conservatives, perceived as the least pro-Scottish of the main parties. The Conservatives have previously been able to dominate Scottish politics, but this was at a time (the end of WWI and the mid-1950s) when public opinion perceived Scotland's best interests to be served by the Union. At this time (when Britishness and Empire played strongly in the public's imagination and when Scotland was industrially productive) Scottish Conservatives stressed more collectivist values, such as civic duty and social responsibility (McCrone: 2001: 113). Alternative views to the strongly unionist Tory model arose as the British economic and social situation changed following WWII, as McCrone (2001: 115) observes,



By the 1970s and 1980s, alternative versions of political Scottishness, associated with the SNP and nationalist elements of the Labour Party, sought to emphasise the gulf between Scottish and British national consciousness, rather than their continuity. The ending of empire, of military conscription, together with fifty years without a major war, coupled with the extensive secularisation of Scotland and Britain, combined to erode and enfeeble the connection between Conservatism, Protestantism and British national identity.

Opinion grew that Scotland's union within the UK was not always to its benefit, shifting focus from a British centred identity to a more Scottish one. Correspondingly, antipathy to the union grew, finding political expression in the rise of the SNP during the 1960s and 1970s. More and more Scots began to feel that Scotland's interests were not best served by the Union. During the 1980s and 1990s the Labour Party increasingly turned to embrace devolution. As Thatcherite neo-conservatism increased the ideological gap between Scotland and England, and Scotland's industrial decline continued, the union more than ever began to be seen as less than beneficial to Scotland. Therefore, as social and economic conditions altered, parties were rewarded at the ballot box if they could project policies which the electorate saw as in the interests of their nation. Over time, political parties which are perceived as representing Scottish interests within the UK benefit most in Scottish balloting (Paterson, 2002).

McCrone comments further on this link between national identity and political values,

...if we measure Scottish opinion *vis-à-vis* that in the rest of Britain, we find that Scots are somewhat more likely to be more 'socialist' (as opposed to pro-market), more 'liberal' (as opposed to socially conservative), and less 'British national' (as opposed to Scottish)...Labour voters in Scotland were significantly more left-wing than their English counterparts, and less 'British' in national orientation. There was a clear association between 'Scottish' and having social democratic values which had been building up during the previous twenty years [the period of Conservative rule at Westminster between 1979 and 1997], and which helps to explain why the Conservative Party came to be identified as an 'English' party (reinforced, of course, by its hostility to Home Rule). (2001: 124)

There is no reason why a strong sense of Scottish national identity should be linked to more left-wing and liberal ideologies. National identity is normally seen as something quite 'banal' (Billig, 1995), i.e. a national identity is something which everyone has but, at least within the context of domestic politics, it does not usually gain internal



political significance unless that identity is disputed. However, within the UK political context, clearly British and Scottish, as well as Welsh and Irish/Northern Irish identities are politically significant, as discussed in the introductory chapters. The Scottish-British identity relationship is changing, and within Scotland at least, the Scottish aspect of most people's national identity takes priority, whilst in England a sense of Britishness is more prevalent (Paterson in Curtice et al, 2002: 211). However, as Brown et al suggest 'it is important to remember that in a crucial sense Scottish politics have always been nationalist insofar as Scotland's interests have always been paramount in explaining the success and failure of the parties' (1999: 5). Currently, both the Labour Party and the SNP have been more successful in being perceived to act in Scotland's interests (McCrone, 2001: 125), and both of those parties have linked Scottish national interests (evoking national identity) and left-wing and social democratic views together in their political discourse (Brown et al., 1999: 78). Unsurprisingly then, Scotland's political parties play an important role in delineating the ideological centre-ground and mediating this relationship between national identity and political ideology. So it is the political parties' role that will now be considered.

### *2.3.2 National Identity and Party Politics 'in a Cold Climate'*

Westminster politics has three main parties, Labour, Conservative and Liberal Democrat. Scotland, however, has four with the addition of the SNP who are the second largest party in terms of share of seats at the devolved elections. The Conservatives, far from being the electoral alternative to Labour, as they are in England, are only the third largest party in the Scottish Parliament, lagging far behind the SNP. A significant conservative presence in the devolved parliament is only possible because of the proportional character of an electoral system they opposed (Brown et al, 1999). As the only substantial party of the right in Scotland, the Conservatives find themselves somewhat ideologically isolated, being ill-suited to coalition partnerships with any of the other parties at Holyrood (including the Greens and SSP). The presence of the SNP in Scottish politics clearly differentiates the Scottish political scene from England in terms of both party dominance and the relative importance of nationalist sentiment in domestic political discourse.



Paterson has commented on the effect of the SNP and not the Conservatives being the main opposition to Labour in the ideological centre of Scottish politics, noting that it 'encourages the centre politics to look leftwards rather than to the right, especially in the context of a broadly proportional electoral system' (2002: 216). Add to this the rise of the SSP on the left of the political spectrum and the Scottish Green Party on the libertarian ground, Scotland has additional party competition of a kind not yet found in English politics. The two largest parties of Scottish politics are both left-leaning and more liberal in their ideological position. Therefore, the main ideological competition and resulting policy environment is over the centre-left in Scotland, whereas in England it is more to the right as the Conservatives inject a more right-wing and authoritarian edge to Westminster politics. As McCrone observes,

The key battle ground in Scottish politics lies between Labour and the SNP, Scotland's two major parties. Both are trusted to work in Scotland's interests, and both tap into similar left-of-centre policy preferences. (2001: 125)

McCrone then goes on to note of the two main parties in Scotland, that around two-thirds of each parties' supporters 'give the other party as their second choice, reinforcing the competitive nature of Scottish politics around a similar battleground' (2001: 125). Therefore, in an electoral system which allows for two choices, as with the Scottish Parliament, voters could be voting for both parties, reinforcing both the centre-left parties and those parties which are perceived as acting in Scotland's interests.

Coming sections in this chapter will delineate the policy differences and similarities of the three parties of the Scottish centre. Ideological compatibility is particularly important in a system which is likely to result in a coalition. Therefore having an understanding of what might determine potential patterns of partnership in government, would be useful in understanding the mechanics of Scottish politics and its discursive negotiation. As discussed in the introduction, the three centrist parties in Scotland are in favour of varying degrees of Scottish autonomy within the Union beyond the pre-1999 constitutional arrangement. Labour is the most unionist of the three; being the party at Westminster which delivered devolution it can also still claim to be pro-Scotland. The Liberal Democrats are federalist, and therefore still unionist in the sense that they want to retain Scotland within the UK, but they also wish to create a constitutional symmetry and devolve powers to English regions as well,



within a federalist constitutional framework<sup>5</sup>. The SNP are the only mainstream separatist party advocating independence for Scotland (but with the retention of the Monarchy).

These ideological positions with regard to Scotland's constitutional standing therefore dictate the potential patterns of division and co-operation in Scotland. Though the SNP and Scottish Labour are both more left-wing than the Liberals a coalition partnership between them is precluded by their relative positions on Scottish independence. That is, no coalition is likely in the current political climate, with a pro-unionist Labour Party in office at Westminster. However, a Conservative Westminster based government, with a left-wing consensus presiding in Scotland could create a political atmosphere, as in the 1980s and 90s, where Scotland feels politically misrepresented in the UK. Such a situation could push the Labour Party closer to their nationalist contemporaries, in a bid to retain power in Scotland. If the Conservative Party changes direction and advocates more powers to the Scottish parliament, to regain a foothold in the periphery, this may equally push the other parties of the Scottish centre to advocate even more powers in order to remain to be seen as the most pro-Scotland. However, as things currently stand the Liberals are seen by both Labour and the SNP as the only acceptable coalition partner. There are rumblings in Scotland's quality press that the Scottish Greens are potential third party partners, with the centrist parties, if a situation where a two party coalition still cannot form a majority. Possible coalition became a point of discussion at the Scottish Greens 2005 autumn conference. Nevertheless, in Scotland coalition partnership in the devolved parliament is determined by parties' constitutional preferences for Scotland in addition to ideological compatibility on the left-right and authoritarian-libertarian axis. These patterns of potential coalition again illustrate the political import of Scottish national identity to internal, domestic Scottish politics.

### *2.3.3 From mass values to policy preferences*

Thus far in this section on the political centre-ground in Scotland, how Scotland differs from England in terms of social structure, national identity and party political

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<sup>5</sup> Labour at Westminster had been in favour of devolution to the English regions, including elected mayors and assemblies (with far less powers than the Scottish Parliament). However, extending devolution to the English regions appears to have halted at the time of writing.



representation have been discussed. This chapter suggests these differences account for Scotland's political ethos, which draws on a more centre-left, more liberal and Scottish-centred national identity. The basic theoretical contention of the political scientist who is interested in voting behaviour and political culture is that policy preference stands in relation to underlying political values. Although there may not be a one-to-one relationship between political values and a set of policy preferences, there is necessarily some determining factor at play. That is to say,

policy is the practical effect of values. Thus when people place themselves on a scale running from left to right, the practical political effect of that will be to influence their attitudes to such policy areas as redistributing wealth or supporting comprehensive education. (Brown et al, 1999: 93)

How these ideological differences are made manifest as different policy preferences among the Scottish electorate has not been discussed. Therefore it is to mass public values and their resulting policy preferences that this section now turns. Such a discussion is particularly important within the context of a discussion of the Scottish Parliament, as Brown et al comment,

the whole tenor of the debate about Scottish political distinctiveness over the last two or three decades has been principally about disagreements over policy, and the main agreement for a Scottish Parliament is that it will produce better policy, by which is usually meant policies more in keeping with what people want in Scotland. (1999: 94)

The Scottish Parliament was argued for and established (among other reasons) to better represent Scottish public opinion and translate that opinion into legislation. Bromley and McCrone (in Curtice et al, 2002: 166-195) claim that Scotland is by no means completely uniform in the social attitudes held by its population, and that differences exist from region to region. But there are general national trends that can be identified and which indicate mass social values and policy preferences particularly on the left to right-wing and authoritarian-libertarian scales as identified earlier (Brown et al, 1999: 78).

Scotland's centre-left values resultantly make Scots favour governmental intervention on economic matters, therefore they are:

- More hostile to privatisation of public utilities and correspondingly also more pro the nationalisation of industry, and more likely to support the trade union movement (Bennie, Brand and Mitchell, 1997: 138)
- More disposed to government action on poverty and the redistribution of wealth i.e. through taxation and state benefits (Brown et al, 1999: 99 and Paterson in Curtice et al, 2001: 210-211)
- And more likely to support a minimum wage policy (McCrone, 2001: 124)

On education, Scots are:

- More opposed to selection in state schools than the English electorate (McCrone, 2001: 124)
- And against private sector involvement in education (Brown et al, 1999: 99)

At the international level Scots are more likely than the English to be:

- In favour of the EU social chapter
- And more in favour of giving greater power to Europe (Bennie, Brand and Mitchell, 1997: 138, Brown et al, 1999: 99 and McCrone, 2001: 124)

However, it is more a case of Scots being a little less anti-Europe, with slight majorities on the left, the right and in the centre still not favouring the Euro (Paterson, 2001: 211).

Therefore, there are significant differences between Scotland and England, covering far reaching and strategic aspects of policy, on the economy, on education and on aspects of international affairs. In relation to the Scottish Parliament, however, and its ability to translate Scottish political values into desired policy preferences there may be a problem. As Brown et al postulate,

The striking point, though, is that – with the exception of education – the differences are not mainly in areas which will be within the powers of the Scottish Parliament. They mainly concern the overall structure of taxation, large-scale redistribution, and even some areas of foreign affairs. (1999: 100)

On the face of it political parties in Scotland face a difficulty in that the devolved powers of the Parliament are insufficient to deliver the policy changes desired by the Scottish electorate. However, as the following sections in this chapter and the discussion in chapter 3 on the 2003 party manifesto will show, the parties of the Scottish centre do attempt to address all of the above areas of policy: in doing so the



parties do not always choose to frame policy issues within the defined context of the devolution settlement.

## 2.4 Manifesto Statements of the Scottish Centre

The preceding section discussed the ideological centre of Scottish politics from several perspectives, including social and party political differences between Scotland and England, and resulting public opinion. Together this has given an overview of the ideological centre in terms of mass public opinion and party political competition. This section will consider the three centre parties of Scottish politics (as defined above), to investigate how the centre-ground is classified by looking at manifesto policy statements. Such an investigation will illustrate how party representation related to public opinion, and therefore how closely party political ideology matched public opinion, in the 2003 Scottish Parliament election. One might not expect an exact match between the public and their representatives as there is a tradition of political representatives leading as well as representing public opinion. The difference between public opinion and mainstream political opinion on capital punishment is a case in point. The political establishment is against whereas opinion polls tend to show a majority of the UK public in support of the death penalty. However, as mentioned above the tenor of the argument for a Scottish Parliament was that Scotland had a different political culture at both the public and party political level, and therefore one would expect to see some ideological fit between the two expressed in political discourse.

As discussed above, the SNP are the main opposition to the Labour Party in Scotland, not the Conservatives. Along with the Liberal Democrats there are three mainstream parties occupying the ideological centre in Scotland. The centre would therefore appear quite crowded, with all three parties reflecting the broad ideological preferences of the centre-left electorate. If they all sit in the centre ground then it is legitimate to ask, what is the difference between them or conversely are their policies the same? The similarity of the parties was a prominent enough issue for Jack McConnell to address it in the introduction to Labour's manifesto.

The choice Scotland faces in the election of May 1 is not a personality contest between people with the same priorities, not a potluck between parties who

have the same policies, and not incidental to the future of our country.  
Politicians are not the same and parties do have different priorities. (2003: 5)

What follows will illustrate that one can define areas of significant similarity but as indicated above there are also key areas of disagreement. Both areas of similarity and disagreement help differentiate Scottish politics from politics south of the Border. As much as possible, the rest of this chapter will focus on policy details as well as general policy statements, such as a commitment to increased spending on health, education and policing. The reason for a concern for details of policy proposals (where this is possible as detail is not always given) is one might assume that if the parties share similar ideological ground they will not only share a desire for similar ends but also similar means to those ends.

The following comparisons, for convenience of analysis, are made in seven areas:

- Health
- Education
- Law and order
- Economy and finance
- Democracy
- Agriculture/aquaculture
- Environment

In their manifestos the parties do not always categorise the following policies within the same areas as this analysis – for example policies on bureaucracy and Private Finance Initiatives/Public Private Partnerships (PFI/PPP) can and are found throughout manifestos, funding different policies. Generally speaking the policy areas discussed below represent areas of devolved concern, for example educational matters such as class sizes and undergraduate university student funding, or on health issues such as the recruitment of NHS staff and hospital funding. That is not to say, however, that matters which technically lie outwith the gift of the Scottish Parliament are not discussed. Such *ultra vires* policies, perhaps unsurprisingly, coalesce around the range of the parliament's powers or the very status of the parliament as a non-sovereign body. Therefore, unionist and nationalist sentiments will be shown to play a defining role in Scottish politics, contributing to the ideological negotiation of the centre ground.



### 2.4.1 Health

On nurses' pay and recruitment all three parties of the centre articulate policies which advocate the increased recruitment of nurses into the National Health Service, as well as better pay. The Labour Party claim to have 'increased the number of qualified nurses by 1,700' (2003: 21) and will continue their programme to 'recruit and train 11,000 nurses and midwives' (2003: 25) by 2005. Labour state this policy raises their original target by 1,500: they commit to giving nurses a 10 percent pay rise over three years. The Liberal Democrats commit themselves to 2,000 extra nurses (2003: 3) and better training conditions for them, while the SNP want to retain more nurses and midwives by giving them an 11 percent pay rise. This pay rise, they claim will also result in increasing numbers of student nurses completing their degrees, thereby increasing overall nursing numbers (2003: 5).

The Liberal Democrats and Labour share their commitment to the so called 'free personal care for the elderly' policy. Both point to the policy as an example which positively characterises the actions of their respective in-groups. This free care policy originally emanated from the Liberal Democrats and Scottish Labour were 'reluctant converts' (Paterson, 2002: 206). This policy was a major legislative moment of the first parliamentary session, and was a provision that the Westminster government did not emulate, rejecting the policy as uneconomic. Paterson claims, on evidence from the *Scottish Social Attitudes Survey 2000* and the *British Social Attitudes Survey 2000*, that,

The overwhelming majority of people in all ideological groups believe that it is definitely the government's responsibility to maintain the living standards of old people... Indeed, in the centre and on the right, the support in Scotland for this is firmer than in England: 88 per cent as against 81 per cent in the centre, and 76 per cent against 71 per cent on the right. Although the question as asked in the survey was a general one, not relating specifically to the costs of long-term care, the pattern of views... suggest that any government action to help old people would be welcomed in Scotland, especially in the centre and on the left. (2002: 206)

Within this context the SNP's lack of criticism is unsurprising as it was policy they actually supported through the parliament, but they are also not forthcoming with explicit praise for the policy.



### 2.4.2 Education

Labour and Liberal Democrats abolished tuition fees in the first parliamentary session, established the graduate endowment and reintroduced grants for university students. The Liberal Democrats pledged they wanted to ‘Increase the funding of Further and Higher Education in Scotland above inflation over the lifetime of the next Parliament’ (2003: 17). Labour stated that they also committed to an increase of 15 percent in the higher and further education budget by 2006 (2003: 8). Although, the SNP would, abolish the graduate endowment – stating it ‘remains absolutely committed to the principle of free education’ (2003: 13) and ‘will work to ensure a more comprehensive, coherent and fair national system of student welfare funding’ (2003: 13) – all three parties oppose the introduction of tuition fees in their manifestos and state a commitment to achieving a ‘high skilled’ economy through further and higher education<sup>6</sup>. Therefore, the centre of Scottish politics certainly shares much on education, not least a commitment to a high skilled workforce and hostility to tuition fees. However, on the detail of how to achieve a high skilled work force there is both agreement and disagreement among the parties. Labour and the Liberal Democrats share a policy on undergraduate student funding, perhaps unsurprisingly after four years of coalition; whereas the SNP disagree with both the other two parties of the centre on this point of policy. Paterson (2002: 203-204) notes that a majority of people in all ideological groups, left, centre and right, in both Scotland and England favour means-tested fees. The UK government, on this point at least are in step with public opinion north and south of the boarder.

All three of the centre left parties pledge to reduce class sizes. The SNP commit to reduce class sizes to eighteen or below within five years for the first three years of primary school (2003: 11); Labour focus on secondary education, promising to ‘reduce class sizes to a maximum of 20 in S1 and S2 for Maths and English’ (2003: 20); while the Liberal Democrats claim they will ‘use the expected fall in school rolls

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<sup>6</sup> ‘Building our skill base and focusing on science, research, ideas and knowledge is central to Scotland’s future economic growth. That is why we are committed to increasing the higher and further education budget by 15 per cent by 2006.’ (*Scottish Labour: On your side*, 2003: 8)

‘The SNP believes that Scotland’s future success must lie in drawing the right lessons from our past and investing in a highly skilled and educated workforce.’ (*SNP: Release our potential*, 2003: 12)

‘Scotland’s universities and colleges are vital drivers both of our economic future and of the achievement of a liberal, well-educated and articulate society.’ (*Scottish Liberal Democrats: Make the Difference*, 2003: 17)



to cut class sizes' (2003: 18 *Make education for life*). The Liberal Democrats also claim they will reduce class sizes by recruiting 3,000 extra teachers (2003: 18 *Make education for life*). Similarly Labour pledge to recruit 2,500 more teachers (2003: 20). The SNP however make no explicit commitment to recruit more teachers; this may be a logical implication if they wish to reduce class sizes but the reader can only assume this to be so.

Labour and the Liberal Democrats both claim credit for free nursery places for three and four year olds. Labour state 'The right start comes with our commitment to maintain free nursery places for every 3 and 4 year old in Scotland' (2003: 17). While the Liberal Democrats expand on their policy commitment,

Accessible, flexible and comprehensive childcare is important in tackling inequality and poverty and equipping people for work... We will: Aim to create flexible childcare provision accessible to all, building on the achievement of nursery school provision for children of three and four, expanding childcare facilities, particularly in the public sector and through co-operative arrangements.' (2003: 35)

The SNP demonstrate a consensus amongst the three parties of the Scottish centre stating 'Welcome progress has been made with nursery education' (2003: 11). Like the Liberal Democrats they go on to pledge to expand on state supported childcare 'by introducing a series of pilot childcare projects' (2003: 10).

#### *2.4.3 Law & Order*

As with teachers and nurses all three parties of the Scottish centre pledge to find funding to employ more police officers, specifically in the area of visible policing. Labour give no specific figures but say they will 'significantly increase the number of police officers on operational duty in every Scottish Force' (2003: 29) and increase funding for support staff and technology to free up more officers for the beat. Recruiting 3,500 officers over the four year parliament is the goal of the Liberal Democrats (2003: 21 and 24); while the SNP set their target at 1,000 more officers on the streets (2003: 9). Therefore, although the parties differ in how much they would increase the numbers of officers on the beat, they share a commitment to visible policing as an effective way to cut crime.

The topic of youth crime features strongly in the law and order sections of all three centre left parties. Labour state 'Youth crime is a particular challenge' (2003: 30); the SNP agree saying 'Youth crime is a growing problem in many of our communities' (2003: 9); and the Liberal Democrats confirm the consensus pledging to cut youth crime and asserting that 'More than 30 per cent of recorded crime is committed by young people. Addressing criminal behaviour at an early stage will help cut crime now and in the future' (2003: 22). As well as sharing a sentiment that youth crime is a problem, Labour, the SNP and the Liberal Democrats have similar policies, with which they propose to deal with the problem. All three parties suggest review and reform of the legal systems for dealing with young offenders: Labour calls for the modernisation of the Children's Hearing System (2003: 30), expansion of youth courts and 'fast-track' Children's Hearings (2003: 31); the SNP similarly recommends 'tougher sanctions for persistent young offenders' and more options given to Children's Panels (2003: 9); while the Liberal Democrat propose a programme to 'continue to expand the availability of sentences that work to stop reoffending, seeking to divert young people from a life of crime' and to 'Improve the information given to panels and judges on the availability of non-custodial facilities.' (2003: 23-24). All three centre parties identify a need for secure accommodation for young offenders: Labour wish to increase the number of places by 125; the SNP commit themselves to doubling the number of secure places available in Scotland; and the Liberal Democrats state 'for the most persistent and serious young offenders, secure accommodation is appropriate. We will devote more resources to making secure accommodation better at reducing reoffending than it does at present' (2003: 24). Again there is a consensus in the Scottish-centre, which identifies parental responsibility as important in dealing with young offenders. Labour propose the introduction of Parental Orders to 'make parents accept responsibility for their children' (2003: 31); the SNP propose similar orders called Parental Compensation Orders (2003: 9); the Liberal Democrats differ slightly, wishing to 'Promote parental responsibility through voluntary measures' (2003: 24) and not legal action.

The SNP indicate a consensus between the centre parties in dealing with narcotic offences with 'In 1999 the SNP pioneered the idea of Drug Courts as an effective way of tackling drug related crime. Over the last term of Parliament, the Labour-LibDem coalition introduced this concept with positive results' (2003: 9).



Rehabilitation features as a part of Labour, the SNP and the Liberal Democrats' strategies to deal with crime. The SNP proclaim their position with 'It is vital that we create conditions in prisons that aid the rehabilitation of prisoners and cut re-offending' (2003: 10): both Labour and the Liberal Democrats express similar sentiments in their own manifestos. However, there is a rhetorical difference between Labour and the Liberal Democrats: Labour (2003: 29-30) foreground the punishment aspect of judicial redress, followed by a commitment to rehabilitation of offenders<sup>7</sup>: whereas the Liberal Democrats (2003: 22-23) do the opposite<sup>8</sup>. Labour identifies rehabilitation specifically with programmes to end drug addiction, rather than issues connected with custodial provision, poverty and equality of opportunity (or at least these alternatives are not present in their manifesto). The Liberal Democrats express policies which aim to deal with offender rehabilitation within the context of custodial sentences and with what they refer to vaguely as 'increasing the range and availability of programmes to stop reoffending' (2003: 22). The level of ambiguity and lack of detail in this policy area affords all three parties a great deal of rhetorical latitude in terms of agreement or disagreement, as there is little explicitly stated with which to pin them down.

Both the Labour Party and the Liberal Democrats suggest the extension of the scheme of restorative justice. Labour prefer to introduce a policy of Community Reparation Programmes 'to make the offender repair the community they have harmed' (2003: 31), while the Liberal Democrats want to bring young offenders 'face to face with the consequences of their actions' (2003: 23). The SNP make no pledges in their manifesto on the restorative justice issue.

There is concord between Labour and the Liberal Democrats over victims' rights/victim support. Both parties supply detail rather than just a commitment. Labour express their intentions at least twice, 'We will strengthen support for victims' (2003: 29), and 'In the second term we will keep up the pressure on criminals and increase the support we give to local communities and to victims of crime' (2003: 29). The Liberal Democratss make similar proclamations, '[we will] Improve the rights of victims' (2003: 21), 'Give particular support to victims of crime, both in relation to

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<sup>7</sup> 'For those who commit crime there must be effective and swift punishment but this must also be matched by the chance for them to change, so they live law abiding lives alongside the vast majority of our citizens.' (*Scottish Labour: On your side* 2003: 29-30)

<sup>8</sup> 'Effective rehabilitation to cut crime. Prisons are appropriate for many offenders and offences. But they can turn lesser offenders in to more serious criminals. We seek to prevent reoffending.' (*Scottish Liberal Democrats: Make the Difference* 2003: 22)

court cases and as they return their lives to normal.' (2003: 22) and 'We have significantly improved the treatment of victims in the last four years. We will build on this, making sure the justice system protects victims' (2003: 25).

Labour identify privacy protection and specialisation of prosecution procedures in relation to victims of violent and sexual offences (2003: 29) and consultation on issuing bail and remand in relation to protecting vulnerable communities (2003: 29) as specific policies which will protect the victims of crime. Liberal Democrats proposed to increase victims' rights through:

- Additional support for the court process and beyond
- Provision of more information to victims about legal process and decisions
- And for vulnerable groups such as children through new additional legislative provisions (2003: 25).

Therefore, there is a great deal Labour and the Liberal Democrats can agree on with regard to the victims' rights agenda.

#### *2.4.4 Economy and Finance*

Economic and public funding issues are an area of policy which overarches all other policy areas. The discussion of policies related to finance come under five headings:

- Funding projects, principally PPP/PFI finance projects
- Benefits funding, centred around fuel poverty
- Bureaucracy or waste in the public services
- Tax varying powers and the Barnett Formula
- Privatisation of public utilities, specifically the water industry.

All three parties share an ideological belief in the importance of state-funded public services. There are aspects of policy they all agree on, or on which they are close to each other but there are also notable areas of disagreement.

The use of PPP/PFI projects as a method of public funding is a good example of the degrees of agreement and disagreement on some policy areas between the centre parties. PPP/PFI funding projects cut across many policy areas and are most closely associated with large scale public infrastructure investment such as building schools, hospitals, prisons and motorways. Whether one refers to the projects as PPP or PFI indicates either support or hostility towards this system of public funding provision. PPP clearly indicates the 'public' aspect of the funding projects; this term



was adopted after similar earlier funding projects called Private Finance Initiatives. The SNP, who are against PPP/PFI funding projects, use the latter term which more clearly indicates the ‘private’ sector involvement in public funding initiatives. Both Labour and the Liberal Democrats state a commitment to PPP but they do so in rhetorically different ways. For example, Labour actually give very little space to discussing PPP, but when they do it is entirely positive<sup>9</sup>, framing the use of PPP in terms of value for money in public expenditure, and contrasted with what they denote as 18 years of underinvestment by the Conservatives. PPPs are said to bring ‘results’ and ‘quality’ to public projects. The Liberal Democrats dedicate more space to discussing PPPs and begin by addressing ‘the debate’ on the involvement of the private sector in public service provision.

The debate about public as opposed to private provision is often misleading: there are some services that are best delivered by the state while others may be better delivered by private, voluntary or mutual organisations. (2003: 12)

The Liberal Democrats go on to stress the public and non-profit (i.e. voluntary and charitable organisations) aspects of the PPP provision, explicitly connecting this with ‘efficiency’. For example,

It is important that people get the best services in the most financially efficient way. We will:

- Encourage greater choice in the provision of new capital for public services, by supporting the development of mutual organisations and non-profit distributing organisations to build and maintain public assets.
- Seek to change Treasury rules to allow public authorities to borrow money and issue bonds, and ensure that rules relating to Public Private Partnerships enable different types of funding to compete on equal terms. This will create a range of options for public authorities considering capital investment, including traditional public procurement’. (*Scottish Liberal Democrats: Make the Difference* 2003: 12)

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<sup>9</sup> ‘Our responsibility is to get the best value from every public pound we spend. For over 18 years our public service infrastructure was under-funded and run down. We have invested through Public Private Partnerships in a way that brought results in new and refurbished infrastructure. Quality rebuilding that minimised the risk to public money and delivered projects on time and on budget. Labour will continue to support PPP and other innovative models.’ (*Scottish Labour: on your side*, 2003: 15)



Foregrounding public bodies, like the Scottish Executive and local authorities (2003: 27) and non-profit organisations in the discussion of PPP, rhetorically stresses the 'public' facets of Public-Private Partnerships.

The SNP do not share a positive attitude towards PPP/PFI projects, portraying them as 'privatisation' (2003: 5). Rather than these projects being value for money and efficient as Labour claim, the SNP define them as 'an expensive privatisation project' (2003: 5). Here the 'private' as opposed to the 'public' aspects of the funding projects are emphasised, for example,

Under this scheme, schools and hospitals are no longer owned by the public sector – they are transferred to a private consortium. Consequently, they are run for profit rather than the public good. By this route, money intended to pay for public services leaves the system to pay excess private profits... We reject this notion of PFI-privatisation. Scotland deserves better, and we will pursue policies that put public service before profit. (2005: 5)

There are explicit contrasts made between public and private, where 'the public good' is disposed of at the expense of 'excess private profits'. Instead of being a method of producing efficiency in the public sector the SNP believe PPP/PFI is the cause of inefficiency and poor service<sup>10</sup>. Whereas Labour present PPP/PFI as a means to an end in terms of producing the public good, the SNP characterise it as a bar to it. The SNP's alternative policy is Not for Profit Trusts<sup>11</sup>. Therefore, the two main parties of the centre disagree on this policy initiative, whereas the Liberal Democrats support the policy but more clearly espouse the policy framed in terms of public and non-profit aspects.

There is a consensus in the centre over government intervention to reduce fuel poverty. All three parties commit themselves to an extension of schemes brought in during the Scottish Parliament's first term under the Liberal-Labour coalition. As discussed above, demographically Scotland is more disposed to government

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<sup>10</sup> 'PFI-privatisation is one reason why the number of NHS beds has fallen –but it is a trend we are committed to reverse'. (*SNP: Release our potential*, 2003: 8)

<sup>11</sup> 'We reject this notion of PFI-privatisation. Scotland deserves better, and we will pursue policies that put public service before profit. We propose the use of Not for Profit Trusts for the provision of public sector assets. These would allow the main issues of ownership, control and finance to be addressed. Under our proposals, the assets would not be owned by a private consortium, whose first motivation was profit, but by a trust, whose first priority was public service. This would ensure that the asset was run for the benefit of the community. It would also mean that instead of being creamed off to pay excess profit, public money was channelled back in to the provision of services.' (*SNP: Release our potential*, 2003: 5)



intervention to reduce poverty; therefore all three parties of the centre are in line with public opinion. They differ in regard to the focus of policy: Labour intend to target the elderly (2003: 34); the SNP also target the elderly as well as the disabled and families with young children (2003: 25) while the Liberal Democrats also aim at those with a disability (2003: 40).

It was asserted in the previous section that the Scottish electorate are more hostile than their English counterparts to the privatisation of public utilities. In connection to Scottish Water the three centrist parties appear to be in tune with their electorate and each other. Although Labour is the only party to explicitly state they will not privatise Scottish Water<sup>12</sup>, the Liberal Democrats<sup>13</sup> and the SNP<sup>14</sup> make supportive policy statements with regard to the publicly run utility, which suggests that they would oppose privatisation. Over how the utility would be run and financed the parties do differ, with the SNP opposing PPP/PFI models and proposing to ‘amalgamate the offices of the Water Commissioner and the Water Regulator’ (2003: 23), while the Liberal Democrats suggest the implementation of the Environment and Water Services Act to ‘ensure the sustainable management and integration of all policies affecting Scotland’s water environment’ (2003: 31).

All three parties of the Scottish centre address bureaucracy in government in their manifestos. Bureaucracy could have come under policy issues connected with democracy because the issue might be discussed in terms of effective and accountable government and/or access to services. However, the issue is often framed in terms of financial waste, which also produces the democratic deficiencies. Bureaucracy is conceptualized by the centre parties’ manifestos as an issue which cuts across many areas of government, including health, children’s services, community support, government and its agencies and education. As such, policies to combat bureaucracy are found throughout the manifestos, in various policy sections. They have been drawn together as one area of discussion here because bureaucracy or waste seems to

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<sup>12</sup> ‘We will not privatise Scottish Water and we will support it with the resources necessary to invest in our public water and sewerage services so that they meet health standards’ (*Scottish Labour: On your side*, 2003: 35)

<sup>13</sup> ‘Implement the water Environment and Water Services Act to ensure the sustainable management and integration of all policies affecting Scotland’s water environment...’ (*Scottish Liberal Democrats: Make the Difference*, 2003: 31)

<sup>14</sup> ‘Infrastructure investment is needed, yet the current models for investment (including PFI-privatisation) have failed to deliver the level of improvement needed and have hit consumers hard in the pockets. Consumers in Scotland need a tough new champion to protect their interests. We will amalgamate the offices of the Water Commissioner and the Water Regulator to give consumers protection’. (*SNP: Release our potential*, 2003: 23)



form a general issue, which like funding programmes (like PPP/PFI), is reducible to a general ideological principle to reduce bureaucracy in the system of government. The SNP identifies bureaucracy as affecting front-line services in the NHS (2003: 6-7): academic assessment in schools (2003: 11): and in the public sector and government where bureaucracy is claimed to produce a democratic deficit and affect the use of public services<sup>15</sup>.

Educating children with special needs (*Scottish Labour: On your side*, 2003: 20), patient care in the NHS (*Scottish Labour: On your side*, 2003: 26) and drug addiction support (*Scottish Labour: On your side*, 2003: 29-30) are some of the issues affected by bureaucracy which Labour propose to address in the next parliament. Like the SNP, Labour also recognise the need to act against bureaucracy in government for example they state, 'we will act to end duplication, buck-passing and waste wherever it exists – whether it is in Scotland's devolved government or in its agencies' (2003: 40). Patient service, specifically hospital waiting times is noted by the Liberal Democrats, like Labour and the SNP, as unduly subject to bureaucratic constraint. They, the Liberal Democrats, propose to abolish hospital trusts to remove a layer of bureaucracy giving more power to primary health care providers (2003: 5, 7). Liberal Democrats agree with the SNP that bureaucracy affects academic assessment in schools (2003: 19) and they concur with the other two parties of the centre on the need for government to limit bureaucratic waste<sup>16</sup>, but also suggest that 'the bureaucracy of government has adjusted rapidly to devolution' (2003: 11) and that governmental bureaucracy is really the fault of Westminster and Whitehall (2003: 11).

A great deal of similarity can be seen between the parties of the Scottish centre over the need to cut bureaucracy and which areas of concern it affects. There is, however, very little in the way of blame for bureaucracy assigned by any of these parties. The Liberal Democrats do criticise external political bodies in London and by implication the SNP is critiquing current government policy. However, all three

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<sup>15</sup> 'We want to make the unaccountable accountable, and we want to reduce unnecessary public sector bureaucracy by transferring powers from unelected quangos to democratically elected councillors'. (*SNP: Release our potential*, 2003: 26)

'We will cut the size of government, starting with a smaller Cabinet and less ministers. And we will abolish unnecessary tiers of unelected, unaccountable public bodies and release resources from excess bureaucracy'. (*SNP: Release our potential*, 2003: 26)

'Cutting government down to size would reclaim our public services for the people'. (*SNP: Release our potential*, 2003: 30)

<sup>16</sup> 'Scottish Liberal Democrats believe that government both central and local has a duty to taxpayers to spend their money effectively and wisely. (*Scottish Liberal Democrats: Make the Difference*, 2003: 11)



parties are of the centre-left and therefore not traditionally committed to 'rolling back the state' in the sense Conservatives mean to make government smaller. None of the Scottish centre parties really conceive of bureaucracy in the neo-Conservative sense, rather they frame it in terms of waste and inefficiency that hinders the delivery of public services.

On taxation policy there is again a great deal of agreement in the centre-ground, but also notable disagreement depending on the context in which taxation is being framed. As was illustrated above, Scots have been shown to have different policy expectations than those in England and that some of those expectations appear to fall outside the remit of the Scottish Parliament. The Parliament currently only has very limited taxation powers, nevertheless the centrist parties, especially the Liberal Democrats and SNP, still present policies on taxation. What is evident from comparing the manifestos is that even though many of the powers associated with general taxation lie outwith the parliament the parties can still debate on the issues by the way they choose to frame the debate. For example, there is a three way consensus on not using the limited tax varying powers within the current devolved situation<sup>17</sup>. This consensus is a qualified one for both the Liberal Democrats and the SNP. For the Liberal Democrats not using tax varying powers is conditional on there not being a change of economic or political circumstances at the UK level (2003: 12). By a change of government at Westminster the Liberal Democrats refer to the Conservatives who may wish to reduce expenditure on public services and/or cut taxes, which would run against the centre-left consensus in Scotland. Non use of taxation powers is context dependent for the SNP as well; under the constitutional status quo of a devolved Scotland they would not use the powers (2003: 3-4).

Other similarities over finance exist as both Labour (*Labour: On your side*: 2003: 40) and the Liberal Democrats (*Liberal Democrats: Make the Difference*, 2003: 11) support the maintenance of the Barnett Formula<sup>18</sup>; however, the SNP and Liberal

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<sup>17</sup> 'We will not use the income tax varying power of the Scottish Parliament' (*Scottish Labour: On your side*, 2003: 40)

'The SNP will not increase income tax. You are already paying higher taxes for public services'. (*SNP: Release our potential*, 2003: 4)

'We do not propose to use the tax-varying power.' (*Scottish Liberal Democrats: Make the Difference*, 2003: 12)

<sup>18</sup> The Barnett Formula was developed in 1978 by the Chief Secretary of the Treasury, Joel Barnett and came into operation in 1980. Bogdanor explains that the 'formula entails that public expenditure in Scotland, Wales, and Northern Ireland is driven by the level of public expenditure in England, since it is the change in the English Level, agreed by English departmental ministers in Cabinet, which



Democrats also differ from Labour on other finance policies. The Liberal Democrats and the SNP appear to concur over business rates: the Liberal Democrats advocate reform of local government to 'allow local authorities power over business rates – including the power to reduce them to attract business' (2003: 33); and the SNP state 'We will reduce Scottish business rates to below the UK rate within the first term of our government' (2003: 4).

A significant divergence over fiscal policy between the parties of the centre occurs when the SNP refer to Scottish independence; clearly political and therefore fiscal autonomy is a markedly different ideological and policy position between the SNP and the other two centre parties of Scotland. Therefore, the parties of the Scottish centre, when discussing financial policy at devolved elections, can evoke different contexts to discuss policies which are *ultra vires*. This is particularly so with the SNP, who at devolved elections are at least in part campaigning for Scottish Independence. In a similar vein Scottish Labour evoke Labour's economic record in the UK political context<sup>19</sup> even though governance at the UK is not the issue at the devolved level i.e. Labour Scottish Executive ministers cannot claim individual credit for measures taken in the Cabinet at Westminster. Therefore, over issues to do with taxation, although one can observe notable agreement one can equally see that Scotland's constitutional status still plays a large role in framing the debate at devolved elections.

#### 2.4.5 Democracy

Devolution of power to communities and public services and choice for the public in the use of those public services form a large part of all three centre parties' democratic agendas. Electoral reform of local authority elections is also shared by two of the three parties of the centre.

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determines the sum available to other parts of the United Kingdom' (Bogdanor, 2001: 243). The formula is a contentious issue as some view it as Scotland getting its fair share (or more than), while the SNP have based much of their argument for Independence on Scotland not getting its fair share, 'Scotland's oil' being a case in point.

<sup>19</sup> 'We will use the opportunity provided by the strength of the UK economy with the lowest interest rates, inflation and unemployment of my adult life, to invest in the future' (*Scottish Labour: On your side*, 2003: 4) and

'Devolution offers Scottish business the best of both worlds. The sound management of the UK economy by Labour and the independence of the Bank of England have shown us that our future need not be tied to the roller coaster, boom and bust economics of yesterday' (*Scottish Labour: On your side*, 2003: 6)



Labour and the SNP make similar broad statements about the need to devolve power in the running of the public services, however, the tenor of those statements differs in terms of the nature of the devolution. Labour's commitments focus on empowering those who work in education and health care sectors<sup>20</sup>, whereas the SNP concentrate on those who use those services<sup>21</sup>. The Liberal Democrats propose a similar policy to Labour over devolving power in education, stating '[We will] Devolve more power down to schools, including more budgetary control for head teachers' (2003: 20) and also pledge to empower people and their communities, but unlike the SNP this is less specifically for the use of public services but for community regeneration<sup>22</sup>.

Proportional representation (PR), for local authority elections, features as a policy commitment for both the SNP (2003: 27) and the Liberal Democrats (2003: 33); both parties share a longstanding commitment to a reduction of the voting age to 16. These positions on PR for local government are not advocated by Scottish Labour; a change in the electoral system would enact a tremendous effect on the composition of

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<sup>20</sup> 'We have taken the first steps to devolve decision making to those at the front line [of public services]' (*Scottish Labour: On your side*, 2003: 15)

'In our first four years, we have worked hard to devolve responsibility and decision making to our head teachers. In the next four years we will do more so that they have responsibility for 90 per cent of the school budget through devolved school management. We will introduce greater flexibility for schools and education authorities'. (2003: 17)

'We will enhance the head teacher's role by devolving 90% of decision making on the school budget' (*Scottish Labour: On your side*, 2003: 18)

'Our commitment to devolving power and decision making to front line public sector staff is seen clearly in the approach we are actively taking to modernise our health service and put the patient at its heart'. (*Scottish Labour: On your side*, 2003: 24)

<sup>21</sup> 'public services should be under the control of the communities who use them'. (*SNP: Release our potential*, 2003: 5)

'There are also some vital structural reforms to undertake which will strengthen the delivery of healthcare nationwide. We want to simplify the structure and create a more accountable and transparent service, with devolved powers to allow communities to shape services according to their needs'. (*SNP: Release our potential*, 2003: 8)

'The SNP does not believe that politicians should have exclusive ownership of education policy. That is why we re-affirm our commitment to establishing an Education Convention consisting of representatives of teachers, parents, pupils, employers and wider civic Scotland'. (*SNP: Release our potential*, 2003: 12)

<sup>22</sup> 'Scottish Liberal Democrats aim to empower people and communities to help themselves to achieve their fullest potential... We will:

- Make people's votes count by introducing the proportional Single Transferable Vote for Local Governance Bill. Councils must be far more accountable to the people who elect them.
- Reform local government finance. Replace council tax with a local income tax related to ability to pay and allow local authorities power over business rates – including the power to reduce them to attract business.' (*Scottish Liberal Democrats: Make the Difference*, 2003: 33)

'Giving people power over their homes and communities. People are the key to community regeneration. We will help the homeless and support people in all types of housing tenure to improve their homes and communities to suit their needs'. (*Scottish Liberal Democrats: Make the Difference*, 2003: 39)



local councils, many of which are currently dominated by the Labour Party. One major policy not mentioned here is the SNP's policy over independence which is clearly one connected with democracy, but which has been discussed in other areas of this and other chapters.

Labour, the SNP and the Liberal Democrats share a commitment to choice in education. Labour<sup>23</sup> and the SNP<sup>24</sup> focus on choice for children while the Liberal Democrats<sup>25</sup> also include parental choice. The three parties propose to increase or enhance pupil choice in relation to their curriculum, the SNP and Labour specifically identifying vocational training in comprehensive education. The Liberal Democrats also propose to increase choice in the funding of public service provision (2003: 12, 33), emphasising the non-profit agents in PPP funding discussed above.

Powers of international affairs are not devolved to the Scottish Parliament, yet all three parties on the centre ground dedicate space in their manifesto to discussing Europe. They make positive statements with regard to the European Union, but again it is the parties' relative positions on Scottish independence that is of central importance in differentiating them. All articulate positive statements about working with other EU member states<sup>26</sup>. The Liberal Democrats and Labour both make representations for working positively for Scotland in Europe for business and for representing Scottish needs in European legislation: they do this, however, within the rubric of constitutional union in the United Kingdom<sup>27</sup>. In contrast, the SNP argue for

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<sup>23</sup> 'We will improve the comprehensive system with increased pupil choice' (*Scottish Labour: On your side*, 2003: 17).

<sup>24</sup> 'We will initiate a major consultation on extending pupil choice' (*SNP: Release our potential*, 2003: 11).

<sup>25</sup> 'Enhance education choices and opportunities, involving parents and seeking to empower children by involving them in decisions about their personal curriculum, while ensuring that literacy and numeracy remain central'. (*Scottish Liberal Democrats: Make the Difference*, 2003: 18)

'We seek to involve parents more constructively in the education of their children and empower children by giving them more choice in a diverse curriculum'. (*Scottish Liberal Democrats: Make the Difference*, 2003: 18)

<sup>26</sup> 'We support the enlargement Europe and will work with the EU Accession States to develop close links between Scotland and the new EU members' (*Scottish Labour: On your side*, 2003: 42)

'we will increase our links to Europe and the wider world'. (*SNP: Release our potential*, 2003: 2)

'We will: Build on the interest the establishment of the Scottish Parliament has generated by forging links with new EU members states and developing countries'. (*Scottish Liberal Democrats: Make the Difference*, 2003: 11)

<sup>27</sup> 'We will ensure that the Scottish Parliament plays an increasing role in helping to scrutinise European legislation. We will work to represent Scotland in the EU, both directly and through the strength of the UK government. We will continue to champion Scotland's interests in appropriate Council meetings of the EU and inside the UK and will work with Scotland's MEPs to help promote a united voice in the European Parliament'. (*Scottish Labour: On your side*, 2003: 42)



independence in Europe<sup>28</sup>, which they argue would give Scotland their rightful level of representation and a greater opportunity at prosperity. In this respect, the SNP are off public opinion as a majority of Scots do not favour further European integration. As noted above, slight majorities in each ideological group are opposed to the Euro and of ceding further powers to the EU (Curtice et al., 2002). The Liberal Democrats are also off public opinion over the Euro; they are more clearly committed than Labour to the introduction of the Euro<sup>29</sup>.

#### 2.4.6 Agriculture/Aquaculture

The decline of rural fishing communities became a notable campaign issue during the 2003 election campaign, and related strongly to the above issue of Europe and the associated Common Fisheries Policy (CFP). Again, one can see striking levels of similarity between the centre parties is over how they propose to deal with the problems of rural fishing communities; and again where there are differences they can be drawn from ideological differences over Scottish independence. All three parties call for reform of the CFP. Alongside reform of CFP, all three argue for more local management of offshore fishing, creating a sustainable industry and support for the fishing industry and its coastal communities. On support Labour notes they are already delivering short term aid but also that they will assist in part by aiding fishing in diversifying the economy of the local communities. They state,

To aid the sustainable diversification of these communities and meet public health demands we will support the development and marketing of commercial salmon market and the emerging markets of shellfish and new marine fin-fish (2003: 14)

Labour speak of a move to a 'sustainable diversification' of the local fishing economy along side sustainable (preferably) local management of fish stocks. The Liberal

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<sup>28</sup> 'Other small European counties have the power to compete on their own terms. They are led by politicians whose utmost priority is creating a better future for their people and their country. They have the advantage of sitting at Europe's top table and of arguing for their own interests and industries'. (*SNP: Release our potential*, 2003: 4)

'Independence in Europe is our gateway to the representation we deserve. With independence, our Ministers will sit at the top table in Europe fighting for the best deal for Scotland'. (*SNP: Release our potential*, 2003: 24)

<sup>29</sup> 'We will: Encourage Scottish business, large and small, to accept the Euro where appropriate, prior to its introduction in the UK'. (*Scottish Liberal Democrats: Make the Difference*, 2003: 16)



Democrats have a similar agenda; however, the focus is different: they too note the financial support already given by the Liberal-Labour Executive and also link local management with sustainability. The Liberal Democrats articulate sustainability in terms of managing fish stocks, rather than the economic diversification of local communities (2003: 32). The SNP also call for the development of local management and direct financial support for the industry and local communities. On the second point the SNP give more detail than Labour and the Liberal Democrats, outlining plans for fleet management, business rates relief, and financial aid<sup>30</sup>. The SNP go on to comment that the fault for the 'current crisis' lies with the UK government, stating that Scottish fishermen have received 'second-class treatment... under successive UK governments' (2003: 24).

#### 2.4.7 Environment

This comparison is done across Labour, the SNP and the Liberal Democrats' main manifesto documents. The Liberal Democrats also produced a separate Environmental Manifesto which is a more detailed document on this subject, which they point to as an indication of their commitment to environmental issues. Over environmental issues again there appear to be large areas of consensus in the centre-ground. All three advocate a green jobs strategy: Labour state 'we will work with business to develop and implement a green job strategy' (2003: 8); the SNP provide a little more detail in their commitment, 'A Green Jobs Strategy will be placed at the heart of our economic policy – offering employment growth in areas such as waste recycling, renewable energy, agriculture and public transport' (2003: 14); the Liberal Democrats state

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<sup>30</sup> 'To tackle the current crisis facing our fishing communities, an SNP government will take five immediate steps.

First, we will implement a Recovery Plan that will include a range of fleet support measures, including tie-up schemes, allowing the industry to retain its critical mass in the face of current quota cuts. Although there may be a case for a limited voluntary decommissioning scheme, the wholesale decommissioning of the Scottish fleet will be rejected.

Second, we will provide a package for onshore businesses including rates relief for fishing-related businesses adversely affected by the current restrictions, and further provide a support scheme to offset the loss of harbour dues caused by tie-ups. We will seek to take full advantage of EU financial support and demand assistance from the UK Treasury given that the UK Government signed up to the Brussels agreement. Specific measures will be provided to support the fish-processing sector.

Third, we will move immediately to renegotiate the current EU fisheries deal and insist that Scottish ministers lead the UK delegation from now on.

Fourth, we will use European and bi-lateral negotiations to begin tackling industrial fishing.

And fifth, we will take steps to prevent quota falling into the hands of foreign fleets or being retained by individuals not actively fishing.' (SNP: *Release our potential*, 2001: 17)



Our programme for government includes a strong focus on measures to protect and replenish the environment. Many of these, particularly recycling of waste and development of renewable energy, offer new opportunities for enterprise, innovation and business. Studies have suggested that more than 5,000 jobs could be created in developing renewable energy from wind, wave and tidal power. (2003: 16)

The Liberal Democrats provide more detail than the other two parties on how the green job strategy would be achieved (2003: 16). Waste management features in all three parties' policy agendas.

Labour (2003: 35) and the Liberal Democrats (2003: 38) propose action to address environmental justice, particularly in urban areas; and both, as part of their green jobs strategies, propose supporting business in the research and development of renewable energy sources and the SNP commit themselves to reducing greenhouse gas emissions in line with the Kyoto Protocol (2003: 14), and improving air quality (2002: 15). And the SNP<sup>31</sup> and Liberal Democrats<sup>32</sup> propose policies of energy efficiency, particularly in new buildings.

## 2.5 Conclusion

This chapter has investigated the policies that function as an expression of the ideological centre of Scottish politics. In doing so, it situated the political parties within a Scottish political culture, which was defined as being different from the political culture in England. More left of centre in attitudes and policy preferences, both the Scottish electorate and the party political makeup was shown to be markedly different to England. These differences have resulted in the Conservative Party being politically and ideologically isolated in the governance of a devolved Scotland. The other three parties, Labour, the Liberal Democrats and the SNP hold the popular political centre. In the context of the devolved parliament, where no party is likely to gain a majority, and three of the parties are ideologically centre-left, coalition politics

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<sup>31</sup> 'We will examine regulations to ensure the highest standards of insulation and construction methods deliver improved energy efficiency in all sectors. We will also encourage energy efficiency by setting targets and by consulting on the inclusion of a system of Energy Ratings for buildings in any schedule for sale or let.' (*SNP: Release our potential*, 2003: 14)

<sup>32</sup> 'We will: Define a new energy banding system to classify houses according to energy efficiency, offering tangible benefits to homeowners for energy conservation improvements they make to their homes'. (*Scottish Liberal Democrats: Make the Difference*, 2003: 41)

is more likely. McCrone (2001: 126) has commented that 'In an important sense, Scotland's politicians are all Nationalists now' and along with public opinion Scottish national identity is politicised in a way that it is not South of the border. All three parties of the centre are seen as pro-Scotland by the general public. This nationalistic trend was shown to be a defining feature of Scottish political culture, and the centre-left parties have successfully linked national identity with centre-left social democratic ideals, effectively isolating the Conservatives and helping propagate the opinion that the Conservatives are a pro-England party. However, the three parties' differing positions on the constitutional status of Scotland play a determining role in the potential patterns of coalition. As Labour and the SNP are the two largest parties in the Scotland Parliament, with Labour the most unionist and the SNP the most separatist, a coalition between the two in the current political climate is unlikely, therefore the federalist Liberal Democrats, the fourth largest party in devolved elections, hold the balance of power.

The latter section illustrated that while by no means identical in their policy programmes, the three parties of the centre in Scotland share a great deal across a broad range of issues in terms of both ideological goals and policy preferences. However, where there was significant difference the nationalist agenda could be seen at play. Labour contextualised arguments within a 'successful' UK framework, while the SNP framed issues in terms of a need for independence. The economy and Europe were two such examples where the constitutional status of Scotland was brought into play. An extract of Jack McConnell's introduction to Labour's manifesto was used to illustrate that Labour at least felt a need to claim that politicians and parties 'are not all the same'. This claim is important in light of this investigation which illustrates that the centre in Scotland is indeed crowded. The later part of McConnell's introduction further demonstrates the importance of framing the nationalist debate in Scottish politics,

It is a choice between two futures. We can build on what we've started, inside the UK, using the powers of devolution to take our country forward or we can rip it all up and start again with the Nationalist's plans for a separate Scottish state and risk all the upheaval and uncertainty that would create at this difficult and challenging time in Scotland and elsewhere. (2003: 5)



This chapter has mapped the ideological centre in Scotland and spotlighted the importance of both a centre-left consensus and nationalist agenda to Scotland's political culture. This begs many more issues, which the following discussion will try to address. For example, now that more has been established about the content of the centre parties' ideologies, the thesis will explore the discursive strategies employed to: negotiate centre-left and nationalist ideological positions; project an image of themselves and their ideologies; and construct their opponents. In short, the thesis will further explore the discursive negotiation of the ideological landscape of devolved Scottish party politics.

## CHAPTER 3: THE CONSTRUCTION AND NEGOTIATION OF IDEOLOGICAL IN AND OUT-GROUPS IN ELECTION MANIFESTOS

### 3.1 Introduction

As the previous chapter explored the content of Scottish party political ideology, this chapter will investigate the ways in which these ideologies are rhetorically constructed (portrayed in discourse) and negotiated (argued for in a competitive electoral environment). This is important because, as will be evident, the content of ideologies is not necessarily the same as how they discursively interact as instances of competing systems of group belief. In addition to these observations, the effects of the new devolved Scottish electoral system on the campaign discourse of parties will be considered. Where new systems of governing and competing for power have arisen, corresponding systems of discursive negotiation and competition for that power will be investigated. Initially, this chapter will provide an account of the environment, or rhetorical context, in which electoral discourse occurs. The importance of the context in which an utterance occurs and how this affects an analysis of political discourse will be emphasized and a framework of analysis will be suggested. Once established the methodology will then be employed to investigate examples of devolved Scottish electoral discourse from the 2003 manifestos.

### 3.2 Rhetorical Context

Elections are argumentative contests, with the electorate as final judge. Electoral campaigns form a significant part of the rhetorical context and the rules of their operation are heavily regulated by legal statute. How frequently elections should occur, rules of conduct and campaign financing, access to and balance in media coverage are all rule governed in the UK, with quasi-public bodies set up to oversee and regulate fair play (e.g. OfCom and the Electoral Commission). The regularity of elections is an important factor in the rhetorical context because it allows for parties to be judged on their performance. Those in power are judged on their actions and achievements, while those in opposition are evaluated on their success at critiquing and holding the government to account. This electoral context predisposes parties' arguments to 'take place in a rhetorical context of justification and criticism' (Billig,



1996: 124). That is to say the rules of the game predispose the game to be played out as an argument. The nature of that argument is about attacking and defending one's own position, so that at the end of the game an external judge (the electorate) decides who has won.

The reader with an interest in semantics will have noticed the conspicuous use of a gaming metaphor in the previous sentence. Chapter five will go on to discuss the importance of metaphor in conceptualising political competition, illustrating how 'conflict' is intimately related to our understanding of political elections, and that this is constructed through the intertwining use of metaphors from the target domains of war, pugilism/sport and argument. For now the pertinent issue is that the process and context of argument is central for understanding the discursive performances of politicians.

In his book *Arguing and Thinking* (1996) Michael Billig discusses the importance of the context in which an argument occurs to the explication and understanding of its meanings. He comments that the meaning of words is not fixed and that 'the same word, or even sentence, may possess different meanings when applied in different contexts' (Billig, 1996: 121). This focus on the context of utterances resonates with the British linguistic tradition from J. R. Firth (1957) through Halliday (1978 and 1985) to the present day discourse and critical discourse analysts, such as Chilton (2004; 2005), Fairclough (1995a; 1995b; 2001) van Dijk (2002; 2006b) and Wodak (2001 and Wodak et al 1999). Register (context of situation) and genre (context of culture) are essential analytical perspectives of this tradition of linguistic analysis. Investigations situate instances of language as social products, which have connection to present and past texts; and are, especially in the CDA methodology, examples of social action. To fully explore the meanings in electoral discourse its texts must be viewed in relation to their context of situation and culture. In a CDA analysis, such as this, instances of electoral discourse are explored from the tripartite perspectives discussed in the introductory chapter, combining the social perspective of the previous chapter with a cognitive approach. That is, the investigation describes the linguistic features of texts, seeking to relate its features and meanings to the texts' context of production and reception, and the cultural significance of those meanings. The argumentative tradition in political discourse is an aspect of culture, and therefore central to appreciating the form of the discourse. Also, the time (election), mode of production (written manifesto) and current social



concerns (devolution, bureaucracy, youth crime etc...) as features of register, are important for understanding the content and arguments.

An obvious factor in the context is that participants in elections argue from different positions. The positions as indicated in the previous chapter can be ideological. In addition, parties' positions are to do with their relationship with institutions of power: whether they are in or out of government. In Scotland this is complicated by the fact that there are major and minor members of the executive. A smaller party holds the balance of power between two larger parties. There is also a superordinate context, the UK government, which is drawn on in arguments. The different positions are ideological, in that different parties have different sets of beliefs which inform and guide their arguments. In exploring the nature of electoral discourse, contributions to the argument must be put in their appropriate rhetorical context, be that in terms of a party's position in relation to holding power or their ideological beliefs. The following analysis will continue to add detail to this initial précis of the rhetorical context.

The following analysis seeks to explain ideological discourse in terms of its patterns and structures. This is achieved through a critical discourse analysis and it is therefore very much a linguistic investigation of ideological discourse. It would be inconvenient to become bogged down in the vast canon of literature, ancient and modern, available on rhetoric – as interesting and engaging as that work is. Occasionally, insights may be drawn upon where appropriate and useful to this investigation. The use of the term 'rhetoric' is twofold: firstly it is difficult to get away from the similarities between the work done here and the insights of the rhetorical tradition, particularly in treating political orations as systematic and persuasive instances of language; and secondly 'rhetoric' is a word so closely associated in the popular vernacular with the discourse of contemporary political parties (though admittedly with quite pejorative connotations) that it would perhaps be perverse not to use it. 'Discourse' might be the preferred term of some, particularly when exploring the operations of 'ideology' and 'hegemony'. 'Rhetoric' carries suitable party political meanings for the analysis of political discourse, functioning like a sub-category of discourse with its wider social meaning. Unlike the context that inspired Fairclough's critique of the marketization of public discourses (1995), in election contexts the protagonists are quite clear and present in a way which makes the use of 'rhetoric', with all its connotations of explicit persuasion, more appropriate



for describing inter-party competition. 'Discourse' and 'rhetoric' are, therefore, used quite interchangeably throughout this investigation; however the former will often be prefixed with 'political', 'party-political' or 'electoral' where appropriate for clarification. This modern study of political rhetoric differs from the classical approach in that its interest also lies outwith the text (Fairclough: 1997: 87). This study is interested in how language interacts with context and attempts to make 'clear links between linguistic choices and strategic functions' (Chilton and Schäffner, 1997: 215) of electoral locutions.

### 3.2.1 *Exploring the rhetorical context*

Thus far it has been argued that when investigating party political and electoral rhetoric that discourse must be socially and culturally situated, and that these are important perspectives from which to analyse texts, in order to glean their meanings effectively. An investigation also requires tools to perform this analysis. The rest of this section will introduce the tools of analysis for this chapter, which will also form part of the analytical framework for further investigation. There are two main approaches employed, augmenting more traditional semantic and systemic functional approaches: the first is van Dijk's (1998) 'ideological square'; the second is drawn from Chilton's (2004) deictic axes.

In *Ideology* (1998: 263-276) van Dijk summarises the ways in which ideological discourses are ordered and constrained at both cognitive and social levels. Rather than just offering an investigation of the content and history of particular ideologies, van Dijk suggests a model to account for how ideologies in general are communicated internally to ideological group members, as well as to external groups and audiences. Most notably he postulates a cognitive strategy by which group beliefs are organised in competitive communication, referring to it as the 'ideological square' (1998: 267). Prefacing this strategy is the notion that ideology functions, in part, to maintain group identity and solidarity and that group identity is contextually important in situations where groups are competing for scarce resources or power. Therefore, in competitive environments discursive strategies, derived from 'mental models', will have a semantic effect in terms of the selection (or non-selection) and representation of information. Mental models are: 'representations in personal memory of events or... of episodes' (van Dijk, 1998: 79); these models are also

subjective, derived as they are from personal experience (whether direct or indirect) of the world. Therefore discursive strategies, founded on subjective mental models, operate with the 'function of expression or suppression of information in the interests of the speaker/writer' (van Dijk, 1998: 267) in competitive scenarios. This strategy is the 'ideological square', and is formulated as follows:

- 1 Express/emphasize information that is positive about Us
- 2 Express/emphasize information that is negative about Them
- 3 Suppress/de-emphasize information that is positive about Them
- 4 Suppress/de-emphasize information that is negative about Us. (van Dijk, 1998: 267)

The model represents a general principle in the organisation of competitive ideological communication: positive self representation and negative other representation.

This investigation is interested in the above model because it provides a framework for examining the discourse of political parties as instances of inter-group competition. Or to use previously adopted terminology, to account for party rhetoric in terms of the dynamics of group cognition and communication. These dynamics form significant aspects of the rhetorical context, as well as other contextual features which are not directly associated with group belief and communication, such as constraints on the field (e.g. election debate on the economy versus parliamentary debate on income tax) and mode (e.g. manifesto versus televised interview) of communication.

As ideologies are *shared* systems of belief, van Dijk links his work on ideology to theories of group identity. Given his 'socio-cognitive' approach it is perhaps unsurprising that van Dijk finds theories emanating from social psychology the most useful, particularly Social Identity Theory and latterly Self Categorisation Theory. These theories are most appropriately represented by the studies of Tajfel (1981, 1982) and Turner (1984), Hogg and Abrams (1988) and Abrams and Hogg (1990). For the purposes of van Dijk's work, as well as this thesis, Social Identity Theory and Self Categorisation Theory are important because they stress the significance of categorisation in the formation of groups and their identities. Billig observes of these approaches to group behaviour that '[t]he theory stresses that categorization is divisive, because categories segment the world... to be a member of an 'ingroup' entails a categorical distinction from an 'outgroup'' (1995: 66). In



defining and labelling who 'we' are, a group necessarily creates a boundary (mental or otherwise) between themselves and others. The motivation for creating and maintaining groups is driven, so the theories suggest, by an individual's need for a positive social identity which is satisfied by group membership (Tajfel, 1981). Positive identity is then maintained by encoding the in-group in positive terms which can then be re-inforced by inverse comparisons with out-groups. At this point one more clearly sees the connection between Social Identity Theory and Self Categorisation Theory and van Dijk's (1998) ideological square. The need for group membership to achieve a positive social identity, in conjunction with the necessity of categorisation to demarcate group identity, underpins the operations of the ideological square: principled distinction between in and out-group memberships, with strategies for positive self and negative other representation to maintain a positive social identity.

Language plays a large part in the process of categorisation as it is one of the primary resources available to individuals by which they can signal their differences (this may also be achieved through other semiotic means, such as choice of clothing, or by physical means, such as building a wall to divide a community). Categorisation is most obviously achieved through the use of nouns, adjectives, collective pronouns, such as 'we' and 'them', and possessive determiners such as 'ours' and 'theirs'. These are the small words which point to the in-group 'us' and the out-group 'them'. In collectively labelling groups, utterers implicitly and/or explicitly construct audiences for their locutions. They speak for proximal groups and against distal groups. This brings the investigation to the second of its analytical tools: deictic analysis.

Paul Chilton asserts in *Analysing Political Discourse* that utterances are 'generated and interpreted in relation to the situation in which the utterer(s) and interpreter(s) are positioned' (2004: 56). The word 'positioned' here can be understood (in this political study) in similar terms to the left-right ideological cline discussed in the previous chapter, where 'left' and 'right' describes parties' ideological differences through a spatial metaphor. According to Chilton, utterers and audiences can use three axes on which an utterance and its subjects (actions, actors, events, and audience) can be plotted: constructing spatial metaphors to orient interlocutors between features of the text, text production and text reception. These features may be understood as:

- where an utterance occurs or is received



- what an utterance is about
- where interlocutors are in the proceedings of the utterance
- what is happening at the time of the utterance's production and reception
- what the social relationship is between interlocutors and the subjects of the utterance.

This mapping is achieved through the use of 'deictic expressions' or 'indexical expressions' which are the 'linguistic resources used to perform *deixis*' (Chilton, 2004: 56). Deixis functions to orientate an utterance to situational features of an interlocutor's environment, or rather it anchors an utterance to particular aspects of the context of situation of the utterance (Brown and Levinson, 1987).

There are three main types of deixis in English. Personal/social deixis marked pronominally by 'I', 'me', 'you', 'he', 'she', 'us' and 'them' and by possessive determiners 'my', 'yours', 'ours' and 'theirs'. In English, personal deixis makes a distinction between first personal (singular and plural), second person and third person and most clearly indicates individuals and groups as distinct entities. Then there is temporal deixis, where adverbs ('here', 'there', 'now' and 'then'), determiners ('before'), prepositions ('after' and 'since') point to temporal positions in the discourse world<sup>33</sup> of an utterance. And there is spatial deixis, in which the definite article 'the' and the adverbs 'here' and 'there' can denote a spatial position. From the perspective of ideological group discourse, the deictic centre i.e. the point from which the utterance emanates is the 'we' of the group, situated in the spatial 'here' and the temporal 'now'. All other subjects are plotted in relation to this centre.

Chilton's (2004) analysis proposes three dimensions of deixis, which he calls 'axes'. The spatial and temporal dimensions are probably most familiar to readers and are representative of the above examples. The spatial axis plots an antithetically distal position relative to the 'here' of an utterance: for example 'here in the West we believe in democracy, unlike in the Middle East', deictic expressions 'here', 'in' and 'the West' point to the physically present context, whereas 'in' and 'the Middle East' plot distal points for subjects removed from that physically present context. Similarly, the temporal axis plots points relative to the 'now' of an utterance, where subjects are encoded as either in the past or of the future. These two axes also facilitate the encoding of personal/social deixis, where individuals or groups are plotted and

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<sup>33</sup> That is the discursive representation of the world created by an utterance, which is not the same as, though it stands in relation to, the 'real' world. See Chilton (2004: 54-56).



conceptualised as being sometimes temporally, but more often spatially distal from the 'I' or 'we' of the utterance. Chilton does not separate personal/social deixis out from the spatial or temporal axes (though he does note that they usually are) probably because 'them' or 'you', realised as psychologically distal, implicitly encodes separateness from 'I' or 'we'. This is to underline a more general point about all the deictic axes: they are all conceptually realised through spatial metaphors (or in Lakoff and Johnson's (1980) term 'orientational metaphors').

Chilton then adds a third axis: that of 'modality'. This third dimension proves particularly interesting in an analysis of political discourse as it plots relative positions of truth and rightness. Chilton explains,

The general idea is that Self is not only *here* and *now*, but also the origin of the epistemic *true* and the deontic *right*. The *m* [modality] axis seems to involve several strands. For instance, there are close connections between epistemic modality (having to do with degrees of certainty), and deontic modality (having to do with permission and obligation) and negation. (2004: 59)

This dimension is therefore closely connected to morality and ideology; and again this is conceptualised in terms of proximity to the deictic centre. Expressing rightness and trueness in terms of physical locations appears to be borne out by familiar expressions, for example, 'he is *way out* in left field on this issue', 'you are a *long way off* the mark', 'the parties are *far* from reaching an agreement', 'the Minister's answers could not be *further from* the truth', or 'the Greens are *closer* to us on this issue than the Tories'. Therefore, the morality of 'rightness' and 'trueness', in ideological terms, is expressed as proximal to the in-group, whereas antithetical positions appear as relative degrees of distance from that point. Chilton asserts,

The polysemy of 'right' and 'wrong' supports the idea that epistemic and deontic scales are closely related: what is right is both truth-conditionally 'right' and legally or morally 'right', and correspondingly for 'wrong'. (2004: 60)

The further away from the deictic centre one moves the further from the truth and less righteous one is. Closed class words such as modal verbs are most typically cited (Simpson, 1993) to represent deontic and epistemic modality e.g. should/shouldn't, will/won't, can/can't and must/mustn't. Open class word choices (or paralinguistic features like intonation in spoken discourse) may also perform the same function e.g.

‘good/evil’, ‘honest/dishonest’, which are opposite values and therefore represent cognitively separate positions. Chilton then postulates that political discourse in particular tends to construct notions of truthfulness and righteousness as being values associated with the in-group party whereas the opposite values are characteristics of other out-group parties. This cognitive and discursive strategy appears to fit very closely to the socio-cognitive approach of van Dijk (1998) and Social Identity Theory and Self Categorisation Theory outlined above. Chilton’s deictic axes expand well on van Dijk’s initial framework, so that one can map the relative positions given to in and out-groups by in-group utterances. Taken together this framework provides not only principles by which ideological discourses are motivated and ordered but also how their meanings are constructed.




Figure 3.1 Deixis Axes (From Chilton 2004: 60)

One can represent the three dimensions of deixis schematically, illustrated by Figure 3.1. The purpose of this discussion is to suggest those who create discourses and those who receive and process them will try to mentally ‘locate arguments and predicates by reference to points on the three axes *s*, *t* and *m*’ (Chilton, 2004: 60-61), which are indexed by textual features of the discourse. Interlocutors identify coordinates on the three axes and use them to navigate and find meaning in the discourse as it progresses.

However, it should be noted that Chilton uses additional linguistic features to plot positions on the deixis axes. Going beyond the traditional markers of deixis outlined above, also included are linguistic items drawn from open class words that still perform a similar pointing or anchoring function. For example ‘our’ would be a



traditional deictic expression and could be employed by whatever hue of political party to point to the in-group, but 'Labour', 'Conservative' or 'SSP' are lexical choices that still deictically point to the political in or out-group. Similarly, the difference between traditional deixis and the expanded sense could be summed up by the distinction between the closed class word 'here' and the open class word 'Scotland', both of which could be used to deictically point to the same space (assuming the speaker is in Scotland). These latter examples are similar to what Higgins (2004a) refers to as 'location lexical tokens'. In addition, months of the year, days of the week or numerals can perform this pointing or anchoring function within a text.

This does not mean that meaning is fixed and predetermined and that the coordinates which the utterer uses are read and interpreted in the same way by receivers of the utterance. On the contrary, audiences are not passive and the meanings they potentially read are many and varied. There is a wealth of material available on meaning and audiences and it will not be regurgitated at great length here<sup>34</sup>. For the purpose of this argument, nevertheless, something of the subjectivity of meaning should be broached. Fiske suggests that,

The production of meaning from a text follows much the same process as the construction of subjectivity within society. The reader produces meanings that derive from the intersection of his/her social history with the social forces structured into the text. The moment of reading is when the discourses of the reader meet the discourses of the text. When these discourses bear different interests reading becomes a reconciliation of this conflict. (1987: 82-83)

While the meanings of a text are constrained by contextual features (partly in terms of contexts of situation and culture touched on earlier) but also in the representations an utterer selects, each individual reader brings an equally unique set of 'diverse cultural resources' (Lunt and Livingston, 2001: 590) to the decoding of a text. In this understanding meaning is negotiated quite actively, with individuals using their different knowledge, experiences, histories and opinions to decode meaning.

Members of the same social group, who share similar social experiences and beliefs, might then be expected to produce similar meanings from a reading (still allowing for individual variability). Correspondingly, an alternate social group with

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<sup>34</sup> Good overviews of the text reception literature are available in Fiske (1987: 62-83) and more recently in Lunt and Livingston (2001).



different shared experiences and beliefs would produce a different reading. Therefore a word like 'privatisation' might be read as a positive predicate by a Conservative Party supporter and plotted as proximal to the deictic centre on the *m* axis. However, the same word might receive an inverse reading by a traditional Labour Party supporter and as such the predicate would be plotted as distal on the *m* axis. The variability of the social position and experience of discourse participants is essential in explaining the subjectivity and vacillating nature of meaning. Social variability of individuals explains how meanings can change over time: as society moves on its changes inevitably affect the positions from which discourse participants encode and decode their discursive representations of the world. This is how a party can advocate a policy at one point in time but then change its support for it at a later date, in light of new experiences: for example, as the evidence of climate change has mounted mainstream political parties have begun to prioritise environmental policies.

This chapter now has a framework with which to explore the party political rhetoric of manifestos. The framework includes: socio-cultural explanations of the rhetorical context of argumentative election campaigns; cognitive linguistic tools for the analysis of political discourse as a phenomenon of competitive group behaviour; and explanations of how the meaning of those group discourses is encoded and decoded. This chapter will now turn from general discussion of the analytical tools to their practical application.

### 3.3 Rhetorical strategies for inter-group competitions

If manifestos in parliamentary elections are the site of ideological conflict there should be evidence of the various party political protagonists trying to curry favour with the electorate. In line with the ideological square one would expect parties to make positive claims of their ideological in-group, while seeking to discourage support amongst voters for out-group opposition parties, by constructing negative claims about them. What follows will investigate how the ideological square is being negotiated in the manifestos of the devolved Scottish elections. There appears to be evidence for a material effect on the devolved political discourse practices because of a change in social practices, i.e. campaigning under a mixed and more proportional electoral system. The adversarial arguments are still in evidence but they exist alongside more co-operative rhetorical stances. Different strategies are dependent on a



party's position in the political field. Whether a political party is likely to be able to form political coalitions and with whom determines the nature and focus of ideological attacks.

This analysis will be subdivided into three sections: the first will investigate the construction of positive in-group representations and the mitigation of in-group criticisms; the second focuses on rhetorical strategies employed by political parties for identifying with the electorate; and thirdly, discursive techniques for negative portrayal of out-groups will be considered. The first two sections deal with the construction of the deictic centre of the ideological in-group whereas the latter section considers deictically distal positions of out-groups.

### *3.3.1 Constructing positive in-group representations*

Positive rhetorical construction of the in-group will be described by reference to particular features. A group can be described in terms of its attributes, actions and achievements, and these are encoded as being in the past, present or future. Positive rhetorical stances might involve combining multiple representations of attributes, actions and achievements, at different points in time: for example, 'we believe in honesty and fairness (attributes-present continuous time) that is why we did X and Y (achievements-past time), and why we will go on to do A and B (actions-future time)<sup>35</sup>. In describing in-group representations in this way, contextual reasons for particular choices will be given. However, as Billig (1996) points out in his discussion of rhetoric, common sense is a valuable attribute for the rhetorical analysis of persuasive discourse. That is not to say that pointing out what might to some appear obvious is not a productive part of analysis, as from sometimes simple propositions interesting conclusions may be deduced.

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<sup>35</sup> Chilton (2004) does not elaborate his description of the temporal axis to include aspect. This may be because as Quirk et al assert,

'[A]spect is so closely connected in meaning with tense, that the distinction in English grammar between tense and aspect is little more than a terminological convenience which helps us to separate in our minds two different kinds of realization: the morphological realization of tense and the syntactic realization of aspect' (1985: 189)

While tense is deictic, aspect is not; instead aspect encodes the way verb action is experienced or viewed in relation to time (Quirk et al, 1985: 188). For these reasons the temporal axis is a sufficient descriptive tool in terms of the cognitive representation of temporality. Aspect, however, provides an additional tool of the linguistic description of time in discourse, but it does not alter the nature of the continuum of the temporal axis, running from the past, through the present, to the future.



In the following example Labour constructs a positive representation of itself in terms of past achievements, 'In our first four years we have secured the highest ever levels of participation in higher and further education - abolishing tuition fees and introducing a new Graduate Endowment' (*On your side: Scottish Labour's Manifesto 2003*: 8). Through the possessive determiner 'our', Labour ascribes positive achievements to the in-group. The noun phrase in the initial clause 'the highest ever levels', indicates a positive assessment of Labour's achievements, applying an orientational metaphor (Lakoff and Johnson, 1980: 14-21), to the numbers of individuals participating in higher and further education. The verb 'abolishing' has positive connotations as it refers to the ending of what, at the very least the Scottish Labour Party and the Liberal Democrat Party, consider a negative levy on students. This extract is an example of a party indicating positive achievement, which carries the implication that if they have previously performed good actions, they will do so in the future. A party of government has the rhetorical advantage of being able to draw on actual achievements from their time in office. However, an important point to bear in mind is that two parties shared power prior to this election and as such two parties potentially campaign on the same policy record. Both Labour and the Liberal Democrats cite abolition of tuition fees and the establishment of the Graduate Endowment as positive policies of the in-group.

A key aspect to Labour's construction of the ideological in-group, is how it portrays the relationship between Labour in the Scottish Parliament and UK and Westminster Labour Party. As might be expected the relationship between the two is depicted favourably, for example,

With the benefit of Labour's sound management of the UK economy, we have made historic levels of investment in health and education. In the next 4 years we are committed to a further increase of 30 per cent in health spending and to taking our investment on education to over £4 billion. We have set national standards for quality and introduced inspection to maintain those standards and we have begun to take action to tackle poor performance where it exists. (*On your side: Scottish Labour's Manifesto, 2003*: 15)

The in-group is portrayed positively through the representation of actions and achievements of the past, present and future. The preposition phrase 'With the benefit' indicates positive value, while 'Labour' in the first clause assigns that positive value to the wider British party, of which the Scottish party is clearly a



constituent. The next two clauses illustrate both a modulation between UK Labour and Scottish Labour and representations of past present and future actions and achievements. With 'we are committed to' (attribute-present) and 'our investment' (action-present continuous) of the second sentence, and the 'We have set' (action-past) and 'we have begun to tackle' (action-past) of the third sentence refers to Scottish Labour in the Scottish Parliament, though the pronominal usage is slightly ambiguous. Ambiguity adds to the construction of a positive and close relationship between the two levels of UK governance under Labour, at least in this context. As noted in chapter 2, Scottish Labour draws on the achievements of the UK Labour government, even though decisions taken at that level lay outwith the Scottish Parliament.

The relationship between Labour in the Scottish Parliament and Labour in the UK is made more explicit in the following examples, 'The work we have embarked on with our partners in the UK government, to guarantee a minimum wage of £5.18 an hour for NHS staff...' (2003: 25) and 'Working in partnership with the UK government we have already made real progress in tackling poverty in Scotland' (2003: 33). Labour in government at Westminster is metonymically referred to as 'the UK government', and the relationship between the two levels of government, and indeed the party at those two levels is described as a 'partnership' (implying equality rather than a constituent or subservient relationship). This 'partnership' is positively characterised by attributed achievements, such as a guaranteed minimum wage and 'progress in tackling poverty in Scotland'. Therefore, both Scottish Labour and the Labour government at Westminster are defined as the ideological in-group. This demonstrates the point made in the previous chapter; the limited powers of the Parliament do not constrain the frames of reference drawn on in making political arguments, when the parties discuss policy in the devolved elections. Therefore, in this example Labour draw on perceived UK successes/strengths in the positive discursive construction of the in-group. Unionism is therefore ideologically at play here in the identity of the in-group.

The SNP employ strategies which differ from Labour because they are the main party of opposition in the devolved assembly. Because they are not in power it is difficult for the SNP to construct representations which encode achievements, therefore, one would expect a greater emphasis on attributes and future actions (if they obtain power). Early on in their manifesto the SNP explicitly state what it

considers to be attributes of the ideological in-group, 'Our values in government will be fairness, honesty and equality of opportunity' (*Release our potential: SNP manifesto: 2*) and 'Our decisions will be determined by fairness not cronyism, honesty not fiddled figures, and equality of opportunity not jobs for the boys' (*Release our potential: SNP manifesto: 2*). Both examples state that 'fairness', 'honesty' and 'equality of opportunity' are part of the SNP's attributes not just now but also in the future. The implication these statements carry is that the opposite is true of the SNP's political opponents, therefore, negatively characterising the out-group, consistent with the operation of the ideological square. However, it will be shown below, in the discussion of mitigations, that the SNP have found ways around this problem of not having concrete policy achievements to draw on.

In positively characterising the in-group the Liberal Democrats occupy a position currently unique in devolved Scottish politics. They are the only party to have been minority partners in a formally established and stable peacetime-coalition in UK politics, and are the only party then to go into an election campaign likely to be in coalition with either main party. One might expect rhetorical strategies to adapt to the demands of this new situation.

As minority partners the Liberal Democrats may suffer from the potential perception of ineffectuality and therefore in positively constructing the in-group they attempt to address this problem,

From free personal care to the abolition of tuition fees, Liberal Democrats have made the difference in the last four years. With bold new plans to promote better health, recruit more teachers and cut crime, people can trust the Liberal Democrats to make the difference again. (*Make the Difference: 2*)

Not only are the Liberal Democrats stating what it is that they have achieved, listing two policies in the areas of health and education, but they also explicitly state they 'have made a difference' (achievement-past) and that they will 'make the difference again' (achievement-future). When compared to the Labour Party's claims of achievements one notices that the addition of the emphatic assertion of achievement (which the Labour Party do not do) is not only functioning as a positive characterisation of the in-group but also as a mitigation of potential criticisms of the in-group.



Other positive constructions of in-group by the Liberal Democrats include: the projection of the parties' attributes, stating they are 'ambitious for Scotland' (attribute-present); and actions '[Liberal Democrats] want to improve people's health, raise standards in education, make Scotland safer and establish a better environment' (actions-future) (*Making the Difference*: 2). But then they again emphasise their 'vital role' and their place in the political system,

It is the Liberal Democrats who are best placed to deliver on the great expectations people have for the Scottish Parliament. We played a vital role in establishing it and have been responsible for many of its most radical reforms, including free personal care, the abolition of tuition fees and land reform. Liberal Democrats are determined to change people's lives for the better.  
(*Make the Difference*: 3)

The in-group is represented positively by encoding past achievements. A 'role' implies that there was more than one role and therefore more than one actor in establishing the Scottish Parliament, and they feel the need to define their own role as 'vital'. This is not a comment on the relative goodness or badness of the devolution (its goodness is an implied given), it is a comment on the quality of their contribution to the policy of devolution. In contrast, Labour as the majority partner in the coalition and the party in office at Westminster do not feel the need to state their centrality to the delivery of devolution; after all they are the party that delivered the Bill in the Westminster Parliament.

One can see positive in-group statements in the Conservative manifesto (*Time To Do Something About It*, 2003) for example in relation to policies on crime, 'Scottish Conservative will reduce crime and the fear of crime' (2003: 7); on health, 'Scottish conservatives are committed to a health service which is universal in its reach and available to everyone wherever they live.' (2003: 11); and on business and industry, 'We recognise the importance of the whisky industry to the Scottish economy and will continue to argue that it should be treated fairly.' (2003: 19). The Conservatives demonstrate a strong commitment to these policy areas through the use of epistemic modality such as 'will reduce crime'. Then they use the non modalised form 'are committed' expressing the definiteness of Conservative commitment to law and order. The former is encoding a pledge to future action, while the latter encodes an attribute in the present. However, there are fewer instances of positive statements about the in-group in the Conservative manifesto, as compared with other parties.



This is perhaps because of the ideological principles of shrinking the state and devolving responsibility to individuals and communities. Therefore, there are more instances of the Conservatives pledging to do something which empowers others to then achieve particular goals. For example,

We will scrap these targets and restore to head teachers the ability to set their own discipline policies including expulsions, detention and uniforms as well as the positive incentives towards good behaviour... This will enable them to exclude disruptive pupils and we will reinforce this by giving teachers the right to refuse to teach pupils with a record of violence. (*Time To Do Something About It*: 16-17)

In the first two coordinated clauses the 'we' of the Scottish Conservative Party pledges to perform certain acts, namely the scrapping of targets to reduce pupil exclusions and to give power back to head teachers. Therefore, power is devolved to another group and they then have the power to act. In this manner head teachers can 'set their own' policies on school discipline. The Manifesto then goes on to suggest causatively that 'This will enable them [the head teachers]' to do x for themselves. The verbs 'restore' and 'giving' both denote the passing of something between agents, and it is this language which reflects part of the Conservative ideology of shrinking the state and devolving power. Therefore, in making pledges which the Conservatives claim will achieve particular goals, they promise to do x or y which then empowers others to achieve the goals of the policies and ideologies. One should be careful, of course, on the basis of a few examples not to overstate a claim which links certain patterns of transitivity to a specific party's discourse. This could prove an interesting area of future investigation, but to explore it further here would be to neglect the current investigation.

Positive construction of the in-group by the Green Party can be seen in the following examples, 'Greens champion locally-owned business...' (*Reach for the Future*: 5) and 'Scottish Green Party policies are geared towards making a lasting improvement...' (*Reach for the Future*: 7) and 'The Scottish Green Party is alone in insisting that we must face up to this problem. Our policies are designed to address it' (*Reach for the Future*: 2). The Greens' actions are positively presented in the use of verb phrases 'champion', 'are geared towards making' and 'are designed'. These represent their present actions as policies which will make 'lasting improvement' and achieve potential future benefits.



There are, therefore, patterns which can be identified running through the various parties' rhetorical contributions. In positively presenting the in-group in their texts political parties generally encode the deictic centre of 'we' in positive representations of their actions, attributes and achievements, in either the past, present or future.

Mitigation against negative portrayal of the group, as the ideological square indicates, is another aspect of positive in-group representation. These rhetorical strategies work in similar ways to the above examples, in that mitigations defend against negative perceptions or accusations of in-group attributes, actions and achievements. Like positive projections, strategies for employing mitigations are determined by the current political context and a party's status in it.

Contemporary political parties have begun to be criticised for the lack of an ideological divide and the increasing personalisation of the political process (Fowler, 1991 and Stanyer and Wring, 2004: 2). Being seen to be different is important to campaigning parties for two reasons. The first is in respect to the rhetorical context of the election: voters have to make a choice. Even when the electorate has two votes, as in the Scottish Parliament election, a choice which privileges one or more parties over others is still necessary. Difference is then a prerequisite of being able to make a choice. In a system where there appears to be a lack of choice because the parties are perceived to be 'all the same', the worry is that voters feel it is not a real choice and so choose not to vote at all (Institute of Governance, 2003). Therefore, the criticism of the similarity of parties is motivated by a concern over political apathy and declining voter turnouts, as much as the lack of difference in and of itself. The second reason difference is important to political parties is because of the psychological dynamics of group identity. If Social Identity Theory and Self Categorisation Theory are right and a positive social identity is bound up in group membership, then political parties need to maintain a distinctive identity in order to ensure the utility of party identity to individual members. Parties need to make clear their distinctiveness so as to satisfy the expectations of their affiliates.

As noted earlier, Labour certainly felt a need to mitigate the 'lack of difference' criticism, stating in Jack McConnell's opening statement in their manifesto,

The choice Scotland faces in the election on 1 May is not a personality contest between people with the same priorities, not a potluck between parties who have the same policies, and not incidental to the future of our country. Politicians are not the same and parties do have different priorities. (*On your side: Scottish Labour's Manifesto 2003*: 5)

Labour uses this mitigation to establish a positive ideological position for themselves and a negative one for their opponents. The final sentence serves to set-up a niche for Labour's manifesto, which will stand in opposition to other political parties' manifestos. Saying that 'parties do have different priorities' evokes the presupposition that Labour presumably has the right priorities. However, this claim of difference between the parties may seem questionable when considered against the analysis of the previous chapter, comparing policy positions of the main political parties.

An opposition party faces a problem when campaigning; parties of office can draw on the laws and actions of their previous term(s), but as the opposition do not hold office it can be problematic demonstrating the party's achievements. This is particularly so for the SNP which until devolution had no numerical chance of holding office. However, there are rhetorical strategies which can be employed to assert achievements and therefore positively characterise the actions of the in-group, for example, 'Since 1999 much of the SNP's drugs policy has been adopted by the Labour-LibDem coalition' (*Release our potential: SNP manifesto*: 8). Ideas of the SNP have therefore been 'adopted' by the out-group of the 'Labour-LibDem coalition'. Positively characterised SNP ideas and actions can then be proved to have demonstrable effect and validity. However, what this may also illustrate is the closeness, in terms of policy, of the three centre-left parties of power in Scotland and their compatibility in terms of power-sharing.

Further mitigations by the Liberal Democrats as ideological in-group are illustrated by the subsequent two extracts,

Scottish Liberal democrats believe the Parliament has achieved a great deal, but must be given time to reach its full potential. We campaigned for a Parliament that will succeed over the long-term and do not favour hasty or destabilising changes in its powers. (*Make the Difference*: 10)

Scottish Liberal Democrats believe that the bureaucracy of government has adjusted rapidly to devolution but seek to improve it further. (*Make the Difference*: 11)



The Scottish Parliament and/or the Executive have faced criticisms of achieving little and not living up to the public's expectations. Overspending on the parliament building and the Conservative's characterisation the building as 'Follyrood' are a case in point. Therefore, the Liberal Democrats as part of the coalition and the constitutional convention that helped bring about the Parliament, attempt to mitigate criticism of the institution and themselves. That is why they state they 'believe the Parliament has achieved a great deal', but then go on to say it needs more time to achieve its potential. The metonymical use of 'the Parliament' is a further mitigation of the ideological in-group as it obfuscates the party's role in the perceived legislative shortcomings of devolution. The Liberal Democrats also claim that the 'bureaucracy of government' somewhat ambiguously 'adjusted to devolution', however they 'seek to improve' the situation. However, the point remains here that the Liberals seek to mitigate a potential criticism of them as a party of government. There is a presupposition that there is bureaucracy and an implication that devolution is something that one would expect to effect bureaucracy. It is the personified bureaucracy which has 'adjusted rapidly' which again contributes to making unclear the Liberal Democrats' responsibility for bureaucracy in government

As a party of coalition in Scotland one might expect to see the Liberal Democrats create space discursively for the possibility of partnerships and this is indeed the case, for example 'We will: Develop partnerships with the UK Government where appropriate' (*Make the Difference*: 11). This example states the Liberal Democrats desire to 'Develop partnerships' with an out-group the 'UK Government', illustrating an instance of a more co-operative discourse between two competing political groups. However, the manifesto still contextualises this accommodating position with the ambiguous qualifying adverbial phrase 'where appropriate' – what amounts to an appropriate situation remains unstated. The Liberal Democrats' more co-operative rhetoric will become more apparent when the antonymic side of the ideological square is discussed below, in the investigation of out-group characterisation.

### *3.3.2 Identifying with the electorate*

Parties are not necessarily campaigning to persuade electors to become prototypical, 'card carrying' party members, but instead to convince them to identify with the party

enough to give them their support, or to vote tactically in the party's favour. To this end, the campaign discourse of mainstream political parties is aimed at broad national audiences (as per the discussion of the centre ground in the previous chapter), as well as more specific groups or sections of the electorate. These targeted groups tend to reflect policy areas, in which those groups might have the most interest. Therefore, in campaigning on the business rates small business men would be addressed, whereas on equal opportunities policies women, homosexuals and/or ethnic minorities would be focused on. One would expect Scottish parties to address electors in a variety of different ways, and in doing so attempt to inculcate those groups with the interests of the party in-group. Indeed this is evident but what is also notable about the Scottish electoral context, as indicated in chapter 2, is the prominence of a nationalist agenda. How national audience(s) and party political in-groups are conceived in relation to the UK state differs in accordance with separatist and unionist doctrines, and this conception correspondingly effects how electoral audiences are addressed. This is apparent in both the construction of in-group's deictic centres and deictically distal out-groups.

In the following example Labour describe the party in positive terms, while at the same time identifying those positive attributes or actions with specified groups of voters:

Labour is on the side of people who want to set up their own businesses and on the side of those who want their businesses to grow. We will streamline support and practical help government offers them... (*On your side: Scottish Labour's Manifesto 2003: 7*).

Business people are constructed as part of Labour's 'in-group', as they attempt to discursively construct an ideological position that encompasses a voting group that in the recent past might not have been traditional Labour voters. This is achieved with the use of a conflict metaphor<sup>36</sup> contained in the prepositional phrase 'on the side', metaphorically including business people on the same army or sports team as the Labour Party and, if elected, the same side as the 'government'. As expected, there is evidence of Labour constructing positive descriptions of itself and also an attempt to inculcate their ideology within the minds of voters by constructing their values and actions as the values of hypothetical voters. A similar example, which encodes the

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<sup>36</sup> See chapter 5 for a detailed discussion of metaphors of conflict in Scottish political discourse.



values of business and finance in the Labour Party ideology, is as follows 'We will build on the success of our financial services sector' (2003: 7). Labour is committing itself to future actions with the use of the modalised verb phrase 'will build'. The 'financial services sector' is denoted as 'our', which refers to not just the Labour Party but the Labour Party and the electorate. Labour is constructing the entire electorate and the party as the ideological in-group.

Parties who already hold office can face two conflicting problems when running for an additional term: firstly, they must demonstrate that they have achieved things while in office, thus demonstrating that they are effectual and worth voting for; secondly, they must create a space for themselves illustrating that there are still things they need to do, without looking as though they have failed in not already doing these things. That is why Labour asserts, 'A lot has been done, but there is so much more to do. Together we can build a better Scotland' (2003: 5). The first sentence of this example fulfils both the need to demonstrate achievements and that Labour is still needed. In making these claims the Labour Party discursively align the electorate with the party in-group by use of the adverb 'Together' and the pronoun 'we', which rhetorically partners Labour and people. The people are the Scottish people in this instance, but as was noted above Labour can modulate between which national/state 'us' they are referring to. At times it is a purely Scottish 'us', sometimes a UK 'us', while at other times it may be ambiguous as to which they are referring to.

In contrast to the Labour Party the SNP have a more centrally Scottish conception of their ideological in-group. Like the Labour party, and as one might expect, they construct Scotland as part of that in-group, for example, 'Only together can we release Scotland's potential' (2003: 2) and 'Our approach will put Scotland in control' (2003 : 3). In the first example, the adverb 'together' along with the collective pronoun 'we' aligns Scottish voters with the SNP as the ideological in-group. The second example carries the implication that Scotland is not in control, and that the SNP are distinctive in emphasising that Scotland is at the centre of their concerns. This point is further illustrated by, 'We will give our economy, the engine of our prosperity and our future, all the attention that it needs' (2003: 2) and 'We will get our public services back on track after years of neglect and mismanagement' (2003: 2). The possessive determiner 'our' refers to Scotland the nation, whose public services have been 'mismanaged' by implied out-groups, but 'we' of the SNP will manage the public services properly, therefore, positively characterising the actions of

the ideological in-group. In the context of the SNP's separatist discourse the out-groups are groups outwith Scotland, UK and Westminster based, as will be illustrated below.

Identifying with the electorate is a rhetorical practice which all the parties enact and it would not be particularly interesting or illuminating to catalogue every instance of the strategy here. Needless to say, one can briefly summarise examples from the other campaigning parties. For example, here the Liberal Democrats speak as advocates for patients in healthcare, 'We will put the patient at the centre of the NHS' (2003: 4). The Scottish Socialist Party constructs the in-group, often in terms of the nation and the people, for example 'the SSP reflects the diversity of modern Scotland.' (2003: 1). The SSP even list all those they consider to be part of their in-group. The SSP as a socialist party claim to represent the working class; who is considered part of that class is defined quite broadly,

Our members span the whole range of working class Scotland: fire fighters, nurses, call-centre workers, students, lone parents, shipyard workers, pensioners, ancillary workers, teachers, construction workers, clerical workers. (2003: 1)

All these various professions are presented as paratactic, equivalent in their status as 'working class'. A list such as this is rhetorically trying to extend the normal definition of what might normally be considered the working class (for example to include students and teachers), and demonstrate a broad appeal to potential voters. In similarly broad terms, the leader of the Scottish Conservatives identifies with an inclusive national electorate with 'I want the best for Scotland – for all of Scotland and its people' (2003: 2).

### *3.3.3 Constructing negative out-group representations*

This section will explore how the various parties rhetorically construct their opponents, applying the analytical framework outlined earlier. Out-groups are constructed as deictically distal and consequently analysis has been broken down to illustrate the use of the three axes (spatial, temporal and modal) and presented in tables which demonstrate the construction of each party's out-groups. Tables are



presented with three columns: ‘Out-groups’, indicating the type of group(s) identified by the uttering party; ‘Statements’, giving a specific textual example from the party’s manifesto; and ‘Deictic Axes’, subdivided into spatial, temporal and modal columns, which illustrate the linguistic cues which construct the out-group(s) as distal. The initial column ‘Out-groups’ is subdivided in three on the horizontal axis into ‘Party Political’, ‘Non-Party Political’ and ‘Locational’, indicating three different types of groups. The first two are self explanatory, being the difference between ‘Tories’ and ‘big business’, whereas the third type of group needs a little introduction. ‘Locational’ groups are those which are specifically identified as being located outside Scotland. The location of out-groups represented in the persuasive orations and rhetorical arguments of parties appears to be an important facet of Scottish political discourse. The data in the tables below is not exhaustive; examples have been chosen from the corpus of manifesto documents, for their illustrative purposes.

Table 3.1 illustrates the SNP’s construction of out-groups in their manifesto and the evidence here demonstrates important aspects of the SNP’s separatist ideology, as well as the nature of the party political debate they are engaged in at the devolved election. Note that the modal column represents moral degrees of righteousness and truthfulness, so that an out-group’s ‘piecemeal approach’ marks out-group actions as morally distal.

SNP				
Out-groups	Statements	Deictic Axis		
Party Political		Spatial	Temporal	Modal
Labour & Tory	We have suffered because successive Tory and Labour governments have taken a piecemeal approach to Scottish transport. (2003: 21)		‘successive Tory and Labour governments have taken’	‘We have suffered’  ‘piecemeal approach’
New Labour & Tory	The Tory de-regulation of buses has not been a success and neither has New Labour's attempts to deal with the situation in Parliament. (2003: 22)			‘has not been a success and neither has...’
Tory  Labour &  Labour-LibDem Coalition	For too long our public sector has been neglected. The needs of services, staff, and infrastructure have been at best mismanaged and at worst ignored by successive Tory, Labour, and now Labour-LibDem coalition policies. (2003: 4)		‘For too long’  ‘successive Tory, Labour and now Labour-LibDem coalition policies’	‘at best mismanaged and at worst ignored’

Labour-LibDem Coalition	The PFI-privatisation policy of the Labour-LibDem coalition is beginning to unravel. (2003 8)		'beginning'	'PFI-privatisation' 'is beginning to unravel'
Non-Party Political				
N/A				
Locational				
London government	London government regards the south east of England as the only powerhouse in the UK economy, with successive Chancellors regarding it as their only economic priority. (2003: 3)	'London government' 'UK economy'	'successive'	'their only economic priority'
Westminster & the UK Government	The Westminster-driven fragmentation and privatisation of our railways has been damaging for our economy...The privatisation of railway and signalling has been acknowledged as a failure even by the UK Government. (2003: 21)	'Westminster' 'the UK Government'	'The Westminster-driven fragmentation and privatisation'	'has been damaging' 'has been acknowledged as a failure even by...'

Table 3.1 SNP out-group deixis

The above table shows that the SNP identify three other party political out-groups. Labour, the Tories and the Labour-Liberal Democrat coalition are the unfavourable out-groups, opposed to a positive formulation of the SNP. In one of the tabulated examples ‘our’ is used to formulate the ideological in-group as both the SNP and the voters, with ‘our public sector’ denoting that the public sector is important to the in-group. Note that this is also an example of identifying with the electorate discussed previously. On the temporal axis these groups are constructed as having done things in the past and up until the present. These negative actions are also plotted distally on the modal axis, negatively characterising the Conservatives, Labour UK governments and the Labour-Liberal Democrat coalition’s management of the public sector as ‘mismanaged’ with its needs ‘ignored’. Figure 3.2 further illustrates that the ‘us’ of the SNP and the Scottish nation is portrayed as deictically proximal on both the *s* and *m* axes while out-groups and their actions are distal from the deictic centre of the in-group.






Figure 3.2 SNP out-group deixis: Tory and Labour governments

The SNP were the main party of opposition before the election and so quite as expected they criticise the current administration, identifying the ‘Labour-LibDem coalition’ as one of their out-groups. In addition to PFI and public sector criticisms in the examples in Table 3.1 the SNP also identify the coalition as being at fault in the following: ‘[t]he Labour -LibDem coalition has ignored these views and continues to press ahead with dangerous and unwanted GM field trials’ (2003: 16); and ‘[u]nder the Labour-LibDem coalition, Council Tax has risen by one third, yet local services have been pared to the bone’ (2003: 26). The SNP label Private Finance Initiatives which contribute to public sector funding as ‘PFI-privatisation’. ‘Privatisation’ connotes negativity in the discourse of the SNP, which is illustrated by verb phrase which further negatively characterised the actions of the policy as ‘beginning to unravel’ - connoting failure and lack of control. The negativity which ‘privatisation’ connotes here is context dependent, as noted earlier. One would expect Conservative readers to derive more positive meaning from the word. Labour and the Liberals do not describe PFI or PPP (public, private partnerships) as ‘privatisation’, as that word carries negative connotations in the political vernacular of the left<sup>37</sup>. The coalition

<sup>37</sup> How political parties discursively accommodate shifts in political position would be a fruitful area of analysis. As a party moves left or right in the political spectrum, which involves adopting policies and ideologies of previously unaccepted positions, they must reconcile this with their membership. Norman Fairclough discusses changes in the language of New Labour in *New Labour, New Language?* (2000). Particularly, in chapter 3 ‘The making of the language of New Labour’, he discusses the effects of Thatcherism and Neo-Liberalism on the language of Labour. The Labour leadership has often tried to

‘ignored’ public views on GM field trials, which are further described as ‘dangerous and unwanted’. Where taxes have risen, services have not improved; in fact they have metaphorically been ‘pared to the bone’, describing a result which negatively characterises their opponents. Therefore, the coalition’s policies and actions in these areas are located distally on the *m* axis, away from the SNP and public’s deictic centre.

At first this rhetorical behaviour appears quite normal and expected; however, on a closer look at the manifesto the Liberal Democrats do not feature once as a singular object of criticism. In relation to the negotiation of the ideological square the Liberal Democrats are not labelled as an out-group by themselves; only in coalition with Labour are they an out-group. This is regardless of the fact that the Liberal Democrats are also a unionist party; yet they do not receive the negative criticism for this ideological position that the other two unionist parties of British politics do (see below). This is not in accordance with van Dijk’s conception of the ideological square. In this instance one might postulate that a lack of direct criticism is most likely functioning as a tacit mitigation of the Liberal Democrat out-group’s beliefs and actions. A rhetorical accommodation of this type is most likely due to features of the rhetorical context, created by the mixed, proportional system of voting, which makes the Liberal Democrats the most likely coalition partners for Labour and the SNP. The latter parties must be careful not to alienate the party which holds the balance of power; neither can they embrace it wholeheartedly.

Van Dijk’s ideological square cannot account for such an eventuality and therefore the ideological square requires some adaptation. In a competitive environment which is likely to require at least two competing parties to cooperate, to obtain and maintain power, then potential partners cannot be characterised negatively, as the normal functioning of the ideological square would demand. Such circumstances create, for want of a better term, a quasi-in-group, which is afforded some of the latitude of the in-group without being fully conceptualised as the in-group. Language here plays a key role in mediating these new identities. By referring to the coalition through a superordinate term like the ‘Labour-LibDem coalition’ the Liberal Democrats can occupy a rhetorical space in SNP discourse which avoids criticism and doesn’t block potential future collaborations. The importance of re-

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reconcile the adoption of free market policies and ideological principles by claiming they ultimately succeed in achieving ‘social justice’, a central ideological principle of the left in British politics.



categorisation in reducing inter-group prejudice is supported by work such as Gaertner et al (2001)<sup>38</sup>. The SNP, however, can still claim they have been critical of the Liberal Democrats as the conditions of the ideological square and electoral competition require. This is an important rhetorical process which will be explored further in chapter 4.

As a nationalist and separatist party, the SNP look upon those who hold political power over Scotland but reside outside it as out-groups. Modal and spatial axes coalesce as out-groups are both spatially and morally distal from the in-group. The spatial location of out-groups within the UK bears a direct correlation to their moral remoteness. Therefore, 'London', 'Westminster' and 'the UK Government' are all objects of negative out-group characterisation. The metonymy of 'London government' in Table 3.1 emphasises the theme of the sentence that the 'south east of England' is the priority of UK governments based at Westminster, and therefore Scotland is not their priority. 'Westminster' is deployed as a negative epithet to an undesirable policy in 'The Westminster-driven fragmentation and privatisation'. London and Westminster are locations that function as metonymies for out-group governments that pursue policies which are not in the interests of Scotland. Similarly, 'Tory and Labour governments', which are London governments, have their actions negatively described as taking a 'piecemeal approach' to a Scottish matter. However, Brussels, Europe or the EU, although spatially distal, do not feature as out-groups. The lack of criticism is most obviously because this is not a European election, but then neither is it a Westminster election. Another reason is that the SNP's stated policy was for independence with full EU membership.

Therefore, for the SNP ideological out-groups are defined as those political powers residing outside of Scotland, but within the UK, such as 'Westminster', 'the UK government' and 'London government'. In addition to those out-groups defined by location, the SNP identify party political out-groups, including the 'Tories', 'Labour/New Labour', and the 'Labour-LibDem coalition'. For the SNP, whose most pointed criticism is directed at the unionist Labour and Conservative parties, it is unionism that remains the main criterion for an ideological out-group. The unionist

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<sup>38</sup> This work follows on in the tradition of Self Categorisation Theory and Social Identity Theory. Gaertner et al (2001) postulate that 'With a one-group representation, bias should be reduced primarily because the social distance with former out-group members has decreased and the social distance with former in-group members has remained relatively close' (2001: 357)

parties are defined as promoting the interests of London or the South East of England and not Scotland.

Labour’s manifesto contains relatively few attacks on their opponents; this may be because they were the main party of power and the incumbent administration. Manifestos in general appear to contain fewer direct attacks on opponents than party election broadcasts. This is probably because manifestos’ rhetorical purpose is more geared towards laying out the in-group’s intentions. However, Labour does make several notable attacks, which clearly indicates who they see as their political enemies.

Labour				
Out-groups	Statements	Deictic Axes		
Party Political		Spatial	Temporal	Modal
The Nationalists/SNP	We can build on what we've started, inside the UK, using the powers of devolution to take our country forward or we can rip it all up and start again with the Nationalist's plans for a separate Scottish state and risk all the upheaval and uncertainty that would create at this difficult and challenging time in Scotland and elsewhere. (2003: 5)	'inside the UK'  'our country'  'a separate Scottish state'  'in Scotland'	'at this difficult and challenging time'	'We can build on what we've started... or we can rip it all up and start again'  'risk all the upheaval and uncertainty'
Tories	No service suffered more under eighteen years of Tory rule than our National Health Service. Turning the tide on almost two decades of under-investment and neglect has been one of the biggest challenges Labour has faced in our first four years. (2003: 21)  The first term of the Parliament has also given a voice to Scotland's civic society in a way that was missing during the Tory years. (2003: 40)	'our National Health Service'	'under eighteen years'  'two decades'  'first four years'  'The first term'  'during the Tory years'	'No service suffered more'  'Turning the tide on... under-investment and neglect'  'that was missing'
Non-Party Political				
N/A				
Locational				
N/A				

Table 3.2 Scottish Labour Party out-group deixis

The first opponent in the Scottish context is the SNP. In Table 3.2 Labour and the electorate, partnered pronominally in the use of ‘we’, are positioned positively in the ideological square, metaphorically building Scotland; whereas the Nationalist’s



want to ‘rip it all up’, destroying the collective ‘we’ of the nation’s good work<sup>39</sup>. The ‘we’ of the nation is also functioning, as Billig (1995) would say, to deictically mark the homeland. The ‘Nationalists’ plans’ on independence are negatively characterised as a ‘risk’ to Scotland and this risk would cause ‘upheaval and uncertainty’ at a ‘challenging time’, plotting the SNP distally on the *m* axis. This attack on the SNP’s policy on independence is a recurrent theme in the Labour campaign and chimes with other attacks, for example in one of their PEBs (see Appendix Text C), conference speeches and press releases. The Labour party as a unionist party refers positively to the UK, placing the constitutional arrangement on the positive side of the ideological square and closer to the deictic centre of ‘our country’ Scotland. Labour make a contrast in the above example, between positive actions ‘inside the UK’ and potential negative outcomes in ‘a separate Scottish state’. The two sides of the ideological square are used to contrast unionist and separatist ideologies, unionist concepts are deictically proximal whereas separatism is distal.

The second ideological out-group explicitly identified in Labour’s manifesto is the Conservatives. Table 3.2 cites all the explicit attacks on the Conservative Party in the manifesto. There is one other less explicit example below in which the one can infer that the Conservatives are the object of a rhetorical sortie.

I still feel angry about all those wasted years when Scotland suffered under-investment and decline, and we did not have the opportunity to make our own decisions to change life in our communities. (2003: 3)

These attacks are constructed as part of Scotland’s past. Jack McConnell reminisces about ‘those wasted years’, in which ‘Scotland suffered underinvestment and decline’. Although the Conservatives are not mentioned they form part of the global coherence of ‘those wasted years’, ‘underinvestment and decline’ being the progeny of Conservative rule at Westminster. In Table 3.2, the suffering of the NHS ‘under eighteen years of Tory rule’, is the period of time since the last Labour government in Westminster. On the *t* axis the proximal positive present of Labour administrations in Westminster and Scotland has given a ‘voice’ to ‘Scotland’s civic society’,

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<sup>39</sup> The building metaphor is a recurrent theme of Labour’s election discourse and appeared to be used without irony, despite the controversy over escalating costs of the parliament building at the Holyrood site.



proximal on the *m* axis. This is contrasted with a modally and temporally distal Tory past.

Describing the Conservative Party only in terms of a historical period, as 'those wasted years', 'years of Tory rule' and 'during the Tory years', renders them archaic, serving to contrast a positive Labour present with a negative Conservative past on the ideological square. The Tories are constructed as part of a negative past which was endured by the people of Scotland, a meaning conferred by the orientational metaphor 'under' in 'under eighteen years of Tory rule'. The metaphor of being 'under' something implies oppression, and the negativity of lowness (Lakoff and Johnson, 1980: 15). Placing them in the past not only contrasts the Conservatives with Labour but relegates them to history: Tories are not the direct object of criticism but 'Tory' is a pejorative epithet to describe a period of the past which carries negative connotations, functioning as a metonymy for the events of that period.

What is significant by its omission is the lack of criticism of other parties, most notably the Liberal Democrats. Labour conceptualise both the SNP and the Conservative Party as their ideological opponents, though the SNP is perceived as a more serious threat, being the second party in the devolved parliament and opinion polls. Smaller parties might not be viewed as a threat to Labour's vote and therefore not worthy of attack; however, the Liberal Democrats as a centre left party and of significant electoral standing is a threat to the Labour vote, but is not the object of attack, indicating the mitigation by omission of an ideological out-group. The implication of this is again that the Liberals are past and potential coalition partners and so a direct or indirect attack on them may affect further opportunities to successfully obtain power. This parallels the SNP's rhetorical strategy towards the Liberal Democrats and on this initial evidence amounts to something out of the ordinary for traditionally adversarial British political discourse.

As the minority partner of coalition with Labour and a potential partner for the SNP the Liberal Democrats are constrained by this context in their production of election discourse. The SNP receive only one attack, early on in the manifesto, which plots their policy on independence as modally distal, i.e. that it is morally wrong to put independence above education and health policy. In this example the *t* and *m* axes converge as the modal auxiliary helps construct the potential future actions of the SNP, which are also characterised in terms of epistemic certainty. Similarly, the Conservatives receive only one rhetorical attack, which rehashes the traditional



argument of the left against the right that tax cuts will be at the expense of public services. More interesting is the Liberal Democrats' treatment of their coalition partners Labour and of agents external to Scotland.

Liberal Democrats				
Out-groups	Statements	Deictic Axis		
Party Political		Spatial	Temporal	Modal
SNP	'The SNP will put independence as a priority before schools and hospitals.' (2003: 3)		'will put'	'will put independence as a priority before...'
Conservatives	'The Conservatives only propose to cut services to pay for tax cuts.' (2003: 3)			'only propose to cut services to pay for tax cuts'
Labour	'We have scrapped tuition fees and brought back grants. We have made personal care free for the elderly. Labour have blocked these things in England. People can't trust Labour ruling on their own. The more votes we get, the more difference we can make.' (2003: 2)	'Labour... in England'  '...can't trust Labour ruling on their own'		'Labour have blocked these'  'People can't trust Labour...'
Non-Party Political				
Whitehall	We are sceptical of the value of proliferating government targets. A whole industry has been set up by Whitehall to measure the performance of the UK government. (2003: 11)	'by Whitehall'  'the UK Government'	'has been set up'	'We are sceptical of...'
Locational				
London Labour	The choice is clear. Labour's London government has not scrapped tuition fees or introduced free personal care. (2003: 2)	'London government'		'has not scrapped...'

Table 3.3 Scottish Liberal Democrat out-group deixis

The out-group, Labour, are defined here as 'Labour's London government, which is negatively characterised as not having done things which the Scottish Executive have claimed to have achieved, i.e. the abolition of higher education student tuition fees and the so called 'free personal care' for the elderly. London Labour is, therefore, both spatially and modally distal from the in-group. Labour is 'London' Labour, and not necessarily Scottish Labour, as the third example in Table

3.3 illustrates. Who Labour is in this extract is somewhat ambiguous; one might assume that it is Labour in general, with the prepositional phrase 'in England' providing specific spatial deixis for non action by the party. Therefore, there appears to be mitigation, or avoidance of criticism of Scottish Labour.

The 'We' of the first clause, in the third tabulated example, denotes the Liberal Democrats as achieving certain policies. Other statements in the manifesto include 'People can't trust Labour ruling on their own. The more votes we get, the more difference we can make' (2003: 3) and 'Labour, on their own, would have been a disappointment' (2003: 43), which carries the implication that people should vote for the Liberal Democrats as coalition partners. The Liberal Democrats seem to accept, without explicitly stating so, that they will not be the largest or majority party after the election. From this position they then argue for as many votes as possible to make them effective (that is influential) coalition partners. There is no outright attack on the Scottish Labour Party but rather on Labour in general or with an English/London focus. Like the SNP whose attacks on the Liberal Democrats were mitigated by including them with Labour in the coalition, the Liberal Democrats' attacks on Labour are in terms of their behaviour in distal England and London. Therefore, the Liberal Democrats are discursively creating an ideological position which includes coalition, and then do not directly attack one of their potential coalition partners in the Scottish Labour Party. Their statements here suggest that they do not expect an outright win but rather seek greater influence in the coalition.

'Whitehall' and the 'UK government' are also out-groups, negatively characterised as creating bureaucracy. Again the *s* and *m* axes converge, constructing out-groups that reside outside Scotland; this is a rhetorical strategy for developing an ideological position that appears to foreground Scotland, which is also to be expected in a devolved election where Scotland is more proximal to voters. The Liberal Democrats criticism of external (from Scotland) political agents is not from a constitutional perspective. Criticism of 'Whitehall' is denouncing only a small part of the overarching state, not the system as a whole. Though they favour a federal system for the entire UK, the bureaucracy criticism is not used as an argument for it. If anything, holding power in Scotland has added legitimacy to the Liberal Democrats at Westminster elections. They can now parry attacks which claim they can promise anything because they will not win office.



Applying the deictic analysis one can identify that, like the other three mainstream political parties of Scotland, the Conservatives construct the alternative mainstream parties as out-groups. In addition, the Scottish Executive is also subject to rhetorical attack as Table 3.4 below illustrates.

Conservatives				
Out-groups	Statements	Deictic Axis		
Party Political		Spatial	Temporal	Modal
Labour	Labour's return to tax and spend and its obsession with piling on new regulations threatens to impoverish us all. (2003: 19)	'Labour's return to tax and spend'  'us all'	'return to tax and spend'	'its obsession... threatens to impoverish us all'
Labour Liberal Democrats & SNP	This has happened because Labour, the Liberal Democrats and the SNP all believe that greater government control, higher public spending and the increased taxes and regulations that follow are the answers to all our problems. They are wrong. (2003: 2)			'This has happened because... all believe that... They are wrong'
Non-Party Political				
The Scottish Executive	The Scottish Executive is spending more on the health service, but the people of Scotland have paid the extra taxes to finance this and they are entitled to a better service in return. (2003: 11)	'The Scottish Executive'		'they are entitled to a better service'
Locational				
N/A				

Table 3.4 Scottish Conservative Party out-group deixis

The first and most obvious out-group is the Labour Party. The first example in Table 3.4 of 'Labour's return to tax and spend' besides being a typical criticism of the left by the right in British politics, is interesting deictically because it plots Labour as both spatially distal but roots the criticism as temporally in the here and now. For a Conservative reader, tax and spend is ideologically wrong (in this instance, the implication of the utterance) and therefore plotted ideologically distal on the *m* as the negative actions of the Labour out-group. The metaphor of 'returning' characterises Labour as travelling through space, back to an old position on the ideological road, but simultaneously anchors the negative behaviour of the out group in the present. Labour as the object of criticism modulates in specificity; the distinction between Labour at the UK and Scottish level is sometimes unclear. In this respect the Conservatives mirror Labour, as the most unionist of Scotland's parties, in obfuscating the distinction between parties operating at different levels of



government. As the party of power, Labour do so to construct a positive picture of the in-group, whereas the Conservatives employ the opposite side of the ideological square.

Under the Scotland Act 1998, although the Scottish Parliament does not have fully devolved economic powers, it does have the ability to vary the basic rate of income tax by three percent and it has control of local authority finance and business rates (Bogdanor, 2001: 205); therefore at first sight Labour in either political location, Westminster or Holyrood, could be the object of criticism. Whichever form of the Labour Party is the out-group, the Conservatives firmly identify themselves with the in-group of the electorate with the collective pronoun 'us' in 'threatens to impoverish us all'. The ambiguity between UK and Scottish identification is furthered as one reads on. The manifesto goes on to castigate Gordon Brown with the generic 'it is the taxpayer who is funding the Chancellor's excessive spending spree...' (2003: 19), referring to a Westminster politician, before returning the focus to Scotland with 'in the coming year the average family in Scotland will be paying an extra £225 a year' (2003: 19).

The Conservative manifesto also identifies the Liberal Democrats and the Labour-Liberal Democrat coalition as an out-group, referred to as the metonym of the 'Scottish Executive' in the third example in Table 3.4. The coalition is negatively characterised by 'they [the people of Scotland] are entitled to a better service in return', which carries the presupposition that the electorate are not receiving a good service for the taxes they are paying. This presupposition is therefore distal on the *m* axis as the negative and wrong actions of the out-group. Therefore, actions the coalition performed badly are subject to criticism. The Liberal Democrats and Labour are directly referenced for criticism with the relational clause 'Labour and the Liberal Democrats are responsible' (2003: 4) for the public's negative impression of the Scottish Parliament. The negative characterisation of public waste by the coalition is reinforced by the use of the pun 'Follyrood' for the Parliament building at the Edinburgh Holyrood site.

Along with Labour and the Liberal Democrats the SNP are also an out-group, constructed negatively as all being ideologically similar; the second example of Table 3.4. The adverb 'all' denotes that the three parties are alike in their belief, a belief which the Conservative manifesto emphatically disagrees with and negatively characterises with 'They are wrong', plotting them distally on the *m* axis. Therefore,



the Conservatives' ideology is positioned positively on the ideological square with the ideology of the three main centre-left parties of Scotland on the opposite side of the square.

The Greens in their manifesto break with the rhetorical conventions of the above parties and do not directly label any other Scottish party political out-groups.

Scottish Greens				
Out-groups	Statements	Deictic Axis		
Party Political		Spatial	Temporal	Modal
N/A				
Non-Party Political				
National governments	Local councils have either been undermined or undervalued in the past, despite their far greater impact on day-to-day life than the national government. (2003: 9)	'national'		'have either been undermined or undervalued ... despite'
The car lobby	Too often attempts to introduce greener transport policies are blocked by the powerful car lobby. (2003: 12)			'Too often'  'attempts... are blocked by...'
Shareholders	This would produce a transport system geared towards the needs of passengers rather than the profits of shareholders. (2003: 12)			'This would produce... rather than...'
Locational				
N/A				

Table 3.5 Scottish Greens out-group deixis

In Table 3.5's first example 'national government' must represent current and previous Labour and Conservative administrations, but who is responsible for undermining and undervaluing local government is left unstated in an agentless passive clause. 'National' provides a spatial anchor for the utterance, which is the antithesis of 'Local councils'. The national government's actions are ordered on the negative side of the ideological square and, therefore, plotted as distal on the *m* axis, having 'undermined' and 'undervalued' local government.

Although the Greens do not construct many political out-groups, this is not to say that they do not construct any identifiable out-groups, it is just that they are non-party political in nature. Business, particularly the 'car lobby' and 'shareholders', are the out-groups of the second and third tabulated examples, who negatively block

‘greener transport policies’, and who reward ‘shareholders’ rather than passengers. The Greens construct their version of the ideological square with environmentalism (including social and environmental justice) on the positive side, while Western consumer capitalism is on the opposing negative side of the ideological square. Correspondingly ‘business’s’ actions and attributes are modally distal as they ‘block’ positive action by the in-group. These antithetical positions, of positive and proximal in-group versus negative and distal out-group are discursively plotted in example three of Table 3.5, where the adverb ‘rather’ grammatically sets in opposition the two sides of the Greens’ ideological square.

Finally, unlike the Greens, the SSP link big business and what they term ‘establishment’ parties. As such the in-group is defined in opposition to the out-groups of establishment parties and big business or the ‘godfathers of global capitalism’ (2003: 2). Establishment parties are identified as ‘the big four’ (2003: 3) of Labour, the Conservatives, the SNP and the Liberal Democrats, and this negatively characterised orthodoxy is also referred to as ‘jaded mainstream politicians’ (2003: 3) and by the metonymy of the ‘Scottish establishment’ (2003: 2). As the in-group therefore the SSP is anti-establishment and as such they state that they will not follow the practices of those parties, ‘Our politics are not dictated by electoral pragmatism. We do not sanitise our principles in pursuit of media respectability’ (2003: 1). Therefore, the in-group is positively constructed by defining it in opposition to the out-group(s).

As a nationalist party, the SSP like the SNP identifies holders of political power outwith Scotland as ideological out-groups. Metonymies of external political power such as Westminster, London, Washington and Brussels mark those out-groups as both spatially and modally distal. The establishment parties and their interests are linked to those agents of global-capitalism, whose power and influence is an antagonism to the in-group. One sees evidence of constructing a link between big business and establishment parties in the third example of Table 3.6. Not only in the eyes of the SSP is there a consensus in favour of big business but the proximal ‘we’ of the party is said to be up against antithetical and distal ‘wealthy opponents, bankrolled by rich business interests’ (2003: 3). Therefore, wealth and business interests are values and attributes of the out-group, the antonyms of which are the values and attributes with which the ‘we’ of the working class in-group can identify. The SSP go on to state explicitly that if they win power they ‘will stand up to the economic power



of the multinationals and the political power of Washington, London and Brussels’ (2003: 6), clearly defining the opposing sides of the ideological square.

SSP				
Out-groups	Statements	Deictic Axis		
Party Political		Spatial	Temporal	Modal
Establishment parties	‘Some of these policies will provoke palpitations at the heart of the Scottish establishment.’ (2003: 2)	‘the Scottish establish-ment’		
The Big Four (Labour, Liberal Democrats, SNP & Conservatives)	‘In this election, we are up against wealthy opponents, bankrolled by rich business interests. As a young, rising party which is rooted in the working class we cannot hope to compete financially with the big four’ (2003: 3)	‘we are up against wealthy opponents’	‘In this election’	‘we are up against wealthy opponents’  ‘we cannot hope to compete financially with the big four’
Non-Party Political				
Big Business	‘The Pro-big Business consensus of the establishment parties that has generated widespread disillusionment in politics’ (2003: 1)	‘establish-ment’  ‘widespread’		‘has generated widespread disillusion-ment in politics’
Multinationals	‘The SSP has the ambition of winning power and establishing an independent socialist republic that will stand up to the economic power of the multinationals and the political power of Washington, London and Brussels’ (2003: 6)	‘multi-nationals’  ‘Washing-ton, London and Brussels’		‘will stand up to the economic power of the multinationals and the political power of...’
Godfathers of global capitalism	‘Entire continents are being turned into gigantic slave labour camps, their natural resources stripped bare by the godfathers of global capitalism’ (2003: 2)	‘Entire continents’  ‘global’		‘turned into gigantic slave labour camps’ ‘their natural resources stripped bare’
Locational				
Washington London & Brussels	‘will stand up to the economic power of the multinationals and the political power of Washington, London and Brussels’ (2003: 6)	‘multi-nationals’  ‘Washing-ton, London and Brussels’		‘will stand up to’
Westminster	‘Nonetheless, as it stands, the Scottish Parliament is a PG certificate parliament whose powers are heavily censored by the grown-ups in Westminster’ (2003: 4)	‘the Scottish Parliament’  ‘in West-minster’		‘are heavily censored by the grown-ups’

Table 3.6 SSP out-group deixis

### 3.4 Conclusion

The findings of this chapter can be summarised as follows. Firstly, it can be seen that not every party has the same vision of who their ideological opponents are, as this varies considerably across the political spectrum. For the four dominant parties of Scottish politics (Labour, the SNP, the Conservatives and the Liberal Democrats) their out-groups are predominantly party political in nature. However, even among those parties there are differences. Labour and the Conservatives tend to construct their out-groups mainly as Scottish in location, though the Conservatives are occasionally ambiguous as to whether they are referring to Labour as a UK party or just as the Labour Party in Scotland. These two parties are the most pro-union of the Scottish parties. Labour is the party of UK government at the time of campaigning, therefore they are less likely to construct out-groups which would politically compromise the union. The SNP, the Liberal Democrats and the SSP also add a locational facet in defining ideological out-groups. Both the SNP and SSP parties are pro-independence for Scotland (as are the Greens) and therefore identify political agents outwith Scotland as ideological opponents. Although ideologically federal-unionists in nature, the Liberal Democrats also define out-groups locationally. As the minority coalition partner that is not in power in the UK government, the Liberals try to characterise government without them as negative, i.e. 'People can't trust Labour ruling on their own' (2003: 2). The final major difference is illustrated by the two minority parties of Scottish politics. Both the SSP and the Greens identify non-political out-groups, namely agents of global capitalism, such as 'the car lobby' and 'multinationals'. This is unsurprising from parties with either socialist or environmentalist ideologies. The Greens, however, do tend to be less pejorative in their characterisations and ambiguous when defining political out-groups, which reflects their stated desire to run a positive campaign.

Devolution as the political system forming the context for these displays of ideology can be seen to effect those ideological utterances. For the Labour Party describing positively a 'partnership' between Scottish devolved government and UK Westminster government necessarily optimistically draws on the newly established constitutional context, between national and devolved parliaments. Therefore, the Labour Party, in government north and south of the border and as ideologically unionist, defines the party in both locations as the in-group. For nationalist parties like



the SSP and the SNP, defining ideological antonyms to Scotland positively identifies the in-group with Scottish voters and constructs political foes that have no immediate relevance to the groups participating in the devolved elections.

The chapter further demonstrated how the campaigning parties rhetorically constructed in and out-groups. This construction is affected by the ordering processes of the ideological square, which were demonstrable in manifesto discourse. In addition to the ideological square ordering groups on an antithetical basis, it was shown that in and out-groups are plotted discursively as being in proximity to and distant from the deictic centre of a discourse. Chilton's (2004) deictic analysis illustrated that the in-group was plotted as deictically proximal, whereas out-groups were deictically distal on the basis of at least one of three axes: spatial, temporal and modal. Proximal positions tend to correspond to positive sides of the ideological square, whereas distal positions plot the negative sides. However, the descriptive power of van Dijk's (1998) ideological square was found to be inadequate when applied to certain aspects of devolved Scottish electoral discourse. The ideological square is discussed further in the next chapter.

The mixed proportional electoral system in particular can be seen to have a material effect in the discursive construction of ideological in and out-groups, especially for the three parties most likely to form a government. Labour do not strongly identify the Liberal Democrats as an ideological out-group, whereas the SNP only ever define the Liberals as an out-group in conjunction with Labour, as in 'the Labour-Liberal Democrat coalition'. Labour as an out-group for the Liberals generally focuses on Labour as a UK party, ruling alone at Westminster; no direct criticism of Scottish Labour is made. Although the SNP are defined negatively as an out-group, it is only once in the entire manifesto. The negative comment occurs within the UK Party's leader's comments, at the beginning of the document and not as part of the Scottish leader's comments. The constitutional arrangements of devolution can therefore be seen to have a material effect on the ways in which parties discursively negotiate the political field. As the two dominant parties of Scottish politics and the two parties most likely to be either in office or the main opposition party, Labour and the SNP construct adversarial positions in relation to each other. This antagonism reflects old adversaries, which are traditionally played out in the Single Member Simple Plurality (SMSP) system of the Westminster elections, and also reflect the benefit both parties receive from the 'first vote' in the mixed system



used at the Holyrood elections. However, because of the proportional 'second vote' neither party is likely to obtain a majority in the Parliament. The Liberal Democrats obtain more seats than they would under a purely SMSP system and as they are centre-left ideologically they are more natural bedfellows for both Labour and the SNP (unlike the Conservatives). Therefore, because of the conditions created by the devolved constitutional arrangements, there are less than antagonistic positions constructed between the two main parties and the Liberals, discursively leaving room for the possibility of coalition. The ideological square requires augmentation to adequately account for discourse which involves instances of out-group accommodation and compromise. In such conditions, a quasi in-group category is necessary, where an out-group can be constructed in terms similar to the in-group: an allied out-group's negative actions/attributes/achievements can then be discursively mitigated on their behalf, either directly or by omission. This is another point explored further in the following chapter.

The proportional aspect of the electoral system confers a more tangible opportunity for minority parties like the Greens and SSP to obtain elected representatives. These minority parties can obtain seats despite them being typically seen as being peripheral to the traditional mainstream of British politics. They can campaign more effectively on ideological ground either neglected or long since abandoned by the four dominant parties in Scottish politics. The 'second vote' encourages voters to make an additional choice and although nothing prohibits voters from marking two votes for the same party, a second vote does afford an opportunity to make a distinct second choice. The minority parties, and the Liberal Democrats, have been quick to realise the potential of the second vote for their electioneering. Both the Greens and the Liberal Democrats ran a 'use your second vote' campaign message in the 2003 campaign to encourage voters to make a different choice than the first vote. The presupposition of a 'use your second vote' is that voting for the same party twice is somehow not using the second vote. This message implies that a voter should make an alternative choice, which is a very different method of voting than in Westminster SMSP elections. A voter can more easily vote tactically for a multiplicity of voices in Parliament, rather than bipartite division between a government and an opposition party. It was suggested that this situation has also affected the type of rhetorical proposition which the Liberal Democrats employ in



campaign discourse, with them proposing to be a balance to Labour governing on their own.

This chapter has attempted to demonstrate the material effect on the linguistic construction of party political positions in the manifestos by the constitutional arrangements of devolution in Scotland for the Scottish Parliament Elections of 2003. The detail contained in the manifestos afforded an opportunity to look in some length at the ideological negotiation of the political field in these elections. This investigation illustrated that the familiar battleground of nationalism and unionism still plays a part in the fight for democratic representation in Scotland. However, because of the contextual conditions of the electoral system the two opposing sides of the argument have to construct potential alliances, i.e. between the unionist Liberal Democrats and the nationalist/separatist SNP. The parties' conceptions of what the nature of the relationship between Scotland and the UK is and should be still affect the manner in which ideological positions are constructed. Unionist Labour constructs a position of partnership, while the Conservatives tend not to draw heavily on negative comparisons between Scotland and the UK. The Conservatives in utilising a large degree of ambiguity when employing referential labels to Labour obfuscate the distinction between Labour in Scotland and Labour in the UK. Conservatives present UK Labour and Scottish Labour as a unitary body and in doing so illustrate the unity of their constitutional conception of Scotland's relationship with the rest of the UK. Therefore, nationalist parties defined locational non-Scottish out-groups, such as 'Westminster' and 'the UK government'. The exception to this was the Liberal Democrats who because of their need to demonstrate their effectiveness in a power-sharing executive constructed the 'UK government' and 'London Labour' as out-groups. And finally, the electoral system for the Scottish Parliament has given minority parties a greater voice, as they can utilise the 'second vote'. The SSP identify the traditional parties of UK politics as 'the establishment' and link them with non-traditional political out-groups of capitalist industry. Whereas the Greens, similarly identify industrial organisations as out-groups they do not directly criticise other political parties.

The following chapter will further explore the rhetorical strategies which are in evidence in the 2003 manifestos, particularly those of which mediate the relationship between the centre parties of Scottish devolved politics. However, these strategies will be investigated in relation to their manifestation in party election

broadcasts, another of the main texts of election campaigns. It will become apparent that these strategies are repeated across different modes of electoral discourse, reproducing aspects of the rhetorical form and content of ideological discursive strategies.



## CHAPTER 4: RHETORICAL STRATEGIES IN PARTY ELECTION BROADCASTS: REDEFINING THE IDEOLOGICAL SQUARE IN THE CENTRE OF DEVOLVED SCOTTISH ELECTIONS

### 4.1 Introduction

Party election broadcasts (PEBs) like manifestos are a major set of campaign texts in a party's electioneering arsenal; so it is those texts that will now be addressed. This chapter will investigate rhetorical strategies voiced through the broadcasts. In doing so this discussion will expand on the analysis of ideological negotiation carried out in the previous chapter. The initial observations made concerning the operations of van Dijk's (1998) ideological square will be further investigated. Both chapters 2 and 3 indicated that adversarial and cooperative rhetorical strategies are in operation in devolved Scottish elections; and that of particular interest were the three centre-left parties, Labour, the SNP and the Liberal Democrats. As such, specific attention will be paid to the ways in which the three centre-left parties of Scottish politics negotiate and construct positions in relation to each other, in the rhetorical space of Scottish political discourse. It will be shown that these observations add support to the previous chapter's call for a redefining of the ideological square; the implication of which is that the character of Scottish devolved electoral politics is somewhat different to the traditional adversarial paradigm of British politics (Bogdanor, 2001: 285-286).

Like manifestos, PEBs have received little scholarly attention; instead research has tended to focus on the impact of campaign reportage in the media (Pattie and Johnston, 2002: 334). However, of the work that has been carried out there are some noteworthy investigations. Pattie and Johnston (2002) assessed the impact of party broadcasts on voting behaviour in the 1997 British general election, finding that there were effects on those who viewed them. Broadcasts were shown to make voters more favourably disposed to parties and their leaders. Although there was no impact on Labour and Conservative supporters' voting intentions for that election, there was a positive swing towards support for Liberal Democrats after viewing. Pearce (2001 and 2005) has taken a CDA approach to analysis, investigating personalisation and informalization in party broadcasts. Most interestingly, Pearce (2005), in a corpus stretching from 1966 to 1997, found an increase in informality over time. Rosenbaum



(1997: 41-77) provides the most comprehensive historical account of PEBs from their inception in the early 1950s through to the late 1990s. His study is situated within a wider discussion of the development of British campaigning methods. Many of Rosenbaum's observations supply the background detailing of the genre illustrated below.

The work of Pattie and Johnston, and Pearce is relevant to this thesis because it has begun to investigate PEBs as texts involved in persuasive discourse. The latter explores some of the processes involved in persuasive public discourse while the former deals with effects of that discourse. The studies represent a meagre, but fruitful, beginning to the investigation of PEBs. More work is still to be done to build on Pearce's initial sorties into investigating the rhetorical strategies used in these largely under-researched political texts. This chapter will attempt to add to this work, by investigating some of the argumentative strategies employed in broadcasts by competing parties. At the time of writing there appeared to be no published research on PEBs for devolved Scottish Parliament elections; therefore this chapter will also begin to fill that gap.

The first televised PEBs were broadcast during the 1951 general election campaign, with Labour, Conservatives and the Liberals all receiving one 15 minute broadcast. Rosenbaum (1997) divides the evolution of PEBs into three phases. The first phase, 1951-68, was characterised by their length, their monopoly on electoral broadcasting and a lack of sophistication. Broadcasts' simplicity were constrained by both the newness of the medium and the limitations of technology i.e., large, unwieldy cameras and expensive, time consuming editing. Broadcasts tended to consist of a leading party member(s) (not necessarily the leader) often talking straight to camera, reading from prepared notes, a so-called 'talking heads' format still seen today. Other formats included a scripted interview and staged press conferences. Before 1959 general elections received no TV or radio news coverage and, therefore, PEBs occupied a monopoly of election broadcast material. Phase two, 1969-78, benefited from improvements in technology, which allowed for cheaper and non-studio based filming. This period also saw a greater degree of creativity in production, with soap-opera, TV advert and broadcast news formats being used, and in general a greater use of visuals. By phase three, 1978-present, Rosenbaum notes that 'talking heads [were] decreasing' (1997: 59). Broadcasts became part of more integrated advertising strategies, coordinating with other party campaign materials. This more



commercial and integrated approach is often credited as beginning with the Conservative appointment of the advertising agency Saatchi and Saatchi (Bruce, 1992; Rosenbaum, 1997). By this later phase broadcasts are shorter and now range between 3 and 5 minutes in length. Reductions in length and the use of advertising agencies have led to accusations that PEBs amount to political adverts, though in the UK, broadcasts are still longer than their U.S counter parts. Unlike adverts political broadcasts have little regulation in terms of content and fairness. They are regulated by OfCom and the Electoral Commission regarding allocation of scheduling slots, which is decided by previous electoral representation. In practice the regulators rarely get involved, negotiations are carried out between broadcasters and parties.

Although, PEBs are rarely considered examples of fine political programming, they still reach a mass audience, broadcast during prime-time scheduling, as well as at other times of day. Unlike manifestos, their audiences can be in the millions. The 2001 and 2005 UK general elections saw Labour's initial broadcast receive 10 and 11.9 million viewers respectively, the Conservative's 8.9 and 12.8 million, and the Liberal Democrats 8.9 and 13.2 million ([http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/uk\\_politics](http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/uk_politics), 03.07.2006). Although Scotland is roughly one tenth of the population of the UK, proportionate viewing figures would still represent a notable mass audience for any party's broadcast. Since their post-war beginnings PEBs have been thought to have reduced in importance. Rosenbaum comments, '[t]his is due not so much to their own content as to a major change in the broadcasting environments – the fact that other political broadcasting has greatly increased' (1997: 74). This shift to more emphasis on campaign reportage may well negatively affect the primary importance and impact of PEBs in directly reaching voters. However, broadcasts still have an important place in the overall campaign strategy of political parties. Party broadcasts represent free airtime unaffected by journalistic questions or interpretation, an opportunity to communicate a message in precisely the way a party wishes it to be portrayed. And like manifestos, PEBs are political set pieces from which spin-off media coverage occurs, something discussed in the following chapter. Due to their shorter length PEBs have a much narrower focus than manifestos, perhaps only dealing with one or two issues. In general, of the broadcasts investigated here, they also tend to be more adversarial and negative in style; a point explored further below.

## 4.2 Argumentative Strategies

This section will focus on how politicians structure their arguments to advocate their party's position. The structuring effects of van Dijk's ideological square, as in the previous chapter, will be shown to be at play. However, also as with the discussion of the previous chapter, evidence will be presented to suggest a reformulation of the ideological square to account for instances of cooperative discourse. In exploring these argumentative strategies the linguistic tools employed will be investigated.

This analysis has categorised four main types of argumentative strategy in the texts analysed: firstly, those with an adversarial structure, which constructs the addressing party and its policies in positive terms and the opposition and their policies in negative terms; secondly, single-sided positive arguments, where only the positive side of an argument is presented without making negative comparisons with opposition parties; thirdly, mitigating arguments made against negative accusations; and fourthly, rhetorical strategies for discursively negotiating power sharing and shared policy achievements in an adversarial campaign. This is not intended to be an exhaustive list of rhetorical strategies. Instead, these particular strategies have been investigated because they relate to the negotiation of parties' ideological positions in relation to each other, rather than strategies for presenting various policies. Placing these argumentative strategies within the wider context of the devolved Scottish political environment will facilitate the interpretation of their meanings. Reflexively, this interpretation will further elucidate understanding of the nature of post devolution political discourse.

Data in this study is referenced from transcripts of each party's broadcasts. Texts are labelled A through to F and a complete transcript of each is located in the Appendix.

### *4.2.1 Adversarial strategies*

This strategy most comprehensively reproduces the structural properties of van Dijk's ideological square. That is to say, it structures arguments around the positive representation of in-group actions, attributes and achievements and correspondingly equivalent negative representations of out-groups. As indicated in the previous chapter, whether a party does or does not hold power when the election is called



affects the type of arguments parties can make: it is easier for those in power to legitimately point to achievements over the preceding term of office. Similarly, for an opposition party their rhetorical position allows them to point to the actions and achievements of the government, which they would necessarily characterise negatively. Nevertheless, adversarial strategies reproduce both sides of the ideological square, whether adopted by the opposition or governing party.

The positive side of this strategy may be summarised with the following possible moves (where X represents a positive value and Y a negative value):

- We have done X
- We will continue to do X
- We are doing X
- We will do X
- We believe in X/We are X

The first four moves can apply to actions and achievements i.e. ‘we have reduced waiting lists’ (achievement), ‘Scottish Labour continues to fight poverty’ (action), ‘we have introduced harsher sentences and continue to speak out against racism’ (achievement and verbal action). The fifth move encodes in-group attributes, as in ‘we believe in honesty’ or ‘we are whiter than white’. A statement such as ‘we believe in our actions on child poverty’ could be interpreted as embodying several moves. It could be an assertion of belief or an attribute, where actions/achievements have ideological connotations, and/or as an assertion of action/achievement. The point is that the above represent possible functional moves that necessarily require contextualised interpretation. As discussed in chapter 3, tense and aspect also play a role in representing actions, attributes and achievements, for example, in the encoding of past, present and potential future actions. As in the difference between the following assertions ‘we have put more money into the NHS’ (present tense – perfect aspect) and ‘we are reducing waiting lists’ (present tense – progressive aspect). The former claims to have achieved something (past action with a positive present consequence), while the latter encodes an action which is ongoing. As per the previous chapter, aspect would be used to encode the future.

Similarly, the negative side of this strategy may be formulated in the following potential moves such as:

- They will not do X
- They did not do X

- They have done Y
- They will do Y
- They will continue to do Y
- They believe in Y/They are Y
- They said/promised they'd do X but did Y
- They said/promised they'd do X but did not

The second, third, seventh and eighth points would probably, though not exclusively, be found in the discourse of opposition parties, where they are critiquing the actions and achievements of those in office. Again these represent potential functional moves, rather than surface representations; and this is not meant to represent an exhaustive list, but represents examples from the forthcoming discussion. A more extensive study, focusing on the categorisation of potential rhetorical moves, could be carried out. However, what is of interest to this investigation is not the cataloguing of strategies but how and why strategies are used, and the meanings they produce when interpreted in context. That is, the focus on interpreting and understanding the implications and meanings of the presence or absence of particular strategies.

In sum, adversarial argumentative moves are a formulaic discursive strategy employed in PEBs (and other spheres of political discourse), which presents a party's policies as a positive alternative to an opposition's negatively presented policies. The above, essentially, reduce to the propositions 'vote for us because of X' and 'do not vote for them because of Y'. It is a rhetorical device designed to persuade an audience. That audience is presented with two alternatives: a positive and a negative choice, as in, 'Scotland faces a choice' (Text A), 'you have a simple choice' (Text D), 'a massive choice' (Text B) and 'there is a choice' (Text C). In constructing this argument, linguistic tools are used: modality to emphasise obligation and duty or a lack thereof, and a desire or degree of commitment; transitivity to realise agency and responsibility in events; grammatical repetition and lists, expressing emphasis, equivalence or formulating contrasts (Atkinson, 1984); and similes, metaphors and puns to construct complex meanings. This adversarial rhetorical strategy mirrors the adversarial tradition of British politics and is used by Labour, the SNP and the Conservative and Unionist Party in their PEBs for the 2003 Scottish Parliamentary Election. The Conservatives and Labour are traditional adversaries in Westminster, whereas Labour and SNP reflect the main adversaries on the Scottish scene. The way these parties choose to construct their relationship in language (their rhetorical



strategies) reflects their adversarial relationship. However, as has been previously discussed, the electoral system and resulting make-up of the Scottish Parliament somewhat complicates the traditional paradigm of adversarial British politics. Nevertheless, this strategy provides some familiar ground from which to further the investigation begun in chapters 2 and 3; and it is to specific examples of the adversarial strategy that this chapter now turns.

This first example is drawn from Labour's broadcast (Appendix Text C). The nationalist agenda has already been identified as a salient and defining issue in Scottish politics. Therefore, it may be fitting to begin with a representation of the adversarial strategy which focuses on this issue. Labour asserts, 'If Scotland votes SNP on May 1<sup>st</sup>, on May 2<sup>nd</sup> the Nationalists will begin the process of breaking up Britain.' In this extract the SNP's policy of independence for Scotland is formulated as a negative value by metaphorically referring to the process of creating an independent Scotland as 'breaking up Britain'. Using conditional 'If...' helps construct a possible future action; and 'Scotland' is the Actor in this hypothetical act. The listener is the potential voter but the negative connotations of voting for the SNP are not formulated in a direct address to voters, as in 'If you vote SNP...' using the second person pronoun 'you'. Voters are collectively referred to as the nation, with the metonymical use of 'Scotland'. Possibly, 'Scotland' is used here to evoke nationalistic responsibility or pride and an implied set of responsibilities to the nation. In the main clause 'the Nationalists' fill the role of Actor and are then responsible for the destructive process of 'breaking up Britain'. An SNP policy is characterised as a negative value by portraying the SNP as the Actor carrying out a destructive process. Therefore, voting for the SNP ('If Scotland votes SNP') would result in the implementation of that 'negative' policy.

The hypothetical future constructed by 'If Scotland votes SNP' indicates a strong prediction of result. Through the epistemic use of the modal auxiliary verb 'will' in 'the Nationalists will begin the process of breaking up Britain' a complex policy is represented in more definite terms. Alternative realisations such as, 'the Nationalists would/could/may/might begin the process of breaking up Britain' certainly express a weaker prediction of result. The SNP's stated policy at the point of the election was to hold a referendum (if obtaining office), which would ask the electorate whether or not they wanted an independent Scotland. However, this SNP policy, is transformed into a more certain ('will') process.

After some more detail of the possible negative effects of independence, Labour presents itself as the positive electoral alternative with, ‘In Scotland today, there are more people in work and unemployment is at a record low’. Labour’s responsibility is left implicit; their role forms part of the global coherence of the discourse, with Labour in office north and south of the boarder. That is, Labour’s position as the power-holding party is a defining characteristic of the rhetorical context of their and other parties’ utterances. Instead, the discourse is situated in both time and place. (The following analysis is in the Systemic Functional tradition of grammatical analysis. See Leech, Deuchar and Hoogenraad (1982) for a more detailed guide to the nature and use of transitivity labels employed in this analysis.)

	circ: loc/place			circ: loc/time	
[	(In	Scotland)		(today)...	
PP	pr	n		AvP	av

This provides the context – ‘here’ and ‘now’ – for the following positive values of ‘more people in work’ and ‘unemployment is at a record low’. Low unemployment and economic success are salient policy issues in election campaigns, with governing parties claiming economic success and opposition parties attempting to criticise the government’s economic success and suggest alternative solutions<sup>40</sup>.

Labour’s role in the positive reality is implicit throughout. ‘Scotland’ either forms a circumstance of location, as above, or fills the role of carrier/possessed, as in,

carrier/possessor		pr: possession		attribute: possessed		
{[(Scotland)		(has)		(the lowest mortgage rates)...		
NP	n	VP	v	NP	d	adj n n

Labour, in leaving itself implicit in the positive propositions of Scotland’s proposed economic success, is closely associating itself with Scotland, the nation and its successes, implying the proposition, ‘voting for labour is a vote for economic success’. It should be noted, though, as was illustrated in the previous two chapters, Labour is more explicit in its manifesto in relating itself with UK and Scottish economic success

<sup>40</sup> Ipsos Mori is one of the UK’s largest pollsters. From 1995-2005 they record issues related to education, health, law and order and the economy as consistently the most salient issues to voters (<http://www.ipsos-mori.com/polls/trends/importance-of-key-issues.shtml>).



Constructing Labour policies and achievements in positive terms, contrasted with negative formulations of the SNP, forms the overall pattern in the discourse of Labour's PEBs and typifies the adversarial structuring of campaign arguments. 'Scotland', with Labour implicit, is portrayed in positive terms ('Scotland has the lowest mortgage rates ever' and 'In Scotland, we are building new schools, cutting class sizes, investing in education') and then the SNP's policy on independence is depicted as putting 'all that at risk'. This strategy, therefore, encodes the rhetorical binary contrasts Atkinson (1984) explicates, which matches the discursive strategies of the ideological square. Labour choosing to use the unionist/separatist issue in their PEBs affirms the importance of the issue in Scottish politics as suggested in the previous two chapters.

The SNP's PEB (Text D) use the same rhetorical strategy as the above Labour example. In a short film where the audience sees an old man waiting for treatment in the NHS and eventually dying, intermittent messages are flashed on screen, before the then party leader John Swinney directly addresses the viewers. The argument begins with negative assessments of Labour's policies on health.

Labour said they'd reduce waiting lists. They haven't.  
Labour said they'd deal with bed shortages. They haven't.  
Labour said they'd tackle staff shortages. They haven't.

In all three propositions Labour is said to have promised something, encoded by the projected clause with a verbal process 'said' and a modalised form 'would' or 'they'd', which indicates strong commitment, from the epistemic system of modality (Simpson, 1993: 50). This forms the first half of an adversarial strategy; however, in this variation (Text D) instead of an opponent's position being constructed in terms of negative policies which they have done or will do, it is in terms of positive policies they promised to do but failed to deliver. Later in the broadcast, John Swinney goes on to reinforce the negative propositions of Labour policies in a direct address with informal syntax and a modalised categorical statement, 'Vote Labour and you'll wait and you'll wait'. As with the previous example from Labour, this strategy encodes a cause + consequence, i.e. 'if you do X, Y will happen', as in 'Vote Labour and you will wait' versus 'Vote SNP and they'll begin breaking up Britain'. Waiting for hospital treatment on long waiting lists is formulated into a pun on waiting for change under a Labour administration. This message recalls the preceding short film as well

as the SNP's first PEB of the election which showed people singing 'Why are we waiting', in a pastiche of the black and white headshots of a United Colours of Benetton advert.

The positive side to this strategy mirrors the negative formulations, putting forward the positive SNP proposition, 'Vote for the SNP... and you'll see a difference'. Instead of 'and you'll wait' it is 'and you'll see a difference'. This time the use of deontic modality with 'will', emphasising commitment to a positive position, employing the metonymy of 'a difference'. The metonymy functions as an abridgement of 'we will reduce waiting lists, we will deal with bed shortages, we will tackle staff shortages'.

In this adversarial rhetorical strategy Labour is the object of the SNP's criticism. However, The SNP do not focus their criticism on Labour's power sharing partners the Liberal Democrats. As suggested in the previous chapter, this is possibly because of the Liberal Democrats' position as a probable coalition partner for the SNP. Therefore, both Labour and the SNP's omission of criticism of the Liberal Democrats in their PEBs seems to support the assertion made in the previous chapter. This point will be developed further below, as more evidence is considered.

#### *4.2.2 Non-adversarial positive strategies*

Unlike the previous strategy, the single positive case does not seek to persuade by presenting the voter with positive and negative alternative choices. Instead, only the positive case of the addressing party is constructed. The moves, therefore, are the same as those available on the positive side of the adversarial strategy above. The actions or existence of other competing out-group parties are not evident, they are left unmentioned. The Liberal Democrats provide an example of this type of rhetorical strategy in one of their election broadcasts (Text F). In this PEB the in-group party's position is set out in positive terms. For example, 'Jim Wallace takes particular pride in what the Scottish Liberal Democrats have done for older people'. Using present perfect aspect, the Liberal Democrats refer to achievements in the recent past, with present consequences. This statement is personalised and anchored in the present by a statement in the present tense simple aspect 'Jim Wallace takes particular pride', which models the party leader's feelings (now) on a presupposition of a particular policy achievement (of the recent past).



A similar positive formulation, from the same broadcast, constructs Liberal Democrat ethos and policy again in terms of the experience of its leader. The broadcast asserts, 'With teenage daughters Jim Wallace knows the importance of education. He was determined to get university tuition fees abolished and he succeeded' (Text F). Here Jim Wallace, 'he', is a Carrier assigned an Attribute, 'determined to get university tuition fees abolished'. Jim Wallace did not just plan to do something but he was 'determined' to do something and in addition 'he succeeded' in the abolition of tuition fees, where 'he' (Jim Wallace) is the Actor in the clause and 'succeeded' a material process. The Liberal Democrats through Jim Wallace, according to this construction, tangibly achieved a policy objective; and it is an education policy, which along with crime and the economy are mainstays of election campaigning in Britain.

The broadcast does not need to go into a detailed explanation of tuition policy for it to be used as a persuasive tool. This again underlines the point made in chapter 3, that a feature of ideological persuasion is that detailed content of an ideology need not be communicated for it to be persuasive. For example, the Labour Party's 1997 general election slogan 'education, education, education' was not a detailed explanation of education policy but an expression of its value and importance. The educational mantra is also a three part list, the rhetorical force of which Atkinson (1984) explored at some length. Referring back to the Liberal Democrats claim on tuition fees, 'abolition' might normally be associated with the ending of some negative practice, particularly a law or regulation, such as the abolition of slavery, or the abolition of apartheid. Use of 'abolition' therefore confers meanings of negative restriction and oppressiveness onto that which is being abolished, in this case the 'upfront' payment of university fees by students. Therefore, abolition from tuition fees implies freedom from paying fees; freedom carries particularly positive connotations which are conferred onto the tuition fee issue. Lakoff (2002) has commented on the power of language to evoke cognitive schema and persuasively frame policy issues. Meanings from one, perhaps unrelated, source domain are transferred onto a target domain, in a semantic process typically understood in metaphor. A similar process may be seen at work with the tuition fee issue. It is true that Scottish students do not have to pay tuition fees, and in practical terms that means at the point of delivery. Students, or rather graduates still have to contribute something to the cost of university education, only this is now after graduation rather



than at matriculation. The Labour-Liberal Democrat coalition also assert that graduates are paying to support the education of undergraduates from less well off backgrounds, rather than retrospectively repaying the cost of their own tuition.

The most notable point about non-adversarial positive strategies, in relation to competitive political discourse, is the absence of criticism of competing parties. The following chapter discusses how ‘negative campaigning’ became a salient issue during the 2003 campaign. Non-adversarial discourse may well be a campaign strategy to present a positive image to voters. However, it could also be a method of negotiating potential power-sharing relationships with other parties. This point will be developed in a subsequent section. Both the adversarial and non adversarial strategies discussed above relate to the construction of positive in-group representations introduced in chapter 3, as do mitigation strategies which will now be discussed. However, as will be shown, evidence points to the use of mitigations beyond the positive representation of the in-group party, which suggest a need to amend van Dijk’s ideological square.

#### *4.2.3 Mitigation strategies*

In van Dijk’s (1998) ideological square those constructing a discourse that involves conflict between groups in society, will not only emphasise their in-group’s good qualities/actions but, when necessary, also try to mitigate their bad qualities/actions. Thus far the first two functional moves of van Dijk’s ideological square have been focused on, in relation to the rhetorical strategies of PEB discourse, concentrating on positive in-group description and negative out-group description. The second half of the ideological square is now explored: the mitigation of negative in-group and positive out-group actions, attributes and achievements. Parties in power might well be associated with negative policies, actions or events, or opposition parties would characterise them as such. It is not in a party’s interest to highlight its errors or perceived faults, but, with opposition parties (and the media) constructing criticisms on the basis of perceived or actual errors and faults negative criticism must be dealt with. It is sometimes necessary for these faults to be downplayed or mitigated in order to achieve their overall purpose to persuade voters.

The three parties of the Scottish centre all have different critical issues they mitigate, due to their different rhetorical positions in the political field. The previous



chapter introduced several negative issues which the parties appeared to be mitigating in their manifestos. These observations are supported by evidence from the party broadcasts. The appearance of the same issues, mitigated in two different political texts, both of which are important in campaigning terms, indicates the validity of the previously stated deductions. The first example, illustrated here, is from the Labour party on the issue of the perceived lack of success of the parliament (Paterson et al., 2001: 92-100). Second is the SNP's mitigation of their policy concerning independence for Scotland. And third are mitigations of critical issues concerning the effectiveness and credibility of the Liberal Democrats.

### 4.2.3.1 Labour

Heading into the 2003 election Labour faced claims that the Parliament in Scotland, or at least its Labour led administration, had achieved little. Such claims were formulated in the Scottish media and in opinion polls monitoring voter opinion (Paterson et al., 2001). These claims were significant enough for Labour to attempt to address and mitigate them in two of their election broadcasts (Text A and B).

In first broadcast Text A their mitigation begins as follows,

Sensor	Pr: material	Proj		Token		Pr: intensive		Value
{[ (You)	(might think)		(the Scottish Parliament)	(has been)	(a disappointment).]}			
NP pn	VP a	v	NP d	adj	n	VP a	v	NP d n

Sensor	Pr: material	Proj	Actor	Pr: material	Range	Pr: material
{[ (You)	(might think)		(it)	(‘s achieved)	(nothing).]}	{[(Setting up)
NP pn	VP a	v	NP pn	VP a	v	NP pn VP phrasal v

	Range		Pr: intensive	Attribute/Cir:accomp	x	Circ: extent
(	(the Scottish Parliament)	(hasn’t been)	(without its challenges)	but [	(in	(just
NP d	adj	n	VP a neg v	PP pr d	n	c PP pr AjP av

Actor		Pr: material			Range		
four) short years)		(Labour)			(has laid) (strong foundations).}}		
adj	adj	n	NP	n	VP	a	v NP adj n

Labour foregrounds two proposed criticisms, placing them at the start of the PEB’s discourse. The mitigation is negotiated through several linguistic means. Firstly, through transitivity, the metonymy of ‘the Scottish parliament’ hides Labour’s role. Secondly, Labour constructs the criticisms as a possible mental phenomenon of the listener/viewer, directly addressed with the second person singular ‘You’. The face threatening effects of this accusation are mitigated by employing the modalised form ‘might think’, where ‘might’ indicates weaker possibility. Formulating the criticisms ‘the Scottish Parliament has been a disappointment’ and ‘it’s achieved nothing’ as potential projected opinions instead of material facts makes such criticism easier to refute. ‘You might think X’ evokes a contradictory response ‘but you are wrong/mistaken’ in argumentative discourse: this response might be perceived as face-threatening, and therefore Labour avoids constructing a contrasting clausal relation (Winter, 1977) such as ‘but you are wrong’. Labour does not construct a direct challenge to the proposed beliefs about the Scottish Parliament; instead they move to refuting the propositions without the use of a clause relational ‘but’ e.g. ‘You might think it’s achieved nothing. Setting up the Scottish Parliament hasn’t been without its challenges’. This is a qualified acknowledgment of the criticism; however, bearing in mind that Labour was the main proponent of devolution, one sees little evidence of them as responsible agents in the establishment of the parliament. In the two projected mental clauses above, it is the parliament that is ‘a disappointment’ and ‘achieved nothing’. Therefore, Labour’s role is grammatically obfuscated.

The Labour broadcast (Text A) then goes on to state, ‘Setting up the Scottish Parliament hasn’t been without its challenges’. Any problems the Scottish Parliament or the executive have had are euphemistically referred to as ‘challenges’. Again there is no evidence of Labour as agents of the ‘setting up’, or of them taking responsibility for the ‘challenges’ of the parliament. Finally, Labour appear as Actors in a clause, framed in positive terms,

Actor		Pr: material			Range		
(Labour)		(has laid)			(strong foundations)		
NP	n	VP	a	v	NP	adj	n



Not only have they ‘laid strong foundations’ but they have done it ‘in just four short years’ (a Circumstance of Extent) which precedes the claims to have laid ‘strong foundations’ in the clause complex. Transitivity analysis clearly reveals Labour’s absence when referring to criticism that could easily be formulated as Labour’s responsibility. Faults are presented as criticisms of the parliament; Labour’s responsibility for the perceived negative actions or inactions of the parliament is not evident. In obscuring their role, Labour is attempting to mitigate criticisms that might be levelled at them.

In terms of semantic moves, the two initial negative propositions in Text A are local moves constructed as potential criticisms which are then refuted by subsequent propositions. Van Dijk comments on such rhetorical strategies, ‘The very strategies on which local moves are based are intended precisely to manage opinions and impressions, that is, what our conversational partners will think of us’ (1998: 40). Taking the text as a whole, Labour mitigates criticism by initially foregrounding it and formulating it in terms which obscure their role. The rest of the PEB refutes the initial negative propositions, laying out in positive terms Labour’s achievements, demonstrating that things have been achieved and presumably therefore these are not things to be disappointed in. In a further attempt to mitigate and refute criticism the broadcast (Text A) goes on to list achievement after achievement, ‘Whether it’s a free nursery place for every three and four year old, whether it’s free bus travel for all Scotland’s pensioners’. Labour’s responsibility in the clause is positively foregrounded, where they are the Carrier in the following, ‘Labour is also committed to helping Scotland’s hard working families’ and an Actor in, ‘Scottish Labour has worked everyday to make every Scottish community safer for our children and families’.

Labour follows a similar strategy in the second broadcast Text B. The main criticism dealt with is that ‘nothing has changed’ in Scotland. Jack McConnell formulates the criticism as follows,

Phenomenon -----						
Senser	Pr: Mental	Proj.	x	Cir: Frequency	Dummy subject	
{ [ (I	(know)		(that)	(sometimes)	(it)	
NP pn	VP v		c	AvP av	NP pn	

-----									
Phenomenon -----									
Pr: Mental	x	[	Cir: Location	Actor/Neg	Pr: Material	]			
(seems)	(that)		(in Scotland)	(nothing)	(has changed).	]}			
VP	v		c	PP	pr	n	NP	pn	VP a v

As in Text A criticisms are formulated as a phenomenon. The Phenomenon in the main clause is given, i.e. we know that it is true, given the authority of the speaker. The embedded Phenomenon is less certain, it ‘seems’ (to the implied viewer) and is likely to be refuted. McConnell linguistically constructs himself as an authority who can distinguish fact from occasional illusion. The strength of the criticism is softened by using a circumstance of frequency ‘sometimes’, so that it is not ‘I know that it seems...’ but ‘I know that *sometimes* it seems’. If it is only sometimes it is not all the time, hence it is a weaker formulation and easier to refute. The rest of McConnell's contribution to the broadcasts goes on to refute the initial negative proposition, setting up a binary contrast within the structure of the text (negative proposition versus positive refutation of the negative proposition). In this way, mitigation as a rhetorical strategy is built into the overall global coherence of the text.

#### 4.2.3.2 SNP

The SNP mitigate criticism of their policy of independence, which Labour attacked in both the 1999 and 2003 campaigns and the Liberal Democrats mention in the introduction to their 2003 manifesto. The SNP’s mitigation strategy is constructed differently to the above Labour mitigations. Instead of formulating the negative proposition at the beginning of the text or section of text, to then be refuted by forthcoming propositions, the mitigation forms an aside at the end of the PEB. The reason for this positioning in the text, in contrast to Labour, may be a reflection of the parties' differing circumstances. Labour has a record in office to draw on to refute negative claims. The SNP in contrast are not in office and the focus of their discourse is on attacking the party in office and stating what they would do differently - the inverse of the party in power. For the SNP, therefore, foregrounding criticism(s) of



themselves may not serve their purpose of demonstrating their opposition's weakness<sup>41</sup>.

The first half of the SNP broadcast (Text D) is a short film following an old man waiting for treatment on the NHS. The second half is a piece-to-camera by John Swinney, sitting in a chair in what looks like a smart home office. Towards the end of his address Swinney leans in to camera, before cutting to a close-up, indicating a change of tone to a more personal address. Swinney then says the following,

And as for independence, I think it will be good for Scotland. I want it but it's not for me to decide, that decision lies with you. Our priority as a party is to prove ourselves to you...

Independence is framed in terms of John Swinney's individual belief 'I want it' and 'I think it will be good for Scotland', in contrast to Swinney's preceding discourse which employs 'we' as in 'we the SNP' or 'we the Scottish people'. Independence is personalised, 'I think it will be good for Scotland' or 'I want it'. Personalising the issue might be a strategy intended to draw on Swinney's personality as either a tool for mitigation or persuasion. Individuals are perhaps easier to trust or are less threatening than groups or institutions.

Two further points should be noted in this mitigation. The first is that Swinney characterises the SNP's policy on independence as a decision that 'lies with you', referring to the referendum which the SNP pledged would precede any decision on independence for Scotland. The second point is that the issue of independence is introduced with a phrase that marks the following discussion as an aside, even a minor issue in that, 'And as for independence'. This downplays the importance of the issue, indicating its mitigation and positioning it marginally within the structure of the text. Independence is not a policy at the vanguard of the SNP's electioneering, appearing at the end of the PEB and dealt with briefly.

To emphasise that independence is a marginal issue (at least in the representation of the SNP's broadcast) within the mitigation there is a clause which shifts the focus of the PEB to the relationship between the party and 'you' the public, 'Our priority as a party is to prove ourselves to you, that we can make a difference to

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<sup>41</sup> A longer term study of election discourse, contrasting the discourse of parties in office and in opposition would be able to better bear out this point concerning rhetorical strategies of mitigation.

your lives, here in Scotland’. The SNP’s ‘priority’ is not independence but to ‘prove’ themselves to the Scottish public. In mitigating criticism of a policy of independence the SNP make a semantic move away from criticism to a broader political agenda.

### 4.2.3.3 Liberal Democrats

The Liberal Democrat mitigation strategies differ from that of both Labour and the SNP. Whereas criticism of Labour and the SNP focused mainly on policy issues or events (potential or otherwise), the Liberal Democrats face criticism that they are ineffectual and lack credibility as a party of government. Liberal Democrats at Westminster elections have faced similar criticism that they lack experience and that because they are not likely to be voted into office their policies are not practical.

The Liberal Democrat mitigation differs from Labour and the SNP in that it does not form a definite semantic move. Instead, the whole of the Liberal Democrat broadcast is a discourse intended to establish credibility. As such, at first sight the example below, from the Liberal Democrat broadcast (Text F) does not appear to be mitigating criticism.

Actor		Pr: Material		Range	
{[(The Liberal Democrats (in Scotland))		(have made)		(a big difference)]}	
NP d	n	PP pr	n	VP a	v NP d adj n

But this statement may function as mitigation against criticism that the Liberal Democrats are ineffectual as a minority coalition partner. Contextualised in this way, then other positive statements on in-group achievements may be viewed in a different light. For example,

Actor		Pr: Material		Range	
[ (They)		('ve increased)		(coverage (by GPs))]	
NP pn	VP a	v	NP n	PP pr	n

In both examples above the Liberal Democrats are the Actor in the clause and use Material Processes, their responsibility for actions and events in the clause are not at all obfuscated. They are clearly stating that they were responsible for improvements to GP services; their coalition partners are not mentioned at all.



As previously discussed the Liberal Democrats construct their achievement of the abolition of tuition fees, in terms of the personal qualities of their leader Jim Wallace, who was 'determined' to achieve the policy and 'succeeded'. This rhetorically demonstrates that the Liberal Democrats can achieve objectives as minority partners in a coalition. This point is then emphasised by a young woman claiming, 'they have done a lot for students' and confirming that she will be voting for them. The use of 'have done', an intensive process, demonstrates the definiteness of the Liberal Democrats' achievements. There are then three quite hyperbolic claims made by unidentified participants in the broadcast. Male 1 asserts, 'Jim Wallace, of course, has been the guiding force behind all these changes', which implicitly characterises the Liberal Democrats as a 'force' causing 'changes'. Therefore, things are achieved under the Liberals. Female 2 then claims, 'The Liberal Democrats in Scotland have made a big difference'. Claiming to make a 'big difference' again challenges any notion of ineffectiveness.

Another aspect to this mitigation strategy is found in the following example which sees the Liberal Democrats construct not a policy achievement but a list of the political qualities they wish to demonstrate. For example, 'It is the Liberal Democrats who have the ideas, the energy, the credibility and the track-record'. Fairclough notes of lists, 'In traditional grammatical terms, lists are 'paratactic' (their elements are equal, one is not subordinate to another. Items in lists are equivalences' (2003: 162). A 'track record' is something which is more tangible or demonstrable than 'energy', 'ideas' and 'credibility', but in listing them as equivalences they are represented as equally tangible and demonstrable. Expressing these qualities in the present tense also indicates their immediacy; they are not something of the past or future but here and now.

Labour and the SNP, therefore, use quite different mitigation strategies from the Liberal Democrats. Labour construct their mitigation as a negative premise at the beginning of the text, setting up an opportunity for the subsequent refutation: this is a definite semantic move from a negative proposition to a positive refutation. The SNP's mitigation over a policy of Scottish independence is carried out by situating the mitigation at the end of the text. They place the contentious issue just before the closing remarks, marginalising and isolating the issue from the rest of the discourse. The audience is addressed in more familiar tone and the issue framed as, an aside, an issue of less importance than the rest of the party's policy agenda, and as a personal



belief of the party leader. In contrast, the Liberal Democrats use the whole of their broadcast (Text F) to establish their credibility, sometimes, in exaggerated terms. Both Labour and the SNP mark textually what the criticism of them is, the Liberal Democrats do not.

#### *4.2.4 Strategies for negotiating power sharing, shared policy achievements and potential coalition partnerships*

The centre ground of Scottish politics and the new devolved apparatus of Scottish governance, which the previous two chapters began to explore, raise interesting issues concerning the manner in which political discourse manifests itself in devolved elections.

This section will further explore how a coalescence of centre-left parties and potential and actual coalition partnership affect campaign discourse. Chapter 2 compared the details of party ideology in the centre; and chapter 3 investigated the ways in which party ideology and identity are constructed and communicated in manifestos. This section will expand on the investigation of those chapters in order to further our understanding of how the relationships between the parties of the Scottish centre are constructed and negotiated.

During an election campaign Labour and the Liberal Democrats run on separate tickets but because of power-sharing they both campaign on the same policy record. This raises questions of how the two parties negotiate responsibility for the same policy achievements, how they maintain a separate identity, and how they discursively position themselves in relation to each other. In other words, how do they refer to each other (if at all) in an election campaign when they could potentially have to share power together again after the election? For the Liberal Democrats this is a particularly important campaigning point as they are the most likely partner in a power-sharing executive for both Labour and the SNP. From the alternative perspective, how Labour and the SNP rhetorically position themselves in relation to the Liberal Democrats is equally important to investigate.

Like most party election broadcasts by parties which hold office both Labour and the Liberal Democrats make claims about policy achievements from their time in office. The achievements of the 1999-2003 administration are the achievements of both parties in the coalition. The executive is a joint venture, working in partnership



as one administration and therefore the results of the administration are the achievements of both parties. Various policies may have come from one side or the other, for example, the abolition of tuition fees for university students in Scotland is widely credited to the Liberal Democrats (Paterson, 2002). However, as has already been mentioned, elections are not run on a joint ticket, with Labour and Liberal Democrats as running mates, like a presidential and vice presidential candidate campaigning on the basis of a joint package. Rather, a potential coalition forms part of the context and sub-text of the election, not explicitly stated but still negotiated in the party discourse of the election campaign. The policy achievements of the Labour-Liberal Democrat coalition form part of this negotiation.

In their broadcast (Text F) the Liberal Democrats claim four policy achievements: free personal care for the elderly; abolition of tuition fees for university students; an increased coverage of GP services; and pre-school/nursery places for three and four year olds. Three of these four achievements are also claimed by Labour in their three broadcasts (Texts A, B and C), however Labour omit the abolition of university tuition fees as an achievement.

Not claiming responsibility for tuition fees policy is a significant omission for the Labour broadcasts to make, especially when it is a popular policy which falls into the holy trinity of electioneering issues, health, crime and education. Also conspicuous by their absence, in the Liberal Democrat broadcasts, are achievements relating to crime; they fail to make claims about crime, either as past achievements or in terms of future plans. Law and order issues are dealt with by the Liberal Democrat manifesto, as illustrated in chapter 2. Law and order was a major campaigning issue for Labour and it is an issue which is often central in election campaigns for parties competing for power. Crime may have been left to Labour, at least in the PEBs, with the Liberal Democrats left to claim responsibility for the abolition of tuition fees. It is difficult to assert with any confidence whether these omissions were coordinated by the two parties. Because of the salience of the issues it is worth noting. However, it is claims which both parties do make that will now be discussed.

In the example below from their broadcast (Text A), beginning 'Whether it is...' Labour lists its achievements embedded within a metaphor of 'building' in the initial long sub-clause. This sub-clause functions as the Theme that contextualises the main clause, i.e. establishing a frame in which the main clause is to be understood.

The Labour party is clearly the actor in the clause, responsible for these policies. The Liberal Democrats are not mentioned. For example,

x	Cir: extent					Actor		Pr: material			Range			
{[	(in	(just four)	short	years)		(Labour)		(has laid)		(strong foundations.)]	}			
PP	pr	AjP	av	adj	adj	n	NP	n	VP	a	v	NP	adj	n

x	Token	Pr: Relational	Value 1	Cir: Beneficiary ---	x
Whether	{[ (it)	('s)	( a nursery place	(for every < three)	and
c	NP pn	VP v	NP d n n	PP pr adj n	c

-----				x	Value 2 ---				x	-----			
(four years old>)				or	<free nursing)				and	(personal care>)			
NP	d	n	adj	c	NP	adj	n	c	NP	adj	n		

x	Cir: beneficiary				Actor		Pr: material		
(for Scotland's older people)]...				[ (Scottish Labour)		(has worked)			
PP	pr	adj	adj	n	NP	adj	n	VP	a v

Cir: location in time			Cir: Reason			Range			
(everyday)			[ (to build)			( a better Scotland)]}			
AvP	av		VP	a	v	NP	d	adj	n

‘In just four short years’, a circumstance of extent emphasises time is important, illustrates that things were achieved in a short period of time (expressed by the adverb ‘just’). These policies are metaphorically a ‘strong foundation’ to then ‘build on’ and it is Labour who is doing the building. For example, ‘Labour has laid strong foundations’, where ‘Labour’ is the actor in the clause who ‘has laid’ (material process) the ‘strong foundations’ (Range).

After listing its achievements, including nursery places and free personal care for the elderly in a co-ordinated sub clause, again Scottish Labour is the actor which ‘had worked’ (material process) to ‘build a better Scotland’ presumably by achieving its previously stated policy goals. A direct relationship between policy achievements and Labour being responsible for them is not constructed; Labour’s responsibility is suggested by the building metaphor. The subordinate clause, indicated by ‘whether’, expresses contextualising topics to which the viewer is invited to relate the main



clause, which characterises Scottish Labour as a ‘builder’. The Liberals are elided from responsibility for policy achievements.

In accordance with the ideological square and the PEB typology we discussed earlier, Labour’s broadcast (Text A) represents achievements in the Scottish Parliament in positive terms, ideologically foregrounding Labour whilst obfuscating the Liberal Democrats’ role. Using the ‘building’ metaphor, Labour does not, at least at the level of the clause, take direct responsibility for policies. This way of representing Labour’s achievements is a rhetorical strategy for ideologically foregrounding Labour positively. At the same time the Liberal Democrats’ role is obfuscated in a non adversarial manner, avoiding either directly crediting them (for nursery places and free personal care for the elderly) or directly criticising them. Crediting the Liberal Democrats might raise questions about the point of differentiating between Labour and the Liberal Democrats, providing opponents with an opportunity for a discursive attack. Equally, criticising the Liberal Democrats might cause problems when trying to negotiate a coalition partnership after the election.

The Liberal Democrats in their election broadcast (Text F) also lay claim to ‘making personal care free for the elderly’, as in the extract below,

(Unseen female narrator)

Jim Wallace takes particular pride in what the Scottish Liberal Democrats have done for older people. If they are no longer able to wash, feed or dress themselves they no longer have to pay for care. It’s a big worry lifted.

(Jim Wallace)

It seems very odd that if you were say suffering from cancer there are certain care packages that you got free but if you were suffering from Alzheimer’s you didn’t. And that seemed to be totally arbitrary and that’s what we’ve addressed in what we did by making personal care free for the elderly. (Text F, 2003).

Wallace presents an argument of justification, delivered in a more informal style. Wallace’s use of conditional ‘if’ clause expresses a hypothetical scenario in which cancer sufferers receive free ‘care packages’. The conjunction ‘but’ signals the alternative negative scenario, where Alzheimer’s sufferers do not receive free care packages. This forms local grammatical coherence in the text as well as creating a contrasting argumentative structure, facilitating the elaboration of the policy achievement. The disparity between the two propositions is then asserted to be

‘arbitrary’, an illogical and negative evaluation. Wallace’s logical argument is prefaced by a perception ‘seems’ (an intensive process) that mitigates the forthcoming argument with a more personal informality. Such informality is also expressed by the Value ‘very odd’, which contrasts with more formal, professional lexis such as ‘care packages, ‘Alzheimer’s’ and ‘what we’ve addressed’. The use of ‘arbitrary’, mentioned above, is intensified by a more informal usage of ‘totally’.

Jim Wallace and the Liberal Democrats are consistently shown as responsible actors, e.g. ‘Jim Wallace takes particular pride’ and ‘the Scottish Liberal Democrats have done’. The presumption is that older people (who are target voters) have benefited and that there is a track record to point to. As Labour elided the role of the Liberal Democrats in the formulation of their policy achievements, so too the Liberal Democrats elide Labour from the formulation of their policy achievements.

In addition to investigating how these two parties refer to shared policies, it would also be useful to illustrate some other strategies the Liberal Democrats use when advocating their policy goals. The first example below, illustrates how they present a past achievement; while the second concerns a method they use to represent future policy goals. These are interesting in light of the Liberal Democrats’ position as an actual and potential coalition partner.

The first example, is the policy of abolition of university tuition fees, also discussed above. The policy is articulated in terms of the Liberal Democrat leader’s desire.


Carrier	Attribute		Pr: material		Range			
...Mcl[ (he)	(was determined)		Scl[ (to get)		(university tuition fees)			
NP pn	VP a	v	VP a v	NP	n	n	n	n
Pr: material	x	Actor	Pr: material					
(abolished)]]	and	[(he)	(succeeded)]}					
VP v	c	NP pn	VP v					

The above extract asserts that Jim Wallace (‘he’) was successful in what he was ‘determined’ to do; but in saying that ‘he was determined’ implies that this was a difficult thing to do or that there was some obstacle to achieving the policy. Whatever obstacle or difficulty it might have been is left unsaid. Therefore, it may be inferred that, for the Liberal Democrats, achieving policy goals is not a straightforward



process but a struggle within government. Of course, for the Liberal Democrats it is not a straightforward process; theirs is a position of a minority partner in a coalition. Therefore, they must negotiate for certain policies with Labour in return for positions in office. As such, voting for the Liberal Democrats is not necessarily a vote for their whole policy agenda, but a few, selected policies which they can agree on with Labour. When claiming a policy achievement it is not only a demonstration of the Liberal Democrats' honesty in doing what they said they would do, not just an example of an achievement but also a demonstration of their ability to achieve goals as a minority partner within a coalition government. Therefore, they are still worth voting for and are not just there to make up the numbers for Labour to achieve its policy agenda. This is a non adversarial way of illustrating the Liberal Democrats effectiveness in government and to demonstrate they are prepared to struggle to achieve their goals. However, Labour, the party with whom they presumably struggle, remains invisible in the PEB.

This second example illustrates how the Liberal Democrats represent future policy goals, bearing in mind their minority party status. As with the above examples from Text F this is a non-adversarial strategy.



Future policy achievements are not constructed in terms of a strong commitment, expressed through the use of the deontic system of modality, such as ‘we will do X’. Instead, they are represented as the result of an individual’s desire (boulomaic modality) e.g., ‘Jim Wallace wants to achieve’ and not in more concrete material process ‘we will do X’. Because of the Liberal Democrats’ position as minority coalition partner they are not in a realistic position to employ strong deontic commitment of ‘will’ and state ‘we will do X’. It is likely they, the Liberal Democrats, might have to negotiate a deal with the SNP after the election or re-negotiate with Labour Party. The use of the non adversarial strategies might be a

rhetorical method of negotiating a political position which will be compatible with two different parties. Compatibility with either the SNP or Labour could prove difficult come the end of the election if too strong a commitment to certain policies was asserted throughout the campaign. If a party were to make strong commitments and then not implement them they could be accused of a U-turn, of not making good their promises or of being ineffectual. These criticisms are certainly something the Liberal Democrats are bearing in mind in constructing their electoral discourse.

Liberal Democrats complicate van Dijk's conception of the ideological square. Is Labour an out-group 'them' to the Liberal Democrats' in-group 'us'? The answer is both yes and no because of the reasons outlined above, associated with coalition government. In line with the theory of the ideological square the Liberal Democrats construct their own achievements and action, attributes and achievements in terms of positive values, but they do not refer to Labour or the SNP (or any other party) in negative terms. The previous chapters illustrated that in their manifesto the Liberal Democrats only criticised the Labour Party in the Westminster context and never just as Scottish Labour. The Liberal Democrats' second PEB, not transcribed here, mirrored the manifesto, making comparisons between England and Scotland: where because of the Liberal Democrats, people in Scotland had free personal care for the elderly and the abolition of tuition fees. The Liberal Democrats' strategy is to suggest voters 'cannot trust Labour on their own' but also not to criticise Scottish Labour directly. For Labour and the SNP each is the focus of the other's rhetorical attack. Therefore, for Scottish Labour and the SNP the ideological square appears to operate just as van Dijk discusses, at least in relation to each other. However, Labour and SNP's relationship with the Lib Dems complicates van Dijk's conception of the ideological square. Neither the SNP nor Labour mentions the Liberal Democrats. This is significant for both Labour and the SNP, as traditionally they are all left of centre parties that would be competing for similar sections of the vote. The Liberal Democrats were part of the executive responsible for policy initiatives as well as Labour, but only Labour receives SNP criticism. Labour, as we have already shown, do not mention the Liberal Democrats' role in their achievements.



### 4.3 Conclusion

In attempting to account for the linguistic behaviour exhibited by the Scottish centre-left parties during elections, the effects of a new and (in UK terms) different electoral system must be investigated. The mixed form of PR, which is likely to result in coalition, is changing the traditionally adversarial discourse of British politics. For Labour and the SNP attacking each other discursively marks out their differences; and this behaviour fits into the ideological square. That is they positively characterise the in-group's actions, attributes and achievements, while negatively characterising the out-group's actions, attributes and achievements. Although, ideologically similar on many issues, as chapter 2 illustrated, the nationalist issue still divides Labour and the SNP, making cooperation extremely unlikely in the current political environment. However, Labour and the SNP do not criticise or even mention the Liberal Democrats in their PEBs or manifestos. This is unusual in comparison with Westminster campaigning. Therefore, the conclusion may be drawn that this behaviour is an attempt by both the SNP and Labour to remain compatible with the Liberals, ready for a potential coalition.

For the Liberal Democrats, highlighting their own good points fits with the ideological square but not attacking either Labour or the SNP is, as has already been demonstrated, a rhetorical move to remain compatible with those parties. Choosing not to attack an opponent could be viewed as a tacit mitigation of an opponent's negative actions, attributes and achievements, which runs counter to the ideological square. This is particularly important as all three centre left parties occupy similar ideological space and are therefore often competing for similar sections of the vote. Such ideological similarity makes coalition more practical between Labour and the Liberal Democrats or between the Liberal Democrats and the SNP. However, in an election campaign one might expect all three parties to be aggressively competing for each other's votes, which as we have seen they are not. The potential outcome of the election, therefore, affects the nature of the discourse of the election campaign. Although difference or distinctiveness is important for all parties in appealing to voters of different kinds, compatibility is possibly as important to Labour, the Liberal Democrats and the SNP. Only through cooperation will the parties be able to form a coalition government likely to achieve stable government and able to implement a policy agenda.

Van Dijk describes the ideological square as, 'functional moves in the overall strategy of ideological self-interest, which appear in social conflicts and actions' (1998: 33). Labour, Liberal Democrats and the SNP are engaged in the ideological self-interested social conflict that is an election; however, as shown, there are numerous examples of non adversarial rhetorical strategies from all three centre left parties. In light of the devolved context, potential coalition partners become (at least for the period of an election campaign) 'quasi in-group' members. 'Quasi in-group' members are not afforded the privileges of full in-group status but neither are they completely an 'out-group'. Therefore, under the conditions considered here van Dijk's ideological square begins to break down under a strict application of its properties. The ideological square needs reformulating to account for competitive discursive ideological contexts where cooperation and compromise form important structural features of the context, that is, where competing groups maximise self-interest through cooperation.



## CHAPTER 5: THE MUTUAL CONSTRUCTION OF POLITICAL DISCOURSE: PARTY ELECTION BROADCASTS AND THEIR MEDIA RECEPTION.

### 5.1 What is press reception?

This chapter analyses the manner in which the PEBs of the Scottish 2003 election were received in the press. During the four weeks of an election campaign<sup>42</sup> more airtime and more column inches are given over to politics and, therefore, more journalists cover politics than normally would. Garton, Montgomery and Tolson note that ‘The perception that the media play a constitutive role in British political life, especially during general elections, is now very familiar’ (1991: 101). The media is an integral part of election communication; the start of every day in the modern election starts with each party holding their own press conference where a room of journalists congregate before the party’s leading politicians and communicators. Election hustings are no longer the mass public address of Gladstone or the soapbox orations of local candidates. Opportunities for public addresses have been transformed by technology and now reach mass national audiences via newspapers and the electorate’s televisions, radios and computers. The media play a central role in communicating the events of elections; and in turn, these events have become increasingly national and media centred in their design and focus. Poster launches, election broadcasts, manifesto launches and publicity stunts now form the staple of election set-pieces, designed to facilitate media coverage. Rosenbaum (1997: 85) has commented that the popular press and television form a ‘duopoly’ in provision of political information to the public. Parties do not communicate directly with the electorate for much of the campaign; their messages are mediated through the organs of the media before they reach the public. Any assessment of contemporary election discourse should therefore attempt to investigate the impact of the media on those discourses produced. Therefore, this chapter will attempt to address issues such as: how campaign events and messages are reproduced; whether messages are transformed or altered in any way; and if there are any effects on the reproduction of political messages, what the possible implications might be for the nature of public debate in elections. In dealing with these issues this chapter will illustrate two

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<sup>42</sup> In the UK official electioneering is limited to a four week period commencing after the announcement of an election and the dissolution of Parliament.



instances of party messages – one Labour and one SNP – being constructed in the press coverage; demonstrating the success of one and the failure of the other. Only these two messages and parties are focussed on because in the reportage of all the PEBs they were the only parties and issues which received coverage. It is suggested below that this selectivity in reporting and comment is a result of cognitive aspects of discourse representation of elections and the discourse practices of politicians and journalists.

Because of the importance of the media in politics and elections, political parties have become increasingly skilled at using the media. They attempt to design their discourse to make their messages consistent throughout the campaign, across differing media and between different candidates (Bruce, 1992; Rosenbaum, 1997). In doing so, the parties hope to deliver a consistent and convincing message to the public, through the filter of the media. It is demonstrable that specific instances of language are repeated in conference addresses, PEBs, in press briefings and by the press itself. It is also evident that the popular press creates its own discourses and sparks its own political debates, which politicians and other media sources are drawn into.

This chapter will demonstrate that the language used by the press and politicians to discuss and/or represent elections habitually characterises those elections as a *war*, *argument* or *pugilistic contest*, all of which are typified as a contest between two sides. The utility of this conceptualisation will be questioned in terms of whether the language used can be said to represent appropriately the post-devolution Scottish political context. The analytical approach is in keeping with this thesis' critical discourse perspective. By exploring the dynamics between the socio-political context and discourse practices this investigation will seek to offer alternative readings to existing hegemonies.

A key point of concern to this investigation is the manner in which the press cover these PEBs. Coverage is not in terms of the policy issues which the broadcasts raise, e.g. issues of devolution and healthcare. Instead, reportage of PEBs is framed as a discourse topic of *negative campaigning*. Negative campaigning as an item of news is not an event in itself but an interpretation given to other events (in this instance two election broadcasts). The issue then appears to be self-perpetuating, no longer dependent on the original events but on the contributions of journalists and politicians who recursively contribute to the discussion of negative campaigning. Claims and



counter claims, from politicians and interested parties, then also become part of the basis for the accusation of negative campaigning. This will be shown to be partly due to two related phenomena. The first is the similitude of political and journalistic discourse practices. The second is that the discourse representations of negative campaigning constitute part of a larger schematic representation of politics. Such a schema structurally privileges particular parties in the Scottish context. Therefore, this investigation will illustrate some of the ways in which ideological dominances are reproduced and maintained.

The corpus for analysis in this chapter is formed from 27 articles (see Appendix II) taken from the Scottish popular press. These represent the vast majority of coverage of the PEBs from this election in the newspapers concerned. A systematic and comprehensive collection was carried out, covering every day of the four week campaign. Every article with content associated with the election was archived. The newspapers from which the articles came were *The Daily Record*, *The Herald*, *The Scotsman*, *The Evening Times*, *The Evening News*, *The Sunday Herald*, *Scotland on Sunday*, the *Sunday Mail* and *BBC News* (online). These are the main indigenous<sup>43</sup> publications, which have a uniquely Scottish focus. The 27 texts focus exclusively on the PEBs of Labour and SNP and the debate that grew up around them. Articles concerning other parties' broadcasts in the election were rare; in fact, only one other article could be found in the author's larger corpus of 1,200 articles covering the entire election. The one other article only briefly commented on a Conservative broadcast. It is difficult to discuss evidence which is not present. However, this chapter will discuss the significance of the omission of debating other parties' broadcasts. The dynamics of political messages in the print press are complex; in order to compare data in a manageable fashion in the space available, this chapter concentrates on one issue. Even though the present analysis focuses on the reception of PEBs, it will be clear from the discussion below that a myriad of processes are simultaneously at work.

Garton, Montgomery and Tolson (1991: 112) comment that there seems to be a 3 to 5 day life cycle (which this thesis will call the 'reportage cycle') for stories in

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<sup>43</sup> Law (2001) in his analysis of the Scottish press, makes a distinction between 'indigenous' and 'interloper' publications. Indigenous titles are those who have historically been based in and focused on Scotland. Whereas interlopers are those publications which have latterly begun to publish Scottish versions of their traditionally London and English focused newspapers e.g. *The Scottish Sun* and *The Scottish Times*.



the press relating to issues of public policy. The evidence gathered in this chapter supports their claim, as the majority of the press coverage of PEBs ran for 5 days, from 13-04-03 to 17-04-03, although there is one other article relating to the same issue that occurred on 20-04-03. Therefore, this investigation focuses on a week of press coverage, from roughly the third week of the campaign.

## 5.2 Methods and concepts: from metaphor and schemata to recycling

This chapter will question the representations that language has been used to create. In doing so, the relationship between metaphor and mental schemata will be drawn upon. The way in which language both reflects and creates representations of reality will be explored. The linguistic usages of the press and politicians, in the production of political discourse, will be critically commented on in reference to the devolved Scottish context.

The following analysis borrows significantly from the work of Montgomery (2005) and Garton, Montgomery and Tolson (1991). Their investigations continue the critical tradition, pay particular attention to the mediating role of the press in political discourse and emphasise the contemporary similitude of discourse practices of media and political agents. Montgomery (2005) and Garton, Montgomery and Tolson (1991) also consider schemata and metaphor as significant features of discourse. They relate specific instances of linguistic representation to the ideological and cognitive processes of agents in the public sphere. Such an approach is highly compatible with the work of Fairclough (1992, 1995a, 1995b) and van Dijk (1998, 2002). Insights into metaphor and schemata illustrate the potential power of discourse to construct a particular reality, which can then be a determining factor in social action. For example, Montgomery (2005) suggests representing reality in some specific way, such as a mass terrorist atrocity as an 'act of war', implies a different set of values and potential responses by social agents than referring to that same event as 'mass murder'. Even so, the relationship between cognitive-linguistic representations and social action is one of influence rather than determination.

To begin the present analysis, examples of metaphorical use will be given, from which two broad topics emerge. The first is characterised as a general campaign issue, that of combative campaigning, with a particular emphasis on *negative campaigning*. The election is characterised as a conflict between two sides and that



election campaign discourse is accused of being negative in tone. An example of negative campaigning is Labour's portrayal of the SNP policy of independence as 'divorce and separation' from the rest of the UK. These two topics – the characterisation of a campaign as a conflict, and the tone of campaign discourse as negative – appear divergent in type at first sight; however, there is uniformity in the use of language and discourse processes which underpin their production. The schemata which the metaphors evoke will be explicated, with reference to the effect(s) on the global coherence of the discourse produced. After this it will be necessary to discuss the similitude of discourse practices of political and media agents, which will be a study of the processes of intertextuality and message recycling. The features of discourse focused on in this chapter are the party political issue of independence, and the campaign issue of negative campaigning. Penultimately, this chapter will critically question the hegemonic inferences of these metaphors and their associated schemata with reference to the devolved Scottish context, before concluding with the possible implications this analysis has for Scottish political discourse.

For clarity it will be useful to introduce some of the terminology and concepts which this chapter will use. The first important concept is that of *metaphor*, which will feature as an important focus of this analysis. Metaphor can perhaps be simply defined as describing something in terms of another thing: 'Metaphors allow us to understand one domain of experience in terms of another' (Lakoff and Turner, 1989: 135). That is, the meaning of one concept is explained and understood with reference to another (Saeed, 1997: 302-303). A basic linguistic description of metaphors can be understood in terms of *source* and *target* domains. The target domain is the thing being described, while the source domain provides analogous meaning(s). For example, 'The legal settlement was a slap in the face for justice'. In this example the legal settlement is the target domain, it is the thing given meaning by the application of a metaphor. The slap in the face is the source domain; the action of physical insult confers meaning as to the nature of the legal settlement.

There are several competing theories of metaphor, including the *classical* and the *romantic*. The former envisages metaphor as a poetic feature which is situated outside normal usages of language. The latter sees it as 'integral to language and thought as a way of experiencing the world' (Saeed, 1999: 303). This thesis adopts a third perspective, a cognitive approach to metaphor, typified by Lakoff and Johnson



(1980), Lakoff (1987) and Lakoff and Turner (1989). This theory owes much to the romantic tradition; however unlike the romantic tradition room is left for non-metaphorical instances of language (Saeed, 1999: 304). The cognitive approach affords an opportunity not to view metaphor as a mere rhetorical flourish but as a significant property of language and mind. Therefore, metaphor is considered as a 'cognitive operation' (Chilton and Schäffner, 2002: 28). Language is linked to cognitive structures (such as the *ideological complex* and *schemata*). Language is thereby given a greater role in the representation, mediation and construction of ideology and reality. This chapter will discuss metaphor in terms of its role in constructing a particular representation of the devolved 2003 Scottish election, and in the mediated discourse of the Scottish print press. The election is portrayed as a conflict and this meaning is constructed out of three main metaphors, *war*, *argument* and *pugilistic contest*. These metaphors are closely related in the language of politicians and journalists, and there is a substantial evidence of mixing of these in any single text. Metaphors are also an important feature of political discourse because they are an integral part of our conceptual systems and as Lakoff and Johnson assert, '...our conceptual system is not something we are normally aware of' (1981: 3). Therefore metaphors are a potential source of conscious and unconscious representations of speakers' and writers' beliefs. Chilton and Schäffner (2002) contend that metaphor may provide a systematized ideology with a conceptual (that is cognitive) structure. These beliefs may be constructed as taken for granted or common sense representations of the world.

*Schemata* are conceptual systems for organising knowledge and experience of the world. Van Dijk defines schemata as 'higher-level complex (and even conventional or habitual) knowledge structures' (1981: 141). Brown and Yule elaborate, informing us that, '...schemata can be seen as the organised background knowledge which leads us to *expect* or predict aspects in our interpretation of discourse' (1983: 248). Therefore, schemata are an aspect of memory as well part of discourse interpretation. They are organised mental representations of past knowledge which are then triggered by an encountered discourse and drawn on to help construct understanding of that discourse (Bartlett: 1932). Metaphors can be important triggers for particular mental schemata, implying an organised set of associated meanings. This process is in part constructive in nature, privileging one set of meanings in preference to other meanings in the reading of a discourse. For example, the use of



conflict metaphors such as war, argument or pugilistic contest in the description of politics, privileges meanings which imply winners and losers. Agents are represented as antagonists, adversaries and rivals. These representations are at the expense of those aspects of politics which do not fit the modelling of conflict metaphors, such as compromise, negotiation and alliances (Beard, 2000: 22). Non-adversarial meanings might be more appropriate in a political system more likely to produce coalition or minority governance. Because the focus of this chapter is on instances of metaphor and the schematic structures they represent, the terms metaphor and schema are often used interchangeably. That is not to say that schemata only occur as a product of metaphor, only that other cognitive-linguistic features of schemata are not the locus of this chapter's interest.

This investigation shares an analytical focus with the work of Garton, Montgomery and Tolson, centring attention on the role of schemata in the discursive reproduction of ideologies. It also agrees with the assertion that schemata have implicit presuppositions, 'which construct chains of imaginary consequences, and which make metaphorical connections which are historically vague and yet universal in common-sense terms' (Garton, Montgomery and Tolson, 1991: 115). Garton, Montgomery and Tolson go on to suggest that in the public forum of mediated political discourse:

[P]articular ideological assumptions and narrative scenarios occupy a place of dominance within this forum, to the extent that their pervasive solidity as forms of common sense is very difficult to challenge. (1991: 116)

The evidence of this chapter supports this assertion. The use of metaphors and their related schemata, in the discourse of the press reception of PEBs, have significant implications for public debate. These implications relate specifically to the issue of interpretation of Scottish electoral politics and generally to our understanding of the nature of political discourse in the public sphere. One of the goals of this chapter is to question the appropriateness of characterising a multi-party system of election and governance as wars, arguments or pugilistic contests.

The term *soundbite* has come into common currency in the discourse of politics and the media over the last ten years. Rosenbaum defines the soundbite as '...a brief, self-contained, vivid phrase or sentence, which summarises or encapsulates a key point' (1997: 91). The soundbite is the modern equivalent of a rhetorical



flourish, but they are intended to be appropriate for media recycling and not necessarily for an immediate and present audience. Rosenbaum explains,

The key verbal skill for politicians today, or those who write their words for them, is not (as it once was) grand and persuasive oratory, but colourful and memorable encapsulation. Or – to encapsulate the point – the ability to talk in headlines. Publicity-hungry politicians think consciously in terms of soundbites. They never give a major speech, interview or statement on the doorstep without planning the morsel of their text which they want to be gobbled up and regurgitated by the media. (Rosenbaum, 1997: 92)

Metaphors can be a productive linguistic tool for politicians in producing soundbites. Their utility comes from their analogous properties, often poetic character and their ability to reduce complex ideas, policies and events to more familiar concepts.

A central concept in this chapter, in its analysis of press reception, is that of *recycling* and the related concepts of *trajectories* and *intertextuality*. Recycling refers to instances in the media where language from one discourse domain (text type), a political speech, a press release or a PEB, may be reproduced in a different media domain, such as a newspaper article or television news bulletin. The language may reoccur as an attributed quote, as a paraphrase or it may be reformulated in an unattributed fashion in the commentary of a journalist. This inevitably involves a re-contextualisation and transformation of the initial source utterance (Garton, Montgomery and Tolson, 1991: 100). Once recycled, an utterance can develop trajectories over time, as recycled utterances are continually reused in different media and political domains and at different times. The trajectory of an utterance in the media and associated discourse domains may see the meaning of the initial utterance change as it is re-contextualised within other media discourses over time (Fiske, 1987: 126). Montgomery discusses the trajectories of ‘the discourse of *war* after 9/11’ (2005: 149), commenting that the sense in which the word *war* had for government officials and the media commentators changed over time after the terrorist atrocities of September 11<sup>th</sup> 2001. Similar, though obviously less dramatic, instances of recycling and discourse trajectories can be seen in the evidence presented in this chapter.

Recycling is also an example of what Fairclough (1992, 1995a, 1995b) and Fiske (1987) call *intertextuality*, where the composition of a (media) text contains constituents whose origin lies outside the text in question. Examples of *intertextuality*



simultaneously construct and mark the *discourse community* (Swales, 1990) of the author and audience in the articulation of the text. Obscure cultural references might be seen as marking a text for a specialised interest group. The jargonised language of an academic journal, or the slang of a pirate 'drum and bass' music radio station create more meanings for their specific discourse communities (see chapter 3 on active audience interpretation). That is not to say that a wider audience cannot obtain meaning from those discourses; rather, they would not obtain as much meaning. More generic cultural references, which might be understood by larger numbers of people, mark a text as more popular in focus, for example a TV news bulletin that evokes the 'Dad's Army' TV series as a metaphor in the discussion of defence policy (Garton, Montgomery and Tolson, 1991). In a general election, where politicians and journalists alike are trying to communicate with mass audiences, one would therefore expect to find more generic instances of intertextuality.

Fiske (1987) offers a useful typology of intertextuality, distinguishing between 'vertical' and 'horizontal' intertextual relationships. He explains,

Horizontal relations are those between primary texts that are more or less explicitly linked, usually along the axes of genre, character, or content. Vertical intertextuality is that between a primary text, such as a television program or series, and other texts of a different type that refer explicitly to it. These may be secondary texts such as studio publicity, journalistic features, or criticism, or tertiary texts produced by the viewers in the form of letters to the press or, more importantly, of gossip and conversation. (1987: 108)

Therefore, chapters thus far have dealt with horizontal intertextual relationships, investigating discourses from a small genre of texts. These are the primary texts Fiske refers to, the party manifestos and election broadcasts. However, this chapter focuses on secondary texts. Vertically related, these secondary 'spin off' texts comment on the primary texts. They are important to investigate because secondary texts, relating to 'criticism or publicity, work to promote the circulation of selected meanings of the primary text' (Fiske, 1987: 117). The selection and structuring of texts and their meanings is, as Fiske (1987) points out, an important aspect of textual and social power. That is, the meanings in texts and the texts themselves are structured in the interest of the dominant social group and their interests. The operation of particular metaphors and schemata will be shown to play an important role in communicating meaning across primary and secondary texts.

5.3 Metaphor and conceptual schemata in press reception: war, argument, pugilism and divorce

The corpus of 27 articles analysed illustrates the importance of specific metaphors to both journalists and politicians alike in the communication of political discourse. The corpus displays uniformity in the use of metaphors in describing events, actions and participants across texts. The initial event(s) which this collection of articles stems from is not just a discussion of the content of broadcasts themselves. The discourse is predominantly about the negative nature of election campaigning. Although numerous parties were campaigning, this discussion was fixed on only two: Labour and the SNP. Three main metaphors occur: the first and most prominent is that *politics is war*; the second is that *politics is argument*; and thirdly *politics is pugilism*. This analysis will demonstrate the extensive mixing of these metaphors and suggests they form an overarching schema, referred to here as the *conflict paradigm*. The textual evidence of this paradigm suggests the meaning of all three metaphors is closely related at the cognitive level. Politics is given meaning by its characterisation as a conflict between two competing sides. The fourth metaphor considered represents Scottish independence as *divorce and separation*. This is an example from Labour Party discourse attacking the SNP's policy of independence from the rest of the United Kingdom.

The three metaphors of the conflict paradigm will be illustrated by the following discussion centring on the tabulated results of analysis. The tables represent the structure and content of the mental schema produced by the metaphor under consideration. Deductions are made on the basis of evidence contained in the corpus; a larger sample would, undoubtedly, produce greater delicacy. The tables attempt to represent categories and subcategories of the schema. Table headings equate to superordinate category branches, the left-hand side indicates co-ordinate branches, and the right-hand side provides textual evidence drawn from the corpus. The various headings, therefore, act as functional interpretations of the textual data, from which the investigative discussion flows.



5.3.1 Politics is war

From the corpus a prominent schema emerged. In this model, political events, agents and their actions are all understood in terms of militaristic references. The source domain provides analogous concepts for politics drawn from names for events in war. Elections, manifesto launches, election broadcasts and conference speeches become wars, battles, campaigns and phases. Table 5.1 illustrates this,

Types of Conflict	
Campaigns:	'Labour prepare scare campaign in response', 'an escalation of the media campaign', 'positive campaign', 'drawn into a negative campaign', 'issue-based campaign', 'TV campaign'
Phases:	'negative phase', 'attack phase', 'the election campaign will enter a new and brutal phase today'
Battles and other Clashes:	'Battle for Holyrood', 'phoney war', 'fighting dies down', 'infighting', 'a bitter war of words', 'a day of bitter clashes', 'tired old attacks on independence', 'parties clash over hospital waiting lists'

Table 5.1 Politics is war schema: types of conflict

For example, '*Battle* for Holyrood set to hot up [Headline]... Labour will go on a *counter-offensive* tomorrow, with an anti-independence *campaign*' (*Sunday Mail*, 13 April 2003) [italics added]. Internal disagreement is described as 'infighting' as if party members are mutinous foot-soldiers and elections themselves are military campaigns, presumably with the aim of conquering all others or at the very least winning.

It may be useful to briefly consider the etymology of key terms to establish some evidence of the history of metaphors and how metaphorical meaning was established. The *Oxford English Dictionary* (OED) records 'campaign' as entering the English language in the 17<sup>th</sup> century, from the French 'campagne'. Its meanings centred on concepts associated with open country or field. Of 'campaign', the *OED* comments it was,

at first occasionally used in all the senses of the earlier *campaign*, but was at length differentiated, and restricted to the military sense, for which it is now the proper term. (*www.oed.com*, 05-06-2006)

From the mid 1600s ‘campaign’ is used predominantly militaristically. However, from the earlier 19<sup>th</sup> century the *OED* records ‘campaign’ used politically. In the earlier 1800s, then one can see evidence of meaning radiating from the militaristic to the political domain.

The politics is war schema divides campaigns into strategic phases, employing different tactics to outmanoeuvre opponents on the battle field. As the following table indicates, tactics and strategies, therefore, play an important role in the militaristic metaphor. An election campaign as a planned and strategic event is strongly congruent with war. In this schema, the events of the campaign can then be characterised as weapons that strategically target an opponent’s weak spots. Under pressure, tactics may have to shift as if to repel an unexpected cavalry charge. In such a schema, the military arts of subterfuge are also important; party strategists are then said to ‘disguise their plans’, or tactics are employed to ‘unnerve opponents’ and less conventional actions can be used such as ‘terrorism’ or possibly guerrilla warfare.

Stratagems	
Tactics:	‘shock tactics’, ‘tactical shifts’, ‘tactics designed to confuse and fool us’, ‘scare tactic’
Strategy:	‘the SNP's strategy’, ‘rethink their strategy’, ‘concentrating attention on your opponent's weak spots’, ‘campaign objectives’, ‘negative campaign to unnerve opponents’, ‘scaremongering’, ‘if you can't beat them, join them’
Targeting:	‘Nationalist target...’, ‘directly targeted Jack McConnell’, ‘targeted resources’, ‘has focused Labour's energies on attacking...’
Subterfuge:	‘attempts to disguise their plans’, ‘the video terrorism’, ‘tactical shifts to hoodwink Scotland’, ‘tactics deliberately chosen to fool...’, ‘tactics designed to confuse and fool us’
Risk:	‘the latest desperate move came’, ‘...it represents a hostage to fortune’, ‘must enter enemy territory’

Table 5.2 Politics is war schema: stratagems



The actions of parties are conceptualised as attacks and defences of positions. As the ‘Types of Combative Action’ Table 5.3 demonstrates, statements criticising individual politicians are ‘personal attacks’. Policies are attacked by opponents and defended by proponents. For example, ‘When the SNP *launched* a series of *personal attacks* on McConnell, Labour said they would not use “*negative*’ *tactics*’ (*Daily Record*, 15<sup>th</sup> April 2003) [italics added]. Policies are themselves conceived of as positions to attack, as if they were an effective sniper in a bell tower or dominating hilltop position. Politicians ‘dig in’ and defend their policy as if it were a vital spot on the battlefield which must be held by men in fox holes. They can also launch ‘counter-offensives’ as a means of defence, presumably because the best form of defence is to attack. Statements can also be a naval broadside, where the speaker becomes a cannon, their words potentially lethal shot. An exchange of words between differing parties over a policy or campaign strategy is a clash or perhaps a skirmish.

Types of Combative Action	
Offensive:	‘prepared to go on the offensive’, ‘crosses the line’
Defensive:	‘defended the negative slant’, ‘counter-offensive’, ‘defended’, ‘launched a series of personal attacks’, ‘the Nationalists launched their broadside against Labour’s...’
Attacks:	‘powerful attack’, ‘launched a series of personal attacks’, ‘launching vicious, negative attacks’
Broadside:	‘the Nationalists launched their broadside against Labour’s...’, ‘the Tory broadside’
Fire	‘Jack McConnell yesterday turned his fire on the SNP’
Out-gun	‘out-gun the small calibre snipers’
Terrorise	‘terrorise the vulnerable’
Blast	‘Labour blast over independence’

Table 5.3 Politics is war schema: types of combative action

Just as the actions and events are subsumed into the logic of the politics is war schema, so are the participants in the election. For example:

Agents & Participants	
Opponents	'if the opponent's vote is such it will defect', 'if the opposition's vote is such'
Strategists	'SNP strategists', 'party strategists'
Leaders	'Tory leader...' 'LibDem Leader...'
Snipers	'small calibre snipers of the SNP'
Casualties	'first casualty'
The vulnerable	'terrorise the vulnerable'

Table 5.4 Politics is war schema: agents & participants

Those who plan the campaign are therefore 'strategists' trying to out-think and out-manoeuvre their opponents. Those that verbally criticise are 'attackers', the truth can be the 'first casualty', and voters exposed to 'shock tactics' of controversial PEBs can be 'the vulnerable' like inhabitants of a besieged town. The public can also 'defect' like once loyal troops who see their best chances with the army most likely to win, or who may have become disenchanted with the strategies of their generals.

Just as there are agents who perform actions there are results to those actions which take on equally militaristic connotations, as in Table 5.5.

Effects & Results of Combative Action	
Physical	'successfully damaged the SNP', 'was brutally effective', 'totally out-gunned', 'if the opposition's vote is such it will defect'
Mental	'terrorise the vulnerable', 'tactics designed to confuse and fool us', 'negative campaign to unnerve opponents', 'tactical shifts to hoodwink Scotland', 'panicked'
Win/Lose	'losing to the Tory broadside', 'their defeat'

Table 5.5 Politics is war schema: effects & results of combative action

There are bipartite characteristics here, and perhaps the above table could have been two separate representations. The first two sub-categories form a pair, demonstrating the physical and mental effects of combat. Physically opponents are said to be 'out-gunned' in an attack on a policy. A party's credibility can be 'successfully damaged'



by a strategic campaign. The result of a negative campaign can be that voters ‘defect’ to the opposition. People and things are materially harmed and damaged by the physical effects of war. Equally, one can see the mental effects of war. Those affected seem to endure unstable psychological states, after being terrorised. Also, individuals can be tricked and fooled by tactics. A logical result of the physical and mental effects of war is that they can amount to the war being won or lost. The second two sub-categories in Table 5.5 illustrate as much, forming an important bipartite distinction: wars are won or lost. It would be a less prototypical representation of a war where the protagonists agreed to disagree and decide to call it a draw. A party might lose a few battles (equating to several policy issues or key parliamentary seats) but still win the war and be elected as the majority party. Therefore, there are two sides, the winners and the losers. This last point will prove important, as the schema structures the war and politics as a battle between two sides.

Values	
Moral	‘courage’, ‘discipline’, ‘he had guts’, ‘what we stand for’, ‘lead a nation’
Immoral	‘crosses the line of decency’

Table 5.6 Politics is war schema: values

Finally, Table 5.6 illustrates that the politics is war metaphor evokes the moral aspects of armed conflict. Leaders have courage to do what is difficult, they lead and they stand for something. The strong party has discipline: the weak party is undisciplined and panics. Just as an army’s success relies on their troops’ ability to follow orders and to hold the line in the midst of battle, so is a political party’s. If war has its moral warriors, its perpetrators can also be immoral and unprincipled. They can transgress the rules of engagement to gain unfair advantage. This part of the schema relates back to tactical aspects discussed earlier, and as such a campaign can be fought positively or negatively.

5.3.2 Politics is argument

The second metaphor which was particularly salient in the press reception of the Labour and SNP broadcasts was that politics is characterised as an argument. As above, evidence is presented in tables, partly to illustrate the structure of the schema evoked by the politics is argument metaphor. As with the previous metaphor the agents, actions and events of the political field are transposed to the schematic ordering of the politics is argument metaphor.

Type of Argument			
Informal		Formal	
Rows	'the <i>row</i> came after', ' <i>dirty tricks row</i> ', 'a <i>political row</i> has erupted', 're-ignited the <i>bitter row</i> ', 'ad sparks <i>furious row</i> '	Critique	'to launch a <i>prolonged critique</i> of the Nationalists'
		Dispute	'embroiled in a <i>bitter dispute</i> '
		Debate	'deterioration in <i>Labour's debate</i> '
Arguments	'Labour's <i>argument</i> that...', 'the SNP's <i>argument</i> '	War	'a bitter <i>war of words</i> '

Table 5.7 Politics is argument schema: types of argument

Elections and the locutions which occur during the campaign appear variously as 'furious' and 'bitter rows', 'arguments', 'critiques', 'disputes' and 'debates'. Characteristically, argument can be subdivided into the formal and informal, and as illustrated by Table 5.8 this has a relational effect on the processes of argument. Arguments themselves are also realised as metaphors, such as the combative 'war of words' where argument is war. This suggests that argument and war metaphors are closely related at the cognitive level. Politics as the target of a metaphor can be realised in both the source domains of war and argument. In addition argument can be the target of a metaphor which can be realised by the source domain of war. The interrelatedness of the schematic representation of these metaphors will be discussed in greater detail below.

If politics is argument, verbal processes are obviously an important aspect of the schematic representations of the argument metaphor. Table 5.8 demonstrates these



processes from the analysed corpus, indicating the manner in which political argument can occur.

Processes of Argument	
Accusing	'accused of trying to terrorise...', 'opponents accused', 'accusing them', 'Mr Swinney yesterday accused Mr McConnell', 'the SNP accused Labour', 'Labour accused the SNP'
Arguing	'other political parties argued' , 'the Scottish Labour leader argued that the SNP'
Apologising & Admitting	'Mr Swinney was unapologetic', 'the SNP has been forced to admit'
Challenging	'John Swinney... challenged Mr McConnell'
Criticising (informally)	'slagging each other', 'negative personality slagging', 'they exchange insults'
Criticising (formally)	'The Conservative criticised Labour and SNP', 'Liberal Democrats poured contempt on both SNP and Labour', 'but speak disparagingly of 'divorce''
Lying	'SNP are telling a pack of lies'
Threatening	'threatening'
Warning	'Tories have warned that...', 'Tony Blair today warned that...'

Table 5.8 Politics is argument schema: processes of argument

Those engaged in political discourse are said to 'argue', 'accuse', 'criticise', 'challenge', 'warn', 'insult', 'threaten', 'lie', 'slag', 'apologise' and 'admit'. There are more formal types of argument, such as debating in which people are 'criticised', 'warned' or where contempt is poured on opponents (note the other metaphor, where contempt is constructed as a liquid that is then emptied onto something). There are also less formal types are argument, such as rows, where people are said to be 'slagging' and insulting each other tit-for-tat. This schema does not explicitly re-categorise those agents involved in the arguing, as happens in the politics is war metaphor. Therefore, one does not see 'arguers' or 'debaters' lexicalised as equivalents of 'leaders', 'strategists' and 'snipers'

5.3.3 Politics is pugilism

Next, there is evidence of a metaphor, which recasts politics as an encounter between pugilistic adversaries. Typically, the textual processes, both written and spoken, of political argument become the physical actions of a boxing match, where words are punches.

Types of Strikes	
Hitting	'hard-hitting Nationalist election broadcast', 'Jim Wallace hit out at negative campaigning', 'Labour hit back by stressing...', 'we are simply hitting back', 'the SNP didn't know what had hit it'
Blast	'Labour blast over independence'
Throw your weight behind	'Mr Blair threw his weight behind...'
Boot or put the boot in	'refused to put the boot into the opposition'
Rip	'ripped the SNP to pieces'
Thrust	'Our thrust will be to give people positive reasons to vote for us'

Table 5.9 Politics is pugilism: types of strikes

When leaders support a party's election campaign they are said to 'throw their weight behind' it. The campaign is the fist at the end of a punch, while the leader lends his body weight to his strike as if to add additional force, the purpose of which is to knock out his opponent. Politicians' retorts to criticisms of policy or campaign strategies are the defensive responses of a boxer under fire, 'hitting back' at their opponents, or a response in anger or frustration is to 'hit out'.



Types of Fights	
Fair/Clean	'refused to put the boot into the opposition', 'McConnell is fighting a cleaner campaign', 'Jim's clean fight plea'
Unfair/Dirty	'below the belt', 'Nat's gutter-fighting posters...'
Bare-knuckle	'the gloves came off in the election campaign'
No-holds-barred	'...but sit up and take notice when a fight starts, especially one with no holds barred'
Duels	'television showdown'

Table 5.10 Politics is pugilism: types of fights

The events of an election become various kinds of boxing encounter, which suggest to an audience the character of those events. There can be clean fights but increasingly in contemporary elections there are dirty fights, another way of characterising negative campaigns. Some encounters, when considered extreme, are portrayed as brutal and bare-knuckle, where 'the gloves came off'. The origin of this well known metaphor may well pre-date the 1838 Rules of the Pugilistic Association (commonly known as the Queensberry Rules). Before 1838 boxers would often train with gloves or 'muffles' to avoid injury, but on the occasion of a set-to in the prize ring they would strip to the waist and fight without gloves. Or the metaphor may be contrasting the two periods of boxing, divided by the introduction of the 8<sup>th</sup> Marquess of Queensberry's rules<sup>44</sup>. The rules were introduced to make boxing matches safer and the rules clearer. Other metaphors from the bare-knuckle era of prize fighting have become fossilised in English, their origin for most speakers opaque. For example, a common metaphor used in political leadership races is 'to throw your hat into the ring', which was the formal way boxing matches would be declared between combatants when the two fighters' seconds would toss their hats over the ropes into the ring. Another common metaphor, used to express whether someone or thing is of

<sup>44</sup> Before the Queensberry rules it was not the case that formal boxing matches had no rules, far from it. The Broughton Rules, named after the boxer Jack Broughton, were generally used during the later part of the 18<sup>th</sup> century up until 1838. Broughton formulated his rules after one of his opponents died following a fight. In these rules, fighters still fought bare knuckle and there were no timed rounds. Instead a round ended when a fighter was either struck or thrown to the floor, and punches could also be thrown in the clinch. Broughton was a prominent enough figure of Georgian London to be buried in Westminster Abbey. His prominence bears testament to the past popularity of boxing in Britain to the extent that boxing has left its linguistic mark on the language ever since.



sufficient quality, is to say whether they are ‘up to scratch’ or ‘brought up to scratch’. The scratch was a yard square chalked or marked in the middle of the ring. In the bare-knuckle era rounds were not timed as in contemporary boxing, instead a round ended when a man was struck or thrown to the ground. Fighters then had an allotted amount of time, usually thirty seconds, in which to come to the scratch ready to fight. Failure to be brought up to the scratch, either by oneself or one’s seconds, resulted in defeat. Hence, the ability to come up to the scratch was the difference between success and failure, as the better quality fighter would always be stood ready at the scratch.

Effects of Fights			
Opponents		Voters	
Disorientation	‘those who have seen this SNP film have been stunned by its simple power’, ‘the SNP didn’t know what had hit it’	Excitement	‘...but sit up and take notice when a fight starts, especially one with no holds barred’
Dismemberment	‘ripped the SNP to pieces’	Support	‘Our thrust will be to give people positive reasons to vote for us’

Table 5.11 Politics is pugilism: effects of fights

Following the logic of the pugilistic schema, if words are punches then the effects of those words are also described in terms of physical and mental effects. As Table 5.11 demonstrates, there are two different groups affected by the metaphorical punches thrown. The first and perhaps most obvious are opponents, who according to the corpus evidence can be either disorientated or dismembered in some way. Disorientation could cover degrees of sensory impairment, opponents could be merely stunned or disorientated but they, presumably, can be knocked-out if the force of the argument were strong enough. As in a prize-fight, in addition to an adversary, the audience or voters can also be affected by the fight. Therefore, voters can be excited



be the skills or barbarity of the pugilists and their support can be swayed. In the above table the quote suggests that votes would support the ‘positive’ ‘thrusts’ of the party as if supporting a fighter who always abides by the rules and fights a clean fight.

Tactics	
Aim	‘concentrating attention on your opponents' weak spots’
Posture	‘new stance’
Fair play	‘refused to put the boot into the opposition’
Cheating	‘below the belt’

Table 5.12 Politics is pugilism: tactics

Boxing also employs tactics and so a political debate is described in terms of a pugilistic encounter. Political arguments are portrayed as punches strategically aimed at ‘weak spots’, like a boxer throwing punches to the torso of a poorly conditioned adversary. When a tactic is not working politicians can take up a ‘new stance’, to launch punches from different angles, to overcome a fighter’s defences. Table 5.12 also shows that political brawlers can choose to play by the rules or cheat and throw low blows. This illustrates that there are opinions as to the right and wrong ways in which to engage in political fisticuffs. There is, therefore, a strong similarity with the politics is war schema, where there are positive (and right) and negative (and wrong) ways in which to wage war.

5.3.4 A conflict paradigm

A common theme to all three of these metaphors is that they involve some kind of conflict, which is either verbal or physical. The conflict is usually between two competing sides: there are two boxers in a fight; there are two sides to an argument (Billig, 1996); and wars are usually conceptualised as a conflict between right and wrong, allies and enemies or ‘us’ verses ‘them’. The similarity of these metaphors goes further, as they appear interrelated at a cognitive level, as everyday experience of language would suggest. In English, it is not only that politics is understood in terms of war, argument and pugilism but also that these three metaphors are understood in terms of each other. An argument is war, ‘a war of words’ and war is argument ‘a

bloody quarrel between two nations'. War is pugilism, 'the RAF delivered a knock-out blow tonight' and pugilism is war, 'Lennox Lewis and Mike Tyson will go to war tomorrow'. And argument is pugilism, 'the Chancellor gave his young opponent a bloody nose in the commons today' and pugilism is argument, 'I'll let my fists do the talking'.

The interrelated nature of these three metaphors is supported by the evidence of all 27 articles in the corpus. There was no single text which did not display one of the three conflict metaphors just described. Often at least two of the metaphors are mixed. For example, in the following two examples the dominant politics is war metaphor is mixed at different times with either the argument or pugilism metaphors. In the first example, politics is both war and argument,

Scare tactic... she defended the negative slant... it would not attack personalities, but was prepared to go on the offensive... the SNP has been forced to admit... slagging each other... what we stand for. (*The Scotsman*, 15<sup>th</sup> April 2003)

In the following example politics is both war and pugilism,

Nationalists' brutal broadcast... on the receiving end of Labour's attacks... the SNP didn't know what had hit it... SNP strategists... was brutally effective... the Nationalists know they must enter enemy territory... but sit-up and take notice when a fight starts, especially one with no holds barred... using negative campaigning... part of the aim in negative campaigning is to unnerve opponents... campaigning has been subdued... attacks on independence. (*The Herald*, 16<sup>th</sup> April 2003)

In the example from *The Scotsman* an event in the Scottish election is metaphorically defined as war, in lexical choices such as 'tactics', 'attack' and 'offensive', and as an argument, with phrases like 'forced to admit' and 'slagging each other'. *The Herald* example provides similar evidence. One can see the war schema in choices such as 'strategists' and 'enemy territory' and the pugilistic metaphor in phrases like 'didn't know what had hit it' and 'no holds barred'. Then there are examples where all three metaphors are mixed together. The follow three examples clearly illustrate this,

1. 'Battle for Holyrood set to hot up... TV broadcast could set alight election... dirty tricks row over shock new TV film... hard-hitting... accused... tactic... counter offensive.' (*Sunday Mail*, 13<sup>th</sup> April 2003)



2. 'A political row has erupted... the row came after... Jim Wallace hit out at negative campaigning... other politicians argued... fight a positive campaign... Mr Swinney defended tactics... the SNP's argument...' (*BBC News Online*, 14<sup>th</sup> April 2003)
3. 'Scare tactics worked... party strategists... new stance... weakening of the SNP's commitment... other political parties will accuse the SNP of hiding their true purpose... they argue... their defeat... a model for its own strategy.' (*Evening News*, 17<sup>th</sup> April 2003)

The high level of congruence between these metaphors and the field of politics is quite clear in examples 1 to 3. This is a familiar pattern throughout the corpus of texts that cover the party broadcasts and the meanings appear highly conventionalised in the political field.

Politics is war appears to be the dominant metaphor, which is then augmented by the addition one or more of the other two metaphors. The extent of interrelatedness suggests that these three metaphors are conceptually ordered together into an overarching *conflict paradigm*. The meanings of the three metaphors and their associated schematic representations often reproduce meanings which encode a binary conflict: good versus bad, fair versus unfair, right versus wrong, us versus them. As metaphors transfer meaning the target domain which the conflict paradigm is applied to is also subject to the logic of antithetical encounters. War, argument and pugilism metaphors are essentially metaphors that predominantly coalesce around those meanings that represent conflict. Any target domain such as politics will therefore privilege meanings within that domain which best suit the conflict paradigm. The importance of this paradigm and the material implications of the meanings it represents will be expanded on in Section 5.4 below, with particular reference to the discourse practices of journalists and politicians.

### 5.3.5 *Scottish independence is divorce*

As should be evident through the discussions of the previous chapters, Scotland's constitutional relationship with the UK is important to the ideological debate of Scottish politics. Independence is the issue that most divides Scotland's two main parties: Labour and the SNP. Bearing that in mind, the Labour Party employed a

consistent *divorce and separation* metaphor to describe the SNP policy of independence for Scotland from the British state. The state of union between Scotland and England is the target domain and marriage is the source domain. Therefore, Scotland is wedded to the rest of the UK and the Nationalist's policy of an independent Scotland is divorce and separation. For example, 'The party [Labour] focused on what it called the nationalist threat to divorce from the rest of the UK.' (*BBC Online*, 14<sup>th</sup> April 2003).

Lakoff (2002) has commented on the importance of metaphors associated with *family* in politics (specifically of the U.S.). He notes that experiences of family life are important to people's interpretation of morality and that metaphors from this domain are well suited to and often used in politics. It is perhaps unsurprising to find the application of a metaphor referring to family life in Scottish politics. The divorce and separation metaphor is important to this thesis because it relates to the observation made earlier that Scotland's constitutional status is still important in the negotiation of political discourse in Scotland. Labour also used the language of divorce and separation in the 1999 election; therefore, they clearly feel that the independence issue is still current to devolved election campaigning.

The 'divorce and separation' metaphor is accompanied by language from the overarching conflict paradigm. For example, the SNP's policy is also labelled by Jack McConnell as 'Tactics deliberately chosen in an attempt to fool Scotland's voters' and as 'Deceit to hide their goal of separation' (*Daily Record*, 15<sup>th</sup> April 2003). Tony Blair on the 15<sup>th</sup> repeats the above messages, 'For all their attempts to disguise their plans for divorce' and 'He [Tony Blair] warned that voters had a choice between continued stability under Labour or the 'instability and isolation that a Nationalist victory would bring' (*BBC Online*, 15<sup>th</sup> April 2003). On the same day *The Scotsman* reports Jack McConnell as saying at the STUC 'the SNP's goal of independence would result in a "hugely expensive divorce"' (*The Scotsman*, 15<sup>th</sup> April 2003) and that 'the SNP are trying to "fool" Scotland's voters that there was no real risk in a vote for separation' (*The Scotsman*, 15<sup>th</sup> April 2003). Negative aspects of the conflict paradigm are transferred to the divorce metaphor. The subterfuge element of the conflict schema appears particularly prominent; and conflict (and dishonest aspects of conflict) is not normally viewed as a positive facet of marriage.



Negative messages about the SNP are contrasted with a positive assessment of Labour (in line with the structuring of the ideological square<sup>45</sup>) which continues the schema of the 'divorces and separation' metaphor. McConnell is paraphrased and directly quoted as saying 'He contrasted this scenario with Scotland under a Labour Executive, by repeatedly using the words "build", "improve" and "partnership within the UK"' (*The Scotsman*, 15<sup>th</sup> April 2003). A building metaphor for Labour's policy programme is also a recurrent feature of the party's discourse in the 2003 election but there is not space to explore it fully here. Building and divorce metaphors, however, are an example of different metaphors combining. As with the three conflict metaphors values and meanings are transferred from one metaphor to another. 'Divorce and separation' are defined in negative terms, destructive in character. Divorce is unstable, uncertain and isolating whereas partnership is stable, certain and inclusive. And divorce is costly whereas in partnership there is prosperity.

The *Evening Times* on the 15<sup>th</sup> April reports Tony Blair as saying in a speech to party activists that deciding to vote for either Labour or the SNP 'represented a stark choice "between devolution and divorce, between investment and cuts, between stability and security and instability and isolation"'. The divorce metaphor is employed by Blair as part of a rhetorical contrast of positive and negative states associated with the adversarial sides of the ideological square. In the Labour election broadcast the connection is initially made between the 'divorce and separation' metaphor and the 'building' metaphor. The unseen narrator of the broadcast declares, 'If Scotland votes SNP on May the first, on May the second the Nationalists will begin the process of breaking up Britain'. This message is then reported in *The Scotsman* on the 16<sup>th</sup> April in a satirical article criticising Labour's broadcast. Also on the 16<sup>th</sup> April, in an analysis of campaign strategies, *The Herald* recycles the Labour messages as, 'Negative campaigning works. Four years ago, the SNP was on the receiving end of Labour's attacks portraying independence as an expensive divorce' (16<sup>th</sup> April 2003).

The divorce metaphor privileges negative meanings of the break-up of a marriage, reinforced via the transference of meaning from a building schema. The meanings from divorce and building metaphors reflect underlying cultural values and

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<sup>45</sup> As a conceptual system, metaphors and their associated cognitive schemata, when being used to encode ideological positions, are most likely subsumed under the organisational structure of the ideological square, i.e. in the positive and negative characterisations of in-groups and out-groups respectively.



opinions on divorce, i.e. that it is a negative and destructive event. James Mitchell in *The Herald* commented during the campaign on Labour's use of the divorce and separation metaphor and its cultural meanings in a Scottish context. He asserts,

For many Scots, especially women, divorce is liberating, but the SNP is struggling to respond effectively. Social conservatism, encouraged by Presbyterianism and Catholicism alike, is alive and politicians dare not suggest divorce is good... The Nationalists must find a convincing alternative analogy or embrace divorce. (*The Herald*, 16<sup>th</sup> April 2003)

Many metaphors have cultural salience in the construction and representation of cultural meanings and values (Lakoff, 2002). This cognitive-linguistic process is what, in the terminology of political communication, gives particular phrases or soundbites 'resonance' with voters (Rosenbaum, 1997). The conflict metaphors discussed above are not merely instances of prosaic language but also culturally specific examples of how British (and probably Western) culture understands politics. If the dominant meanings of divorce in British culture are negative ones then it is those meanings which will be privileged in the minds of the individuals who produce and interpret a discourse. For example, if divorce is viewed as expensive, destructive and represents a failure, then when used as a metaphor those will be the dominant meanings transferred to the target domain.

#### 5.4 Language, discourse practices and the press reception of party election broadcasts

This section will look more specifically at the professional practices and cultural background that constitute the production of news copy and in doing so the effects on party messages will be analysed. The overall theme of the press coverage of the 2003 election broadcasts was that of negative campaigning, which in turn was characterised as negative campaigning between two sides: Labour and SNP. The effects of the use of metaphor and the schematic knowledge they represent will be investigated, i.e. the practical effects of characterising the field of politics or a policy in a certain way. The language produced by the conflict paradigm bears scrutiny here, as elements of that conceptual schema are deployed to critical effect by both journalist and politicians in the language that constitutes the discourse of press reception of PEBs.



#### *5.4.1 Negative campaigning*

The negative campaigning theme formed a meta-topic of discussion in the press. The primary focus of press reporting was not of the policy claims and criticisms made in the broadcasts. Although coverage in the PEB corpus coalesced around certain events, the press commented on the overall style of campaigning by Labour and the SNP. Negative campaigning as a topic is connected to the 'politics is conflict' paradigm discussed above. It is drawn from those parts of the conflict schema that are concerned with aspects of the fairness of behaviour. For example, one can think of the rules of war and that there are (in terms of cultural norms) proper ways for armies to conduct themselves. There are strategies which are honourable and likewise there are improper and dishonourable strategies as well, such as terrorism, targeting non-military targets or the use of certain weapons. Similarly, in pugilistic or sporting metaphors the notion of a fair fight or fair play has strong consonance with notions of conduct in war and right and wrong. Negative campaigning is therefore seen as an inappropriate way to electioneer. In congruence with the adversarial sides of the ideological square, individual parties are unlikely to openly concur that their election practices are negative but they are more likely to comment that the campaigning of others is. Therefore features of the conflict paradigm are drawn on in competitive ideological discourse. Dishonourable and unfair practices are likely to be drawn on to describe metaphorically the particular political activities of various groups or individuals one is opposed to.

Negative campaigning was a theme that continued in the press and other media throughout the election. However, it became more focussed in the third week with the airing of the Labour and SNP PEBs discussed here. It is apposite to discuss the issue of negative campaigning because it elucidates several relevant points concerning media coverage of Scottish elections. Firstly, the consistency of language used to discuss negative campaigning, by both journalists and politicians, illustrates a similitude of professional discourse practices. Secondly, and related to the first point, the negative campaigning issue further illustrates the nature of recycling and trajectories of particular discourses. Thirdly, the issue illustrates the complexity of strategic communication by political agents in the mediated discourse of the press.

Garton, Montgomery and Tolson (1991) suggest that certain metaphors evoke particular imaginary scenarios and common-sense discourses and are an integral part

of the process of political communication. This chapter has proposed that conflict metaphors are such integral metaphors. Garton, Montgomery and Tolson (1991) also assert ‘there is a certain consonance between the scripts and metaphors used by some politicians and those used in news narration’ (Garton, Montgomery and Tolson, 1991: 114). It can be seen below that both journalists and politicians reproduce this conflict schema time and time again in the written press.

Pub.	Date	Quotation
Sunday Mail	13/04/03	‘Labour will go on the <i>counter offensive</i> tomorrow, with an anti-independence <i>campaign</i> .’ [Journalist]
The Scots-man	14/04/03	‘David McLetchie, the Scottish Tory leader, said: “There are <i>lines of decency</i> that politicians should not cross...” [Quoted politician]
Daily Record	15/04/03	‘Wallace refused to be <i>drawn into negative campaigning</i> , which he claimed was “a major turn-off” for voters. He has written to other party <i>leaders</i> urging them to “ <i>fight a clean fight</i> ”’. [Quoted and paraphrased politician]
The Herald	15/04/03	‘John Swinney last night <i>defended</i> the SNP’s controversial party election broadcast to be shown tonight by telling Labour: “You can say it is sick, in bad taste and <i>below the belt</i> – but the one thing you can’t say it is not true”’. [Journalist and quoted politician]
The Scots-man	15/04/03	‘Patricia Ferguson, Labour’s <i>campaign</i> co-ordinator, claimed that the broadcast set out the stark choices facing the electorate. And she <i>defended</i> the negative slant of the film, saying the party had made it clear all along that it would not <i>attack</i> personalities but was prepared to go on the <i>offensive</i> over the issues.’ [Journalist paraphrasing a party activist]
Evening News (Edinburgh News)	17/04/03	‘Nationalist critics of this <i>new stance</i> claim it shows a weakening of the SNP’s commitment to its core policy of independence. And the other political parties will <i>accuse</i> the SNP of <i>hiding their true purpose</i> .’ [Journalist comment and paraphrasing of un-attributed political agents]

Table 5.13 Shared discourse practices of journalists & politicians: the conflict paradigm



Table 5.13 illustrates that politicians, party activists and journalists alike continuously evoke the same conflict paradigm, and they effectively talk/write about politics in the same way. This is to the extent that politics as conflict is constructed as representing common-sense assumptions about the political field. Therefore, once a theme or subject establishes dominance in the public discourse of the press (evoking established cultural meanings) it is self-sustaining within the 3-5 day reportage cycle. The 'negative campaign' theme in the press in part arises out of the established cultural hegemony that politics is a conflict. Those meanings provide an accessible rubric for discourse production and interpretation. Actions that are considered to be unfavourable electioneering practices are understood in terms of the ordered meanings of the conflict paradigm. It is not only journalists but politicians and their spokesmen who employ this cognitive schema when producing their discourse. Therefore it can be seen in Table 5.13 that a journalist can define a political party's actions in terms of a military campaign, saying 'Labour will go on the counter offensive'. Then politicians give responses, clearly demonstrating the same paradigm, so that the Tory leader refers to 'lines of decency', while the Liberal leader is reported to have called for a 'clean fight'.

There are perhaps unforeseen or unconscious consequences in the production of this discourse. Once the negative campaign theme has achieved salience all the main political protagonists are compelled to comment on it because of media questioning. However the overarching paradigm constitutes the political field as a conflict between two sides, in this instance Labour and the SNP. Political agents from smaller parties inadvertently reinforce the dominance of the two dominant parties of Scottish politics, casting the election as two-party contest when using conflict metaphors. Of course, it may have also been the case that minority party politicians did also comment that the election was about more than two parties. As these comments would not be easily compatible with the established schema for representing politics their utterances may have gone unreported. Therefore, it can be seen from the analysis of the negative campaign theme in the press, that journalists and politicians demonstrate a high degree of similarity in their discourse practices. They produce strikingly similar utterances. Utterances that continuously recycle are those which best fit the established norms of journalists and politicians' discourse practices and their (and their audiences') modes of comprehension.

### 5.4.2 Party messages

As noted in the section above, reportage of PEBs only covered two parties and in doing so framed the debate in terms of negative campaigning, rather than debating the issues the broadcasts actually discussed. Despite reportage focussing on negative campaigning this chapter will suggest there is evidence that Labour was more successful than the SNP at getting their campaign message reported. Therefore, comparatively, Labour's strategic communications can be considered more successful than the SNP's. However, this is not to say that the SNP were unsuccessful in their overall campaign. For example John Curtice a week into the campaign commented,

Labour has already allowed the SNP to set much of the campaign agenda with high-profile, well trailed and oft-repeated promises – more police, better pay for nurses, and abolition of student tuition fees. (*The Scotsman*, 7<sup>th</sup> April 2003)

This chapter focuses on the press reception of the Labour-SNP broadcasts as a significant event in the reportage of the election campaign, rather than the campaign as a whole.

#### 5.4.2.1 *The state of Scotland and England's matrimony: Labour's 'divorce' metaphor*

This section will now compare the success of the two parties' strategic communication.

Part of reporting practice in the press is to reproduce direct quotations and paraphrases of sources (Venables, 2005) and as such the press consistently recycles the Labour message. As different party spokesmen at different events produced almost identical formations of the party's message, reporting of the party line was almost inevitable. Even when an article was critical of Labour's campaign strategies or their use of language the message was still consistently reproduced.



Date	Pub.	Headline/ Byline	Direct Quote or Paraphrase of Party Message	Journalist Comment Or Non-party Quote	Context
14/04/03	BBC Online	McConnell attacks SNP 'deceit'	<p>'The party focused on what it called the nationalist <i>threat to divorce</i> from the rest of the UK'</p> <p>[JM] "Just a little more time before Scotland <i>separates</i> from the UK."</p> <p>[JM] "Tactics deliberately chosen to fool Scotland's voters that there is no real <i>risk in</i> a vote for <i>separation</i>"</p>		Report of Jack McConnell's STUC speech
14/04/03	Scots.	SNP accused of bad taste in broadcast		'Labour will screen a party election broadcast tonight, portraying <i>independence</i> as a backward and <i>destructive</i> move which would ruin Scotland.'	Comment on SNP and Labour PEBs
15/04/03	et	Dying pensioner ad sparks furious row	[JM] "On May 1, we can keep building for the future or we can rip it all up and face <i>upheaval</i> and <i>uncertainty</i> ."		Reporting controversy over Labour and SNP PEBs.

Table 5.14 Press coverage: Labour's 'divorce' metaphor

Table 5.14 Press coverage: Labour's 'divorce' metaphor (Continued)

Date	Pub.	Headline/ Byline	Direct Quote or Paraphrase of Party Message	Journalist Comment Or Non- party Quote	Context
15/04/ 03	dr	SNP are telling a pack of lies	<p>'the Labour leader said the Nats were trying to "fool" the Scottish people into <i>splitting</i> from the United Kingdom.'</p> <p>[JM] "Tactics deliberately chosen in an attempt to fool Scotland's voters that there is no real <i>risk</i> in a vote for <i>separation</i>."</p>		Article supportive of Labour criticizing the SNP over PEB and campaign strategy
15/04/ 03	BBC Online	Blair launches attack on SNP	<p>'Prime minister Tony Blair has warned Scots they face a "stark choice between <i>devolution and divorce</i>" from the UK...'</p> <p>'He [TB] warned that voters had a choice between continued <i>stability</i> under Labour or the "<i>instability and isolation</i>" that a Nationalist victory would bring.'</p> <p>'He [TB] said "For all their attempts to <i>disguise their plans for divorce</i>, no-one should be in any doubt that every vote for the SNP will be taken by them as a vote for <i>separation</i>".'</p> <p>'He [TB] said it was "a choice between two futures. Between <i>devolution and divorce</i>. Between <i>investment and cuts</i>. Between <i>stability and security</i> and <i>instability and isolation</i>".'</p>		Report of Tony Blair's campaign visit and speech at the Burrell Collection in Glasgow.



Table 5.14 Press coverage: Labour's 'divorce' metaphor (Continued)

Date	Pub.	Headline/ Byline	Direct Quote or Paraphrase of Party Message	Journalist Comment Or Non- party Quote	Context
15/04/ 03	Scots.	McConnell: SNP deceiving voters	<p>'... a warning that the SNP's goal of <i>independence</i> would result in a [JM] "<i>hugely expensive divorce</i>" that would bring cuts to public services.'</p> <p>[JM] "we can keep <i>building</i> for the future or we can rip it all up and start again with for years of <i>upheaval</i>, <i>uncertainty and threat</i>."</p> <p>'The Scottish leader argued that the SNP tactics were deliberately chosen in a attempt to "fool" Scotland's voters that there was no real <i>risk</i> in a vote for <i>separation</i>. He contrasted this scenario with Scotland under a Labour Executive, repeatedly using the words "<i>build</i>", "<i>improve</i>" and "<i>partnership with the UK</i>".</p>		Report on McConnell's speech to the STUC and argument between SNP and Labour over PEBs.
15/04/ 03	Scots.	Labour plays on independ- ence 'horror'	<p>'Throughout, a Vincent Price-style voice-over warns of the threat of a "<i>costly SNP divorce</i>"'</p> <p>'...as the narrator tells the nation that independence would "leave Scotland <i>isolated in an uncertain world</i>".</p> <p>She [PF] said the "stark choice" facing the electorate was between economic <i>stability and investment</i> under Labour or "<i>tax rises and cuts to pay for a hugely expensive divorce</i>".</p>		Satirical comment on Labour PEB and negative campaigning styles.

Table 5.14 Press coverage: Labour's 'divorce' metaphor (Continued)

Date	Pub.	Headline/ Byline	Direct Quote or Paraphrase of Party Message	Journalist Comment Or Non- party Quote	Context
15/04/ 03	et	Don't vote for ' <i>divorce</i> ' says Blair	<p>'He [TB] said: "For all their attempts to <i>disguise</i> their plans for <i>divorce</i>, no-one should doubt that every vote for the SNP will be taken by them as a vote for <i>separation</i>."</p> <p>He [TB] represented a stark choice "between <i>devolution and divorce</i>, between <i>investment and cute</i>, between <i>stability and security</i> and <i>instability and isolation</i>".</p>		Report- ing on Tony Blair's campai- gn visit to Scot- land
15/04/ 03	Herald	Swinney defends 'negative' campaign	'...Patricia Ferguson, Labour campaign coordinator, said: "the SNP have been forced to admit in recent weeks <i>separation</i> from the rest of the UK is their number one priority."		Report- ing on negative camp- aign strate- gies of Labour and SNP
16/04/ 03	Scots.	May the dark force be with you in TV election	<p>'On Monday night, we heard a bloke on parole from a crypt intoning: "If Scotland votes SNP on May the first, on May the second the Nationalists will begin the process of breaking up Britain." How awful.'</p> <p>'Then the screen went wonky again as Dr Jekyll disappeared behind the couch and reappeared as Mr Hyde to warn: "The <i>Nationalist divorce</i> would leave Scotland isolated in an <i>uncertain world</i>".</p>	'A map showed Caledonia severed physically, as if by celestial chainsaw, from Mother England. Crikey, a geological disaster. What a fearful prospect.'	Satire on SNP and Labour PEBs

Table 5.14 Press coverage: Labour's 'divorce' metaphor (Continued)



Date	Pub.	Headline/ Byline	Direct Quote or Paraphrase of Party Message	Journalist Comment Or Non-party Quote	Context
16/04/ 03	dr	Clear choice for Scotland		<p>‘Unfortunately, Swinney is committed to the repeatedly rejected policy of <i>independence</i> which would <i>isolate</i> and eventually <i>bankrupt</i> Scotland.’</p> <p>‘But there is another huge plus for giving the vote to Labour and that is the <i>partnership</i> between Blair himself and Brown – national and international-calibre politicians who <i>care deeply</i> about Scotland.’</p> <p>‘Under the SNP, Scotland would be out of step with the times. A Scotland for steep personal taxation, <i>divorced from reality</i>. The Daily Record goes for the Blair-Brown-McConnell <i>partnership</i> any day.’</p>	Leader – in support of Labour. Election characterized as a choice between two sides, Labour and SNP.
17/04/ 03	en	Parties have agreed to scare and scare alike	“‘If Scotland votes SNP on May 1, on May 2 the Nationalists will begin the process of <i>breaking up Britain</i> ”, the party’s latest broadcast declared.’	‘Meanwhile, Labour is trying more or less the same message as last time about the threat of “ <i>divorce</i> ” posed by the Nationalists.’	Comment on Labour’s portrayal of SNP’s policy on independence.

Date	Pub.	Headline/	Direct Quote	Journalist Comment	Context
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		Byline	or Paraphrase of Party Message	Or Non-party Quote	
20/04/03	sh	<i>Divorce</i> talk 'wrong', says anti-abuse campaigner.	'A Labour spokesman said: "It is a massive leap of logic and one that we would never make to imply that the fact that <i>divorcing Scotland</i> from the rest of the Uk would <i>damage Scotland</i> means that we would suggest that a <i>woman</i> in an <i>abusive relationship</i> should not seek a <i>divorce</i> .'	'Labour's core election strategy of comparing <i>independence</i> to <i>divorce</i> is inappropriate and sends the wrong message to <i>separated couples</i> and their <i>children</i> , a leading campaigner against <i>domestic abuse</i> has said.'	Report on the reaction of anti-abuse campaigners to Labour's 'divorce and separation' characterization of independence.
				'Margaret McGregor, convenor of the Zero Tolerance Trust, condemned Labour for putting the 'fear factor' into <i>divorce</i> , when in reality many women in <i>abusive relationships</i> need all the support they can get to seek <i>separation</i> .'	
				'"The whole message is very negative," said McGregor. 'In reality it's often very difficult for <i>parents</i> to decide on <i>divorce</i> and <i>separation</i> , especially if there are children involved. On top of that we have the politicians saying there will be <i>terrible consequences</i> .'	

Table 5.14 Press coverage: Labour's 'divorce' metaphor (Continued)

Table 5.14 Key:

People: Jack McConnell (JM), Tony Blair (TB), Patricia Ferguson (PF)

Publications (Pub.): *The Herald* (Herald), *The Scotsman* (Scots), *Evening Times* (et), *Daily Record* (dr), *Sunday Herald* (sh), *Evening News* (en)



One might regard Labour's divorce and separation metaphor as an instance of successful strategic communication in electoral discourse. The message is successful not in terms of its effects on voters<sup>46</sup> but in terms of the consistency of its reproduction and recycling in the press. This reproduction is influenced by several factors: firstly, the consistency in the production of the message by party agents; secondly, the location of this message production i.e. at events designed for media consumption; and thirdly because the message draws on established cultural meanings shared by politicians, journalists and the public. The result is that even though much of the press reception of PEBs related to negative campaign strategies, Labour achieved what the SNP failed to do. Labour's message was consistently and accurately reproduced and embedded within the wider press reception of the election.

#### *5.4.2.2 Waiting lists and the NHS: the SNP's 'dying man'*

The SNP faced the same criticisms of negative campaigning on this occasion; however, a consistent identifiable message was not put across. A PEB that became known as the 'Dying Man' broadcast had no narrator and so there was no verbal 'hook' for the press to recycle. The broadcast flashed up text, such as 'Labour said they'd reduce waiting lists. They haven't. Labour said they'd deal with bed shortages. They haven't', but these pieces of text were not recycled. Instead many of the press reports recycled the 'Dying Man' broadcast by describing what occurred in it. For example,

The film shows an elderly man sitting, waiting for medical treatment. He slowly gets worse until he disappears, leaving his empty chair behind. There are no voice-overs or music, the images are stark and clear, and the man, called Bill, never speaks. One of the final images is of a doctor peering into what appear to be the man's eyes, which slowly fade to darkness. The message the SNP hope to get across with the broadcast is that Labour has failed to reduce waiting lists. It finishes with the slogan, "How long can you wait?" (*The Scotsman*, 14<sup>th</sup> April 2003)

Alternatively, reports reproduced a SNP party spokesmen explaining the message of the broadcast as in the following example,

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<sup>46</sup> In this instance the effects on voters' opinions of these particular political messages is unknown, however the Electoral Commission's report (2003) concluded that negative campaigning did not have any significant affect on voters.

Nicola Sturgeon, the SNP election co-ordinator, claimed this week’s message would resonate with voters: ‘The election broadcast exposes the tragic truth behind Labour’s failure to tackle waiting times. It tells a simple story that far too many people the length and breadth of Scotland will recognise. It is the story of waiting; waiting for the care you need, waiting for Labour to deliver on their promises. (*Sunday Herald*, 13<sup>th</sup> April 2003)

The Nationalists were, therefore, unable to have a consistent party message recycled in several different media domains, constantly re-enforcing a simple theme. The ‘How long can you wait?’ slogan repeats the theme of the Nationalists’ first broadcast which saw different people singing ‘Why are we waiting?’ and a poster advertisement with a picture of Jack McConnell and the slogan ‘Time’s up’. If these were slogans intended to be repeated in the press they were certainly less effective at being recycled than the equivalent Labour messages on divorce and separation. Table 5.15 simply illustrates the SNP’s lack of success in terms of column inches and the number of articles.

Date	Pub.	Headline/Byline	Direct Quote or Paraphrase of Party Message	Journalist Comment Or Non-party Quote	Context
13/04/03	sm	Nats in dirty tricks row over shock new TV Film	‘The subtitles ask: “ <i>How long can you wait?</i> ”’		Discuss-ion of SNP ‘Dying Man’ broad-cast.
13/04/03	sh	The election’s tough new phase: SNP say Labour let patients die	‘When it seems he has collapsed, there is a doctor shinning a torch into a patient’s face, as graphics accuse Labour of failing to keep their hospital waiting list, bed shortage and staff shortage pledges. And with the question ‘ <i>How long can you wait?</i> ’, the final scene shows the man’s empty chair.’		Discus-sion of SNP ‘Dying Man’ broad-cast and Labour/ SNP argu-ment surrou-nding it.

Table 5.15 Press coverage: SNP’s ‘Dying man’ message



Table 5.15 Press coverage: SNP's 'Dying man' message (Continued)

Date	Pub.	Headline/ Byline	Direct Quote or Paraphrase of Party Message	Journalist Comment Or Non- party Quote	Context
14/04/ 03	Scots.	SNP accused of bad taste in broadcast	'The broadcast finishes with the slogan: "How long can you wait?" The advert represents an escalation of the SNP's media campaign which has been based around the slogan: " <i>We can't wait any longer.</i> "'		Discuss- ion of Labour and SBP broad- casts, mostly focus- ing on critic- ism of the SNP.
14/04/ 03	Scots.	Morbid SNP film 'crosses line of decency'	'The message the SNP hopes to get across with the broadcast is that Labour has failed to reduce hospital waiting lists. It finishes with the slogan, " <i>How long can you wait?</i> "'  'It represents an escalation of the SNP's media campaign, which has been based around the slogan, " <i>We can't wait any longer.</i> "'		Report of criticis m of SNP broad- cast
14/04/ 03	BBC Online	Election broadcast 'shocking'	"My message to Jack McConnell and his Labour Party is simple – <i>time's up</i> ," he [John Swinney] said'.		Report of critic- ism of SNP broad- cast

Date	Pub.	Headline/ Byline	Direct Quote or Paraphrase of Party Message	Journalist Comment Or Non- party Quote	Context
15/04/ 03	dr	John sounds alarm bell for Jack	<p>'The SNP yesterday attacked Jack McConnell, saying his "<i>time's up</i>". Nats leader John Swinney unveiled a poster showing a scowling picture of McConnell superimposed on an alarm clock. The slogan reads: "<i>Time's up</i>" and the hands of the clock point to seven o'clock, the time polls open on May 1.'</p> <p>'He [John Swinney] added: "My message to Jack McConnell and his Labour Party is simple. <i>Time's up</i>.'"</p>		Report of SNP poster unveil- ing

Table 5.15 Press coverage: SNP's 'Dying man' message

Table 5.15 Key:

People: Jack McConnell (JM), Tony Blair (TB), Patricia Ferguson (PF)  
Publications (Pub.): *The Herald* (Herald), *The Scotsman* (Scots), *Evening Times* (et),  
*Daily Record* (dr), *Sunday Herald* (sh), *Evening News* (en), *Sunday Mail* (sm)

Possible reasons for this lack of recycling may be simply that the PEB slogan came in the form of a question. It is the press that is usually in the habit of asking questions, even rhetorical ones. Therefore, journalists may have chosen not to ask the question for the SNP or to reformulate it in different language. This may not be a conscious decision: the rhetorical question did not fit the conflict schema as well as Labour's. Labour's message on independence did not come in the form of a slogan or catchphrase as such but as a metaphor intimately related to a speaker's conceptual system, drawing on common cultural or common sense knowledge. As such, Labour were able to embed a consistent party message within the reportage of the PEBs. The Labour message was frequently reported in articles because it was consistently repeated at subsequent media events, which may not have been directly related to the party broadcast (for example, speeches to the STUC). Because the Nationalists did not have a consistent, identifiable and accessible message the press coverage could not recycle it. Therefore much of the reportage focussed on criticism of the SNP's electioneering strategies and their defence of them. The SNP also lack the support of



any major newspaper title. In contrast the Labour Party who in the UK context has the general support of stable mates *The Times* and *The Sun* and in Scotland can claim the loyal support of the *Daily Record*, the biggest selling daily tabloid in Scotland.

## 5.5 Conclusion

This chapter began with an analysis of common metaphors and schemata employed in the representation of the political field in media discourse of the Scottish print press. It was demonstrated that there was a high degree of similarity between journalists and political agents in their application of said metaphors and schemata. These metaphors and their associated schemata privilege certain meanings and exclude others. In this case, metaphorically referring to the political field in terms of conflict represents politics as a contest between two antagonistic factions: the Labour Party and the SNP. Scotland's multi-party system is represented by both journalists and politicians of all colours as two party politics, in the corpus examined here.

The conflict paradigm is pervasive in the discourse of the election, to the extent that it forms a common-sense value of how the political field is constituted. This is at the expense of meanings which would better represent minority parties' interests. The multi-party complexion of the Scottish Parliament has already been discussed, with no one party likely to form a majority executive and with many other small parties and individual candidates likely to obtain political office. Therefore representing politics as a conflict between two sides appears inappropriate in the case of Scottish devolution. Conflict represents neither the actuality of the situation nor the interests of many of the participants. Even so, influential agents involved in Scottish politics have no need to challenge this hegemony: it is in the interest of both Labour and the Nationalists to have the political field conceived with them as the main protagonists. The press appear to continue a tradition derived from Westminster reportage, of constituting politics as a battle between two opposing ideologies. This is given a distinctively Scottish flavour by substituting Labour's Conservative opponents with Scottish Nationalists. Garton, Montgomery and Tolson comment in their work on metaphor and schema that,

Particular ideological assumptions and narrative scenarios occupy a place of dominance within this [mediated political] forum, to the extent that their



pervasive solidity as forms of common sense is very difficult to challenge. Moreover, such forms of discourse are not simply restricted to the fields of topics (such as defence) which they represent, but are also mobilized, metaphorically, in the way public debate is reported. (1991: 115-116)

Therefore the conflict paradigm is perpetuated as a common-sense representation of the field of politics as it is reinforced by the institutional agents of the two dominant parties and the media. Smaller participants in the political field would find it difficult to have their alternative voices represented in discursive constructions that structurally subsume the meanings they are trying to promulgate.

This chapter also suggested that the negative campaign theme, particularly prominent of the third week of the election, arose out of the conflict paradigm. Although critical of Labour and the Scottish Nationalists the commentaries still propagated the conflict paradigm's structuring of the political field as a binary conflict. When other parties were drawn into the debate, reportage of their comments were more often than not limited to commenting on the activities of Labour and the SNP. This reinforces the assumed centrality of the two main parties to this political process and runs counter to the interests of competing minority parties and candidates. The negative campaign theme further illustrates Garton, Montgomery and Tolson's (1991) observation that schema can become regulative or productive mechanisms in the production of media discourse. Once a story and its associated language gains prominence, future discourses are conceived and framed in keeping with the structure of the established schema. In this instance the conflict paradigm is the overarching schema for representing the political field. The negative campaign theme was the story that took hold and played out over the third week, constantly reinforced by politicians and journalists in different publications day after day. In performing a regulative function, metaphors and schema privilege certain meanings and exclude others: this explains why the press only focussed on Labour and the SNP. The Conservatives, Liberal Democrats, Greens and Scottish Socialist parties had broadcasts, events and messages they wished to be communicated in the third week of the campaign. However, as minority participants the minority parties were unable to compete against the hegemony of two party politics media coverage. Therefore, it was illustrated that other activities by Labour and the Nationalists, such as poster launches and speeches were assimilated into the binary conflict paradigm and



negative campaign theme. Minority party activities were unable to be prominently represented in this area of reportage.

Finally, this chapter compared the Labour and Scottish Nationalist messages of the third week of the campaign. Although both parties had to communicate their messages through often negative commentary about their campaign methods, Labour achieved greater success. This chapter suggested that Labour was more successful for several reasons: they were able to stay 'on message' more successfully, partly because their message wasn't in the form of a slogan or question; and Labour's choice of language was a culturally salient metaphor that evoked many common-sense assumptions about the nature of divorce. The divorce metaphor could easily be transferred to the target domain of the SNP's policy on independence. Although the SNP received coverage and recycling of their message, instances were far fewer occurring over fewer days than Labour's. These final observations illustrated the complexity of mediated political communication through the press. The press' reportage of the two broadcasts focussed on the negative campaign strategies of the parties involved. The Labour party were able, in this instance, to successfully embed their message within this coverage; whereas the SNP's became lost in the criticism.

## CHAPTER 6: IMAGINING SCOTLAND: 'THE NATION' AS IDEOLOGICAL TOOL

### 6.1 Investigating language and national and state identities

Thus far one of the things this thesis has demonstrated is that national identity plays an important role in Scottish politics. National identity creates an overarching nationalist agenda in the sense that, as McCrone (2001: 126) suggests, all Scottish politicians are Nationalist in their outlook. However, it has also been shown that the different parties construct different positions for Scotland in relation to the UK, both in terms of ideological content and in the labelling of in and out-groups. Chapter 3 illustrated that categorisation of nation and state groupings had an important ideological aspect when explaining party political in-group and out-group labelling. Some parties are unionist, others unionist within a federal framework, while others are separatist, wishing to situate Scotland outside the current UK constitutional framework. These ideological positions of Scottish nationalism have been shown to affect the potential patterns of coalition, with the federalist Liberal Democrats holding the balance of power between the unionist Labour Party and the separatist SNP. All three parties are left of centre and social democratic in their ideological orientations but Labour and the SNP's differing positions over Scottish independence preclude a partnership between them in the current UK political climate.

It should be clear by now, through the discussion of previous chapters, that language plays an important role in the representation of and public competition between ideologies. Both the importance of the nationalist agenda in Scottish devolved politics and the significance of language in the mediation of intergroup conflict around that issue have been investigated. This chapter intends to continue to explore how language represents the nationalist agenda in Scottish politics.

If Scottish national identity is so important to the political culture of Scotland, it is legitimate to ask, what do ideological interpretations of Scotland look like? If the different parties construct different positions for Scotland within or outwith the UK are their conceptions of what Scotland is different? If there are differences between political conceptions of Scotland, are conceptions different and/or related to other socio-cultural conceptions of the nation? For example chapter 2 demonstrated that in recent times, at least, Labour and the SNP have been successful in linking in the



public mind centre-left, social democratic values with Scottish national identity to the extent that right-wing Conservatism was often associated with Englishness, and as such the Scottish Conservatives find themselves ideologically isolated in Scotland. Therefore, do all the parties of Scotland draw on any non-political or non-civic<sup>47</sup> sources in constructing their conception of the Scottish nation? And are these conceptions used in any ideologically competitive way in devolved Scottish election discourse, i.e. in combination with conceptions of party identity? The analysis in sections 3 and 4 below will explore statements in manifestos and PEBs to explore the character of the discursive construction of Scotland and Scottish national identity by Scotland's political parties. The analysis will show the effects of party political ideology on the ideological conceptions of Scotland, demonstrating the active use of the nation as an ideological tool of persuasion.

In exploring the above questions this chapter will firstly place this investigation of discursive constructions of 'the nation' within a broader theoretical tradition. Anderson (1983), Billig (1995) and others have explored the 'imagined' nature of modern nations and the role of discursive acts in maintaining what Billig refers to as a 'banal' nationalism<sup>48</sup>. Much of the work done in this discursive tradition has focused on national press, including Scottish specific work (Higgins, 2004a and 2004b; Law, 2001; Schlesinger, 1998), which will be discussed further below. Billig notes politicians also play an important role in this process,

Democratic politics is founded on the institutions of nationhood; politicians have become celebrities in the contemporary age, their words, which typically reproduce the clichés of nationhood, are continually reported in the mass media. (1995: 11)

This chapter therefore looks at the role of politicians in the discursive process of constructing the nation. These discursive approaches are contrasted with the empirical

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<sup>47</sup> That is conceptions of nationalism which do not draw on the traditional political ideologies of left and right or public institutions, such as educational and legal systems. In their critical discourse analysis of Austrian national identity, Wodak et al (1999) make the distinction between *Staatsnation* and *Kulturnation* aspects of national identity. *Staatsnation* is equivalent to civic-nationalism, a kind of constitutional patriotism associated with the formal democratic institutions of society. By contrast, *Kulturnation* is equivalent to non-civic nationalism, which draws on more ethnic, as well as bounded conceptions of national identity, such as place, landscape, common language and common history.

<sup>48</sup> Banal nationalism refers to the everyday habits, including discursive ones, which maintain the ideological coherence of a nation, particularly in Western democracies. The theory explains how the nation is maintained in the minds of its people day-to-day by being continuously 'flagged' in seemingly unobtrusive ways. See page 172-176 below for further explanation.



work of Curtice et al (2002), McCrone (2001), Brown et al (1999), Bennie, Brand, and Mitchell (1997) and Brown, McCrone, and Paterson (1996). The discursive approach requires a degree of revision in light of the aforementioned empirical work as well as this investigation. In addition, in light of this chapter the empirical investigations mentioned are also shown to have limitations and require adaptation.

## 6.2 Imagining Nations: the National as Ideological Construct

The following sections explore what the actors on Scotland's political stage conceive Scotland to be. In this exploration the focus is on the discursive manifestations of political parties' imaginings of Scotland. This 'imagining' is not meant provocatively; it does not intend to imply that Scotland is a fanciful notion, an imaginary and therefore false concept. The sense is that of Benedict Anderson's work, and is one which fits with this discursive investigation of ideology and politics. For Anderson nations are imagined but not imaginary,

It [the nation] is *imagined* because the members of even the smallest nation will never know most of their fellow-members, meet them, or even hear of them, yet in the minds of each lives the image of their communion. (Anderson in Spencer and Wollman, 2005: 45)

In this theory the ubiquity of national imagining is therefore a powerful constituent in what makes a nation, a communion of Cartesian egos aggregating their sentiment, 'we think therefore we are'. Nationalism for Anderson is born out of the proliferation of print capitalism, and is primarily a discursive narrative. Individuals form nations through the community of print press and novelistic audiences, who imagine their commonality to be fundamentally limited, that is sovereign and bordered, connected through time and spatial proximity. One can see how such a mass act of cognition suits a cognitive-linguistic approach, particularly with its emphasis on textual audiences. The 'Nation' forms important elements of accounting for the context of culture, from which political genres result. Politicians propose to speak for 'the people' and in the interests of 'the Nation' and audiences do not have trouble determining which people and what nation they speak of.

Like Anderson (1983), Gellner (1983) places the industrialisation of literacy central to explaining the contemporary ideology of nations and nationalism. Behind the work of both Anderson and Gellner is the premise that nations and nationalism are



a phenomenon of the industrialised world, nations are not social artefacts which can be really seen in the primordial mists of time. However, though nations are a modern phenomenon, they are not thought to be modern by those who imagine them. On the contrary, Hobsbawm (1992) and Hobsbawm and Ranger (1983) have discussed both the historical emergence of nations and the invention of traditions which portray nations as timeless and bounded. They are bounded in the sense that 'our' traditions link 'us' together culturally, and in turn those traditions differentiate 'our' nation from 'theirs' (cf. Billig, 1995: 71). In these theories, nations and nationalism are a product of a process and organisation of industrialised modernity and nationalist beliefs are maintained by the communicative practices of nation states. Smith (2001) has tried to reconcile the above 'modernist' accounts of nations, which heavily emphasise the role of elites in the conceptualisation of the nation state, with primordialist and ethno-symbolic theories<sup>49</sup>. He concludes, 'the nation can be regarded as a sacred communion of citizens, and nationalism as a form of 'political religion' with its own scriptures, liturgies, saints and rituals' (Smith, 2001: 146). Smith's metaphorical use of 'scriptures' and 'liturgies' maintains the importance of discursive devices in the maintenance of nations and national identities, which leads this discussion to a more general point about nationalism.

The sense being given to nationalism here is an ideological one; and like other ideologies it can enact the processes of hegemony. Therefore, nationalism does not have to be foregrounded and openly disputed; it can also be 'banal' (Billig, 1995), that is to say, everyday and omnipresent in a world of nation states. What is often described as patriotism, under this paradigm, is a form of nationalism. Billig (1995) has gone some way to illuminate the ways in which nationalism is present in the everyday discourses of societies. Nationalism is an ideology which is maintained and communicated through a complex dialectic of remembering and forgetting. The nation is routinely flagged through the discursive (and semiotic) practices of everyday life; and it is because of the naturalness of these practices that 'our' patriotism is often unseen but when brought to the fore is always thought of as natural, neutral and rational. This aspect of Billig's theoretical approach draws on Bourdieu's (1990) concept of 'habitus'. Billig explains,

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<sup>49</sup> For an overview of theories of nations and nationalism see Smith (2001) and Spencer and Wollman (2005).



Patterns of social life become habitual or routine, and in so doing embody the past. One might describe this process of routine-formation as *enhabitation*: thoughts, reactions and symbols become turned into routine habits and, thus, they become *enhabited*. The result is that the past is inhabited in the present in a dialectic of forgotten remembrance. (1995: 42)

Owing to the forgotten rituals of everyday life it would be unusual for someone to forget or be unaware of their national identity. Billig (as did Barthes, 1983) draws attention to the un-waved and un-saluted flags (1995: 40-43) on the wall of the town hall or service station forecourt. Some flags are not meant to be saluted: while the union flag may be saluted by soldiers trooping the colour, the same flag as motif on a ladies' t-shirt should not. It is the un-saluted flags that form part of the habitus of everyday life; their presence and symbolic significance is simultaneously forgotten and remembered. These everyday practices and rituals by which national identity is maintained and remembered have been overlooked by many academics (Billig, 1995: 51), as well as being unnoticed by individual citizens.

National identity is a form of group identity, a way in which the world is implicitly divided up topographically and psychologically into an 'us' and numerous 'them'. Here this investigation returns to the earlier discussion of Social Identity Theory and Self Categorisation theory (see chapters 1 and 3) as an analytical tool for investigating group behaviour, including discursive acts. A national identity is one such group identity and therefore one would expect to see positive in-group and negative out-group characterisations (for example, 'our' reasonable British patriotism versus 'their' belligerent French nationalism). However, an important point to note is that Social Identity Theory accounts for why a national identity can be something which is both present and not present in the minds of fellow countrymen. The theory predicates that individuals have multiple identities or ways in which they can categorise themselves. These identities are both latent and context sensitive, becoming active in an appropriate situation (Billig, 1995: 69). Billig goes on to explain,

The latency of nationalist consciousness does not depend on the vagaries of individual memory: if it did, then many more people would forget their national identity. Nor does national identity disappear into individuals' heads in between salient situations... The apparently latent identity is maintained within the daily life of inhabited nations. The 'salient situation' does not suddenly occur, as if out of nothing, for it is part of a wider rhythm of banal life in the world of nations. What this means is that national identity is more



than an inner psychological state or an individual self-definition: it is a form of life, which is daily lived in the world of nation-states. (1995: 69)

At this point the argument has come full circle from Billig's introduction because it is everyday discourse practices which are therefore an essential part of remembering and forgetting national identities. Billig illustrates his point with a linguistic investigation of daily newspaper journalism, showing that copy is rooted in an assumed national audience. The nation and its audience is signalled by the routine use of deictic markers, which are 'Beyond conscious awareness, like the hum of distant traffic, this deixis of little words makes the world of nations familiar, even homely' (1995: 94). The deictic markers like 'here', 'us', 'our', 'then' and 'now' flag the nation of place, of temporal and demographic continuity and in doing so represent much more than they initially encode in their surface structure. These 'little words' presuppose that the readers understand what 'our' nation is, who its members are, what 'we' believe in and which traditions 'we' observe.

For all the strengths of Billig's work, Scotland raises some relevant concerns with this theory<sup>50</sup>. These concerns centre on the conflation of state and national identities, an homogenisation of state and national audience. Brown, McCrone and Paterson, before devolution, referred to Scotland as a 'stateless nation' (1996: 25), a country with a definable national identity separate from Britishness but lacking 'a fully independent legislature' (1996: 25). Similarly, Tom Nairn (1977) remarked on what he termed Scotland's 'sub-nationalism'. Developing after the Union, for Nairn (1977) this was a type of non-political, cultural nationalism that developed and existed sublimated by the more 'cosmopolitan' identity of the British state. Billig himself notes on several occasions a less than uniform 'British' arrangement in the identities and the institutions which propagate those identities. He observes that the 'British' press often means an English and London-centric press and that other parts of the Kingdom (particularly Scotland) have more dominant regionally specific media (1995: 111). Billig also observes that England is frequently hyper-extended to mean Britain in the English press (1995: 70). On this later point Smith expands,

In practice, the English have always found it impossible to distinguish their own English ethno-nationalism from a British patriotism, which they conceive of equally as their 'own'. This is not simply an imperialist reflex. Rather, it

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<sup>50</sup> The same criticism can be levelled at much of the work of the theorists discussed above.



reflects the way in which British patriotism was felt in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries to be a 'natural' extension of English ethnic nationalism; and how a British nation came to be viewed by the English, and not a few Scots... as a coming together of the various nations inhabiting a united kingdom. (2001: 16)

Brown et al (1999), Curtice et al (2002) and McCrone (2001) have all noted that Scots make a clear distinction between a 'British' state identity and their 'Scottish' national identity, and observe that the English tend not to do likewise. In these above studies (see chapter 2 for more detail) participants were asked to weight the importance of their identities (i.e. Scottish more than British, British more than Scottish, equally Scottish and British, just Scottish or just British) and in doing so the Scots, though varying the weight of their responses, had no difficulty in understanding the question. However, it was observed that the question of distinguishing one's state and national identity is not always understood in England, which supports Smith's (2001) assertion of the equivalency of Englishness and Britishness. This is by no means to invalidate Billig's analysis of banal nationalism, but as both Law (2001) and Higgins (2004a, 2004b) have observed in relation to press analysis the theoretical approach perhaps could be augmented to account for the more complex aspects of the British case.

Law observes that 'Billig tended to treat banal nationalism as a single genetic cell coded by state-centred rhetoric' (2001: 314). In two subsequent papers Higgins (2004a and 2004b) agrees with Law (2001), that at least in the Scottish media there is ample evidence for a more complex dialectic in the projection of national and state identities in Scotland. In studying press reception of the 1999 Scottish devolved election, Higgins (2004a and 2004b) explored the complex relationship between state and national identities in the Scottish media, observing that there was a distinctly politicised influence in the mediation of the two identities. This mediation of national and state identities was not merely a case of framing news stories from an ideologically Scottish versus an ideologically British perspective. Instead, national and state identities mean different things to different groups in Scotland and accordingly carry different balances and weights of emphasis or occlusion. The Scottish press used varying applications of deixis and location marking – or what Higgins calls 'locational tokens' (2004a) – which rhetorically mediated between dual identities, placing different levels of emphasis on particular identities depending on political ideology (i.e. unionist or separatist) and context. Therefore, these are not



antithetical identities, a rhetorical position could be exclusively Scottish or British, equally positions could be more Scottish than British, or more British than Scottish, or equally Scottish and British. Higgins concluded that a greater role should be given to 'politics in shaping the expression of national identity in the media' (2004b: 467) as patterns of discursive categorisation of Scotland match the constitutional preferences of newspapers.

Thus far this investigation has come to the conclusion that Scotland and Britain and their associated identities, have a political entailment in Scotland which is not manifest in England with its national-state identity(s). Britishness does not have the hegemonic dominance in Scotland as it does in England. The details of nationalist advocacy have been drawn into and entangled with party political arguments. Scotland is not banally ideological, in that its mental image does not sit passively and unnoticed in the minds of Scotland's politicians or people. Scotland is strategically foregrounded and evoked for political advantage. The existence of a Scottish nation and identity is not at dispute in Scottish politics; discord arises in representing how that nation and its identity sit with the British state and identity. It was previously stated that state and national identities are to a large extent conflated in England, while in Scotland this is not the case. The following analysis supports Law's (2001) claim that state and national identities should be distinguished and Higgins' (2004b) call for greater consideration to be given to politics in the formation of these identities in the analysis of banal nationalism.

The studies of Brown et al (1999), Curtice et al (2002) and McCrone (2001) concur with that of Law (2001) and Higgins (2004a and 2004b) in differentiating state and national identities. However, Brown et al (1999), Curtice et al (2002) and McCrone (2001) tend to emphasise civic aspects of nationalism as prime in the politics of Scottish identity. Their argument has largely been premised on heavy emphasis on a civic society. This distinctive Scottish civic-society is claimed to have been kept alive by the institutions of law, education and church post 1707 in the absence of sovereign state apparatus (see Brown, McCrone and Paterson, 1996; McCrone, 2001; and Paterson, 1994). The analysis below will point to evidence which would suggest that consideration of non-civic aspects of national identity should also be investigated to give a more representative picture of Scottish national identity (a conclusion which their own evidence could be used to support).



### 6.3 Party Political Descriptions of the Nation

Work by the Manifesto Research Group (MRG) and the Comparative Manifesto Project (CMP) has taken a quantitative approach, to statements in party literature. This research has the strength of being able to analyse a large number of lengthy documents. However, MRG and CMP codes manifesto statements by subject but does not give a detailed account of the content of those statements. Therefore, MRG and CMP analysis does not provide the level of textual detail that this thesis has sought to give; and the quantitative analysis does not look at manifestos as part of wider discourses. As such, the following qualitative analysis takes a systemic functional approach in order to be able to compare the detail and meanings of inter-party conceptions of Scotland. This section will look exclusively at Scotland and Scottish national identity; whereas the following section investigates how Scotland and Scottish national identity are negotiated in relation to Britain and British identity.

Billig (1995) and Shotter (1993) claim nationalism is a tradition of argumentation. The argument concerns who the national 'we' is,

Rival politicians and opposing factions present their different visions of the nation to their electorates. In order for the political argument to take place with the nation, there must be elements which are beyond argument. Different factions may argue about how 'we' should think of 'ourselves' and what is to be 'our' national destiny. In so doing they will take for granted the reality of 'us', the national place. (Billig, 1995: 95-96)

These 'taken for granted assumptions' can be seen in the construction of Scotland the place and Scotland the people which political parties routinely use to address their audience. Indicative of this is the following example from the contents page of the SNP manifesto, where the sections are entitled 'Our Choice', 'Our Prosperity', 'Our Public Services', 'Our Environment', 'Our Nation', 'Our Scotland' and 'Our Potential'. The collective possessive determiner roots the party manifesto in a national Scottish audience, as well as identifying the party with the national interest.

It will be shown that all the Scottish parties address the nation and that they share many conceptions of the nation and its people. Correspondingly, one can observe certain grammatical patterns for encoding the nation. The first is that the nation and its people are modelled on experiences of 'being', for example the type of experience of the world one sees encoded by relational clauses, as opposed to



experiences of ‘doing’, encoded by material clauses, or experiences of saying or sensing, encoded by mental and verbal projected clauses. A second common representation is one of ‘possessing’, that is possessing particular features (characteristics, aspirations and achievements). It follows, in a systemic functional analysis, that possession is not just marked by the genitive inflection (’s) but also as a form of relational clauses. For example, relational clauses that encode possession as attribute or identity (see Table 6.1 for hypothetical examples).

	(i) attributive 'a is an attribute of x'	(ii) identifying 'a is the identity of x'
(1) intensive 'x is a'	Scotland is small	Scotland is a world leader in child law
(2) possessive 'x has a'	Scotland has an excellent education system	Excellent education is Scotland's birthright; Scotland's birthright is excellent education
(3) circumstantial 'x is at a'	Scotland is at a crossroads	Scotland is the future

Table 6.1 The principle categories of ‘relational’ clause (adapted from Halliday and Matthiessen, 2004: 216)

As table 6.1 illustrates, relational clauses of ‘being’ are characterised by intensive verbs, while relational clauses of ‘possession’ are, unsurprisingly, marked by possessive verbs. For the purposes of this investigation, relational clauses are of particular interest because they are either attributive or identifying, encoding the descriptions of a thing as an element of that thing’s being. Circumstantial relational clauses are of less interest to this section simply because one sees less evidence of them in the data analysed. The third common representation is the personification of the nation. Clearly, this overlaps with the second type of representation, for example, ‘Scotland has an enduring spirit’ would be an example of a possessive relational clause ‘has’ and ascribing ‘an enduring spirit’ to Scotland personifies the nation as being able to possess something. Personification also includes instances where the nation is said to ‘do’ something and therefore have action. Also relevant are material process clauses, where the nation is said to act.

In these varying forms of representation one sees the nation in many forms. There are the inclusive civic conceptions, so often foregrounded by political parties and academics alike, such as education, legal, demographic diversity, and religious



and social tolerance. In democracies, civic values tend to be inclusive because of the pluralistic and accountable nature of government. However, there can be non-inclusive civic forms as well, as societies are inherently bounded, making distinctions between themselves and others and assigning rights and responsibilities on that basis. Inclusive civic values might be religious tolerance or universal right to education, whereas exclusive values might be the exclusion of English residence for voting in devolved Scottish elections. There are also non-civic and exclusive conceptions; these include representations of the nation in terms of language, religion, landscape, history, place and tribe. The latter conceptions are ways of distinguishing one's nation from others on non-constitutional or legal grounds. In making distinctions, boundaries are created which indicate difference; boundaries which are, at some level of realisation, exclusive. In contrast, the former civic conceptions encode meanings associated with democratic and civic values, such as social diversity, inclusiveness and public institutions and practices (such as education and the law). Therefore, excluding English residents from voting in Scotland is a civic issue; excluding the English on the basis of their ethnic origin would be a non-civic value. Non-civic values can also be inclusive, for example in support of so called 'community languages'. The following tables illustrate the Janus face of nationalism in Scotland. It can be realised through democratic and public institutions – civic, multicultural, inclusive - but still with non-civic and exclusive facets.

Table 6.2 and 6.3 present a discourse analysis of civic and non-civic conceptions of the nation, building on the systemic functional approach illustrated in Table 6.1. The tables compare manifesto statements between campaigning parties. Column one denotes the party identity of the statements represented in column two. Columns three to five then display a functional analysis of those statements: column three gives a systemic functional grammatical analysis; column four categorises statements in terms of civic/non-civic and inclusive/exclusive/neutral conceptions of the nation; and column five labels the specific types of civic/non-civic and inclusive/exclusive conceptions. Greater delicacy is provided by column five to column four in describing what type of conception of the nation is being constructed discursively. For example, in row one, column four, the statement is defined as civic because it refers explicitly to the 'civic society' and the parliamentary institution; because it is not clear whether this is an inclusive or exclusive statement it is given a neutral label. Column three pulls out specific linguistic evidence which points to the



possessive nature of the utterance, in this case there is a personification and the use of genitive inflection marking possession by the nation. Row five then provides additional information the type of civic nationalism labelled in terms of the national attribute or description, in this instance it refers to 'society'.

Party	Manifesto Statement	Syntactic Features Encoding the Nation	Civic coding Inclusive/Exclusive	National attribute/description
Labour	'The first term of the Parliament has also given a <i>voice</i> to Scotland's civic society in a way missing during the Tory years' (p40)	Personification 'voice'  Genitive inflection 'Scotland's'	Civic-neutral	Societal-Civic – 'Scotland's civic society'
Labour	'Scotland's courts have a long history and many valuable traditions' (p16)	Genitive inflection 'Scotland's'	Civic-neutral	Institutional-Legal 'courts'
Labour	'Scotland <i>has</i> a proud educational tradition that <i>we</i> should cherish and build upon. <i>It is a</i> Scottish strength...' (p8)	Relational clause Possessive process 'has'	Civic-neutral	Institutional-Education 'educational tradition'
Labour	'Scotland's diversity is a <i>strength</i> ...' (p39) [inclusive]	Genitive inflection 'Scotland's'  Personification 'Scotland's' 'strength'	Civic – inclusive	Societal-Diversity – 'diversity'
SNP	'The SNP welcomes the contribution of Scotland's ethnic minorities to <i>our</i> national life. Scotland <i>has</i> a long tradition of welcoming those who choose to live here' (p27)	Genitive inflection + personification 'Scotland's'  Possessive determiner 'our'  Relational clause Possessive process 'has'	Civic - inclusive	Societal-Diversity – 'ethnic minorities' 'tradition of welcoming'
SNP	'Scotland <i>has</i> always been an outward looking nation' (p24)	Relation clause Possessive/attributive process 'has always been'	Civic – inclusive	Societal-Diversity – 'outward looking'
SNP	'We will ensure that <i>Scottish</i> History, Literature, and Language are taught in <i>our</i> schools...' (p11) [civic – education, but exclusive in 'our' culture]	Phrasal noun 'Scottish History, Literature and Languages'  Possessive	Civic-neutral	Institutional-Education 'taught' 'schools' 'Scottish History, Literature and Language'

		determiner 'our'		
LibDem	'Liberal Democrats welcome the diversity of modern Scottish society and seek to ensure that everyone, regardless of ethnicity, sexuality, gender, disability or age is treated on an equal basis' (p35) [civic-inclusive]	Noun phrase ascribing attribute 'the diversity of modern Scotland'	Civic – inclusive	Societal-Diversity – 'diversity', 'ethnicity', 'sexuality', 'gender', 'disability', 'treated on an equal basis'
LibDem	'We will: Empower the voluntary and independent sector, enabling the dynamism and flexibility of Scotland's rich and diverse civic society...' (p33)	Genitive inflection 'Scotland's'	Civic – inclusive	Societal-Civic + diversity – 'civic society', 'diverse'
Conservatives	'As Scots, we rightly take great pride in <i>our</i> tradition of learning. It is a passport for progress for individuals and for society' (p15)	Possessive determiner 'our'	Civic-neutral	Institutional-Education 'tradition of learning'
Conservatives	'We recognise that diversity is one of <i>our</i> defining characteristics as a nation.' (p21)	Possessive determiner 'our'	Civic – inclusive	Societal-Diversity – 'diversity'
SSP	'Scotland <i>has</i> always had a separate education system from the rest of Britain. Today, <i>Scottish</i> education tends to be more broadly based and less elitist than in other parts of the UK.' (p22)	Relational clause Possessive process 'has'  Phrasal noun 'Scottish education'	Civic – inclusive & exclusive	Institutional-Education 'education', 'education system'  Societal-Inclusive – 'less elitist'  Societal-Exclusive – 'separate', 'from the rest'

Table 6.2 Party statements of civic conceptions of the nation

One can find ample evidence of expressions of civic nationalism. In Table 6.2 Scotland's civic society is personified with 'a voice' given to it by the establishment of the devolved assembly. Legal and educational practices and institutions are articulated by Labour, Conservatives, SNP and SSP alike, as being 'traditions' belonging to Scotland. Traditions imply some form of collective practice with temporal continuity. Labour imbues education practices in Scotland with an emotional value, as Scotland is said to possess a 'proud educational tradition' (2003: 8). This emotion is echoed by the Conservatives, who proclaim 'As Scots, we rightly take pride in our traditions of learning' (2003: 21). The SSP mark out Scotland as different due to the distinctiveness of its education system; they say it has 'always had a separate' (2003: 22) system from the rest of the UK.

Diversity is another important facet of civic nationalism because it does not constitute national belonging in exclusive ethnic terms. Diversity also implies



important meanings associated with the salience of equality and difference within the civic community, which lie at the heart of many conceptions of contemporary democratic polities (i.e. equality before the law, and freedoms of religious and political expression). As Table 6.2 illustrates, Scottish parties regularly employ these conceptualisations of the nation, just as Brown et al (1999), Curtice et al (2002) and McCrone (2001) suggest. Labour describe diversity as a 'strength' (2003: 39), again personifying the nation. Similarly, the SNP state that Scotland has a 'tradition of welcoming' (2003: 27) and of being 'outward looking' (2003: 24). The Liberal Democrats hail the 'diversity of modern Scotland' (2003: 35), while the Conservatives proclaim diversity to be a 'defining characteristic' (2003: 21) of Scotland. The character of the Scottish nation is therefore variously defined as both 'modern' and as having 'traditions'. These traditions are civic institutions and practices such as education and the law, which imbue the nation with characteristics of a civic-inclusiveness and the valued attribute of diversity. Yet this very diversity and inclusiveness are characteristics which define Scotland and therefore presumably mark it out as different from other nations. Civic and inclusive conceptions of the nation and of national identity are indeed evident in the proclamations of Scotland's politicians. However they are not the only type in evidence.

Party	Manifesto Statement	Syntactic Features Encoding the Nation	Non-civic Inclusive/exclusive	National attribute/description
SNP	'Scotland <i>is</i> a nation of abundant natural and cultural assets. We <i>have</i> breath-taking scenery, rich energy sources and fertile agricultural land... we [the party] want <i>our</i> vibrant heritage, culture, and creativity to flourish and be shared with <i>our</i> neighbours in the world' (p14)	Relational clause Intensive process 'is' Relational clause Possessive process 'have'  Possessive pronoun 'our'	Non-civic - exclusive	Societal-Culture Landscape + culture + heritage – 'cultural assets' 'breathtaking scenery', 'fertile agricultural land', 'heritage', 'culture'
SNP	'We live in a beautiful country, which <i>is</i> rich in natural resources and energy sources.' (p14)	Relational clauses Intensive process 'is'	Non-civic - exclusive	Place-Landscape 'beautiful country', 'natural resources'
SNP	'Geographically, Scotland <i>is</i> a diverse nation, with some of the least densely populated and most scenic landscapes in Europe. As a nation, <i>our</i>	Relational clauses Intensive process 'is'	Civic - inclusive	Societal-Diversity – 'diverse nation', 'our strength is in that diversity'

	strength <i>is</i> in that diversity...' (p19)		Non-civic – exclusive	Place-Landscape – 'most scenic landscapes in Europe'
SNP	' <i>As an island nation with a rich maritime history and numerous islands and archipelago communities...</i> ' (p22)	Role 'as'  Accompaniment 'with'	Non-civic – exclusive	Place-Landscape – 'island nation'  Place-Historical – 'with a rich maritime history'
SNP	'We will administer Scotland's culture and languages with a new department.' (p18) [non-civic languages and culture]	Genitive inflection 'Scotland's'	Non-civic – inclusive	Societal-Culture + Language – 'culture', 'languages'
Labour	'Sport <i>is</i> an integral part of our culture' (p32)	Relational clause Intensive process 'is'	Non-civic – neutral	Societal-Culture – 'sport', 'culture'
Labour	'Scotland's culture, from the languages we speak to the arts we perform and applaud, the sports we play and the riches we find in our libraries and museums, makes Scotland unique.' (p36)	Genitive inflection + personification 'Scotland's'	Non-civic – inclusive	Societal-Culture – 'culture', 'languages', 'arts', 'sports', 'libraries', 'museums'
Labour	'We will recognise the importance of Gaelic as a unique part of Scotland's national living heritage' (p37)	Genitive inflection + personification 'Scotland's'	Non-civic – exclusive	Language/heritage – 'Gaelic', 'living heritage'
LibDem	'Scotland has a distinctive and colourful language heritage. Today in Scotland there are speakers of English, Scots, Gaelic, many community languages such as Chinese Urdu and British Sign Language. Language enriches our entire society and allows citizens to access public services and communicate with each other' (p36)	Relational clause Possessive determiner 'has'	Non-civic – inclusive	Language – 'language', 'speakers', 'English', 'Scots', 'Gaelic', 'Chinese', 'Urdu', 'British Sign Language'  Diversity – 'colourful', 'enriches', 'many community languages'
LibDem	'We will: promote access to the countryside, mountain areas and water... for international and domestic visitors to enjoy Scotland's unique scenery and wildlife' (p16)	Genitive inflection 'Scotland's'	Non-civic – exclusive	Landscape – 'countryside', 'mountain', 'water', 'unique scenery', 'wildlife'
Greens	'We will enable all schools to offer languages reflecting Scotland's cultural and ethnic diversity, including, Gaelic, British Sign Language, Bengali, Urdu, Punjabi, and Chinese languages.' (p8)	Genitive inflection 'Scotland's'	Non-civic – inclusive	Societal-Diversity + Culture + Racial + Language – 'diversity', 'cultural', 'ethnic', 'Gaelic', 'British Sign Language', 'Bengali', 'Urdu', 'Punjabi', 'Chinese', 'languages'



SSP	'Despite Scotland's sparse population and <i>its</i> vast tracts of natural wilderness...' (p29)	Genitive inflection 'Scotland's'  Possessive pronoun 'its'	Non-civic – exclusive	Landscape – 'natural wilderness'
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Table 6.3 Party statements of non-civic conceptions of the nation

Table 6.3 demonstrates that non-civic expression of national identity and the nation are also tangible in the proclamations of the Scottish political parties. The three most evident types of non-civic conceptions of the nation are that of landscape, culture and language (though language is often conceived as a constituent element of the national culture). In referring to the national landscape, parties are constructing conceptions of Scotland the place. This geographical definition is clearly non-civic as it does not pertain to either the political or civic institutions/practices of the polity. Landscape is a particularly exclusive definition of the nation as well, indicating boundaries and geographical specificity. For example, the SNP note that Scotland is ‘an island nation’ (2003: 22) and ‘a small nation’ (2003: 24). However, other conceptualisations use more emotive lexis in their instantiations and the homeland is flagged in patriotic and dramatic terms. The nation’s geography is variously described as ‘unique’ (Liberal Democrats, 2003: 16), said to have ‘vast tracts of natural wilderness’ (SSP, 2003: 29). Scotland is thought to be a ‘beautiful country’ (SNP, 2003: 14) and to possess the ‘most scenic landscapes in Europe’ (SNP, 2003: 19). This is not the Scotland the democratically open society, it is the Scotland of the glen and highland mist, of lochs and heather; it is the nation as the place of emotional belonging and geographical uniqueness. Here ‘our’ nation is more beautiful than others and the national ‘we’ is connected to the landscape it inhabits.

Thus far, this chapter has proposed a descriptive distinction between civic and non-civic aspects of society. However, in contemporary democracies a strict distinction is probably not accurate, as many aspects of what would be considered non-civic life are often subsidised, supported and regulated by the state. For example sport, film and theatre, art and language all receive some form of state sponsorship in the UK, be it in the form of tax breaks, direct subsidies and grants or forms of centralised administration. Just as Benedict Anderson (1996) astutely suggested that there probably has never been a tidy fit between nations and states, so it is safe to



assert the boundaries between civic and non-civic aspects of society overlap somewhat. Therefore, it is unsurprising to see that expressions of cultural nationalism are evident in Table 6.3. The SNP want to administer 'Scotland's culture and languages' (2003: 18) from a new department and to share this 'vibrant heritage, culture and creativity' (2003: 14) with its international neighbours. Labour suggest sport is 'an integral part' of Scottish culture (2003: 38) and that 'Scotland's culture... makes Scotland unique' (2003: 36); whereas the Greens define Scotland as 'culturally and ethnically' (2003: 8) diverse. These conceptions again balance differing definitions of the nation; they are at once exclusive in defining 'our' national culture, but often also inclusive, suggesting that culture is diverse. This is perhaps even more evident in the parties' statements about the nation's languages.

All three of the centre-left parties (and the Greens) in Scotland proclaim they will give institutional support for languages. They make positive and inclusive claims about Scotland's languages; they variously refer to English, Scots and Gaelic and 'community languages' such as Urdu, Punjabi and British Sign Language. These languages are in lists and therefore might appear paratactic and equivalent in value. Seen in these terms the parties' attitudes to languages would be culturally inclusive. However, for the three centre-left parties some languages are 'more equal than others'. Labour states that Gaelic is part of Scotland's 'national living heritage' (2003: 37) and all three parties commit themselves to supporting Gaelic, while the Liberal Democrats and SNP include Scots as a language worthy of state protection. To this end the Liberal Democrats state 'We will: Recognise the importance to Scotland's history and culture of our heritage languages of Gaelic and Scots' (2003: 36-37), and the SNP promise 'secure status for the Gaelic and Scots languages' (2003: 18) while only 'encouraging community languages' (2004: 18). In policy terms one must assume that Scots and Gaelic are of more value than 'community languages'. Perhaps then the implication to be taken is that Scots<sup>51</sup> and Gaelic are somehow more Scottish than other languages, as 'living heritage' would suggest, which evokes some form of temporal continuity and shared cultural practice between countrymen. Anderson (1983) Billig (1995) Hobsbawm (1990) and Smith (2001) all point to the importance of language in creating a sense of national identity. Scotland's politicians are no different, although they inclusively proclaim Scotland to have a diversity of

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<sup>51</sup> That is not to say that defining Scots as a language is not without controversy and in calling it a language is itself a political act.



languages and cultures, they also exclusively privilege one or two of those languages. Therefore, Scots and Gaelic are less languages found in Scotland and more *the* Scottish languages<sup>52</sup>. These, non-civic conceptions of the nation and nationalism by Scotland's politicians would seem to sit at odds with some of the empirical literature discussed earlier.

Brown et al (1999), Curtice et al (2002) and McCrone (2001) assert that, for all the major parties, conceptions of Scottish national identity and nationalism are civic in nature. McCrone suggests,

The key to understanding Scotland lies in recognising that nationalism derives from... institutional autonomy, and is not some vague set of historic emotions which politicians can manipulate. (2001: 195)

Birth, ancestry and residence are considered the main markers of Scottishness by a majority of Scots (McCrone, 2001). In addition, there is evidence to illustrate Scottish icons are held in high regard. McCrone notes the percentages of Scots proud of the following icons: Scottish landscape 97 percent; Scottish music 82 percent; Tartan 79 percent; William Wallace 76 percent (2001: 147). Scots are said to pragmatically choose civic democratic solutions for Scotland at elections (or referenda), and these pragmatic decisions override any non-civic, more emotive conceptions of nationalism. For Brown et al (1999), Curtice et al (2002) and McCrone (2001), civic nationalism must be the dominant conception of Scottish nationalism. However, at elections or referenda voters are asked to make a decision within the context of formal state institutions. It is, therefore, hardly unexpected that voters, given the civic context, make decisions which fulfil civic conceptions of national identity. These civic decisions are those that best fit the *habitus* of the democratic culture of which voters are a part. Given a cultural context, such as an international football match, then non-civic exclusive conceptions of the nation and nationalism are paramount; here heritage, parentage, commonality of place of birth and language are much more important.

However, even though McCrone comments that in Scotland nationalism is not something which politicians can manipulate by pushing the appropriate emotional buttons, Scottish politicians clearly still use the language of non-civic nationalism. It

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<sup>52</sup> English as the dominant language requires neither protection nor encouragement.



is just that non-civic and civic and inclusive and exclusive conceptions exist side by side. The overarching context of an election may privilege civic conceptions of nationhood but, as was indicated earlier, the distinction between the non-civic nation and the nation's mechanism of state is not always clear. Therefore, in a Scottish election where the state has administrative remit of aspects of the nation's cultural life, it is perhaps predictable to see cultural, non-civic conceptions of national identity and nationhood. Pressures to administer and support language(s), sport, the countryside, music and art necessarily draw cultural conceptions of nationalism into the civic arena. As such, one can find manifestations of these non-civic and sometimes exclusive conceptions of nation and national identity in the language of politicians.

The important point is that while people are in a civic context, like an election, they make decisions appropriate for that context. Scots may well have voted for a parliament and continue to vote in elections informed by civic-nationalism. However, their decision is still underpinned by a sense of national place and national belonging, which can never be fully reconciled with purely civic and inclusive ends. Sufficient numbers of Scots felt themselves not just politically but culturally different to desire greater institutional autonomy. In policy terms, the North East of England and Yorkshire and Humberside are similar to Scotland in their centre-left policy preferences; but neither had the political will to deliver even a moderate form of devolution in 2005. What is the difference? It is not just a sense of political difference but a sense of cultural difference, of national belonging.

The above analysis illustrates that non-civic and civic and inclusive and exclusive forms of nationalism intermingle in the devolved party literature. This chapter has disagreed somewhat with Brown et al (1999), Curtice et al (2002) and McCrone's (2001) assessment of Scottish national identity. It is not that the nationalism displayed is ostensibly civic and inclusive, nor is it purely non-civic and exclusive, ethnic and tribal. Instead, there is interplay between differing manifestations. There is ample evidence for the civic and inclusive nationalism but there are also exclusive and cultural expressions. These however are never the fully fledged 'hot' (Billig, 1995) and irrational forms which are said to be at odds with democracies. Exclusive and cultural conceptions appear to co-exist happily with the other forms. A balance is struck between defining the national 'in-group' as bounded and different but also tolerant and pluralistic as a democracy requires. Where tensions



are manifest is between party political conceptions of the nation and nationalism, particularly with regard to how national identity should be mediated against state identity. The chapter will now turn to an example of the party political effects of negotiating state and national identities in Scottish devolved electoral politics.

#### 6.4 Party Ideology and Conceptions of Nation and State

Scottish political parties all have distinguishable conceptions of what the nation is.

These conceptions are affected by party political ideology: as one might expect each party purports to *really* speak in the interests of the nation. However, in Scotland it is not just left/right or authoritarian/liberal elements of party policy which are the locus of ideological competition in elections to decide the fate of the nation.

Separatist/unionist ideologies enter into the Scottish ideological mix in a way unseen in English politics (with the exception of European politics<sup>53</sup>). Therefore, an important aspect of investigating Scottish electoral politics is to account for how the concepts of nation and state interact with each other and with other facets of party politics. Chapter 2 has already explored the centre-ground of Scottish politics and illustrated how an important and distinguishing feature of Scottish politics was that Labour, SNP and the Liberal Democrats have been quite successful in associating aspects of Scottish identity with centre-left politics. It was also demonstrated that both in terms of the ideology and policy manifestations of those ideologies the centre-left parties share tangibly similar political ground. What differentiated them are their stances on the constitutional status of Scotland in relation to the British state.

Exploring the discursive processes involved in constructing ideological out-groups in electoral campaigning, Chapter 3 illustrated that there was a locational aspect to defining one's ideological opponents in Scottish politics. For unionists like Labour and the Conservatives there were no locational out-groups; their focus on Scotland and the Union did not present a context in which there were political out-groups outwith Scotland. However, Nationalists such as the SNP and SSP drew

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<sup>53</sup> It would be interesting to investigate how national and state identities are negotiated in relation to the European Union. Little is given over to international affairs in these manifestos but where there are examples Europe is referred to generally positively. However, elections for the European Parliament are a different campaigning context. Anecdotally, one might observe that across the UK opinion polls indicate that voters are far from enthusiastic Europhiles (see Chapter 2). Major campaign themes in European elections tend to be over getting the most out of the EU for Britain (or Scotland in the SNP's case) and standing up to Brussels. To discuss this further at this point would be tangential.



antithetical comparisons with non-Scottish out-groups particularly with English/UK/London labels. Both Law (2001) and Higgins (2004a and 2004b) have argued that Billig's (1995) conception of 'banal nationalism' be revised after exploring the Scottish media. Thus far this thesis' exploration of devolved electoral politics supports this position: national and state identities are not conflated in the habitus of Scottish life. Different parties, depending on their separatist/unionist credentials, construct the relationship between national and state identities in differing ways. This process is most obvious in the manner in which parties characterise the nation's relationship with the state.

Party identity did not appear to play a notable role in differentiating conceptions of the nation. Although the SSP tended to broadly address electors as a working class audience, this did not appear to affect constructions of the nation in the terms discussed here. Similarly, the Green Party did not evoke Scotland as a 'green and pleasant' land any more than the other parties. If anything the Greens seemed to address a Scottish national audience less than the other parties; perhaps because their environmentalism makes them frame issues in more international terms. Therefore, although unionism and separatism, as ideologies, affect how conceptions of national and state identities interrelate discursively, individual party ideology does not seem to differentiate greatly conceptualisations of the nation, with each party sharing similar conceptions of what Scotland is like.

#### *6.4.1 Unionists*

The Labour Party, as has been previously noted, during the 2003 (and 1999) devolved elections chose to portray the relationship between the Scottish and Westminster Parliaments, Scottish Executive and UK government and Scottish Labour Party and UK Labour Party as a 'partnership'. In terms of the ideological square, this is a positive characterisation of in-group members. However, the noun 'partnership' performs an interesting function, discursively acting as a superordinate term conjoining levels of state governance and national and state identities. For example the Labour PEB (Text B) refers to 'partnership and stability under the Labour Government', which could include government both north and south of the border. Both national and state identities are represented in positive terms but also have a common goal under the superordinate term. The 'partnership' description works along



with the 'building' metaphor in Labour campaign texts, for example 'Labour has laid strong foundations... Scottish Labour has worked everyday to build a better Scotland' (Text A) so that the partnership has a superordinate goal of creating a better future. This is the positive side of the ideological square; however, on the negative side one can see the SNP negatively portrayed. Instead of being in partnership with the UK government, the SNP is said to want 'divorce and separation' from the UK. As an alternative to 'building', the Nationalists are characterised as destructively 'breaking up Britain' (Text C), independence would be to 'rip it [progress] all up and start again' (Scottish Labour: On your side, 2003: 5). Therefore, the current constitutional arrangements are a partnership which is positive and productive, whereas independence is divorce which is negative and destructive. Therefore, Labour uses the independence issue to frame the rest of the policy debate. Achieving productive goals in education, health, law and order and the economy are positively associated with the UK constitutional framework, while preserving the identity of Scotland within the subordinate categorisation<sup>54</sup>. This observation appears to chime with work by Sherif (2001) and Gaertner et al (2001) on reducing inter-group bias. Scottish Labour portrays many policy objectives within the superordinate goal of stability, both economic and constitutional. Superordinate terms like 'partnership' and 'the UK economy' are the discursive manifestations of these goals. Partnership creates a positive frame within which to view the Union, reconciling the division between constituent nations and overarching state. In addition to this, the SNP's separatist ideology is characterised as the kind of 'hot' nationalism, which Billig refers to (1995: 43-46). For example, 'But schools and education would be neglected while the Nationalists gave priority to their obsession with an expensive divorce' (PEB, Text C). Labour denotes the Nationalist's movement as emotional and irrational, as they are 'obsessed' with a divorce rather than with 'rational' policy concerns. This portrayal of the SNP follows Billig's (1995) description of the term 'nationalism' being used to characterise 'their' ideology as emotional and excessive in opposition to 'our' rational and measured patriotism. Fitting the descriptive framework of the ideological square, the SNP are thus depicted negatively as an out-group.

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<sup>54</sup> For example, 'Higher growth is vital if all *our other ambitions for Scotland* are to be realized. *We will use* the opportunity provided by the strength of *the UK economy* with the lowest interest rates, inflation and unemployment of my adult life, to invest in the future' (emphasis added) (Scottish Labour: On you side, 2003: 4)



Like Labour, the Scottish Conservative Party does not identify political out-groups on the basis of the location outside Scotland and also seek to discursively construct links between the levels of nation and state. The language mediates discrete but connected positions for national and state identities. In commenting on Scotland's culture the Conservatives state 'It is a vital component of being Scottish and British' (*Scottish Conservatives: time to do something about it*, 2003: 17). The co-ordinating conjunction 'and' indicates that 'Scottish' and 'British' are identifiably different yet related. Partnership is also a descriptive tool of the Conservatives, who refer to a wish to 'Strengthen relationships between the constituent parts of the United Kingdom' (*Scottish Conservatives: time to do something about it*, 2003: 1). 'Constituent parts' and the preposition 'between' indicate elements of equivalence which come together to form a larger whole 'the United Kingdom'. Implicit in this statement is the differentiation of nations and state, that it is a partnership between nations that constitutes the United Kingdom. They also state that as unionists the Scottish Conservatives want to emphasise 'the partnership between Scotland's two Parliaments' which will 'strengthen the United Kingdom' (*Scottish Conservatives: time to do something about it*, 2003: 5). The genitive inflection denotes Scotland's stake in both constitutional levels of governance, and 'partnership' as with Labour's usage implies a constructive relationship 'between' two discrete levels, the national and state.

A feature of Scottish unionist ideology therefore is to recognise the difference between nation and state both in the abstraction of identities and at levels of governance post 1999 devolution. Unionists mediate the relationship between those levels of governance and manifestations of identity; in doing so they seek to reconcile the distinction between them, constructing the relationship as a productive partnership. Key to this investigation, in relation to Billig (1995) is that there is no conflation of national and state identities, they are separate and distinct but connected. As with Higgins (2004a), context plays a role in how the location of nation and state is referenced, this in turn reflects different strategies for mediating those identities. For example, in the following extract Labour are constructing a Scottish focused position, but one which recognises the overarching UK state context. 'My [i.e. Jack McConnell's] vision is of a Scotland where opportunities to grow are enjoyed by all young Scots... where we use our partnership inside the UK' (*Scottish Labour: On your side*, 2003: 3). 'Scotland' and 'Scots' obviously mark the national homeland and



people. Equally, the collective 'we use our' (pronoun and possessive determiner) again point to the Scottish people and Scottish Labour party and their part in the UK 'partnership'. In addition to these elements, the preposition 'inside' points to the superordinate level of state, thereby differentiating nation and state. Scottish Labour alternatively can also focus on the UK level when it is beneficial. For example Tony Blair in Labour's PEB (Text B) asserts that the devolved election is a choice between a negative SNP vote and a positive vote for 'partnership and stability under the Labour Government'. The context here is the state 'partnership', and the success of the economy's low inflation and low mortgage rates. But the economic successes mentioned do not fall under the responsibilities of the devolved powers. 'Labour Government' is ambiguous, but given the context probably includes both UK and devolved government, but reference to the economy and partnership projects a positive frame from which to view the union, with its state and national levels. Scottish unionists therefore can modulate between identities depending on the given context. They can point to the national level, 'we' Scots and 'we' Scottish Labour; and they can point to the state level of 'we' in the UK or 'we' the UK Labour party, where the UK state level necessarily includes the Scottish national 'we'.

#### 6.4.2 Separatists

For parties like the SNP and SSP there is only one deictic centre, that of the Scottish 'we'. Either in terms of place, people or party the in-group or centre of political concern is Scottish. Rather than attempting to mediate the relationship between nation and state as unionists do within the current UK context, nationalists want to obtain co-ordinating fit between nation and state rather than a subordinate one. In the nationalist's conception of Scotland, the UK is an 'other' and they construct out-groups on the basis of their location outside Scotland. Therefore, as was illustrated in Chapter 3, out-groups are identified as 'London', 'London Government', 'Westminster' and 'UK Government'. The Scottish deictic centre constructed as an antithesis to the UK is demonstrated by the following,

And successive UK governments have been more of a hindrance than a help to Scotland. As long as we remain part of the centralised UK, we will continue to see low growth...' (*SNP: Release our potential*, 2003: 3)

The SNP distinguish the current state level as something which is a 'hindrance' to the national level. '[P]art of the centralised state' implicitly denotes Scotland as a marginal part of that state. The 'we' of the second clause complex is specifically a national Scottish 'we' at the exclusion of a state 'centralised UK'. There is no modulation between different deictic centres in nationalist rhetoric. However, as with the unionist examples, what is important to note is that nationalists make a clear distinction between national and state levels in the current UK context. Nationalists are arguing for a union not of nations under a collective UK but a union of nation and state at the Scottish level.

## 6.5 Conclusion

Initially, this chapter sought to demonstrate that civic and inclusive forms of nationalism are not the only important forms in Scottish politics, contrary to what Brown et al (1999), Curtice et al (2002) and McCrone (2001) maintain. Other non-civic and exclusive forms are also drawn on in the language of Scottish politicians. Civic and inclusive concepts of nationalism are naturally important in elections which are ostensibly imbued with civic and inclusive meanings in contemporary democracies. Brown et al (1999), Curtice et al (2002) and McCrone (2001) conclude from voting patterns in elections and referenda that electors vote on the basis of civic nationalism, and therefore this must be the predominating form of nationalism in Scotland. However, it was suggested that voters perhaps make decisions appropriate for the context, i.e. a democratic election, but that does not mean that other forms of nationalism are not important in accounting for Scotland's national identity. Brown et al (1999), Curtice et al (2002) and McCrone's (2001) work also indicates non-civic and exclusive definitions of Scottishness which are held by a majority of the population. They overlook these non-civic and exclusive conceptions of Scottishness as they do not fit conclusions drawn from voting patterns and opinion survey data which look at democratic contexts. This chapter then illustrated that civic and non-civic and inclusive and exclusive conceptions of the nation and national identity intermingle in the language of politicians. There does not appear to be a problem in this intermingling; these different conceptions comfortably co-occur. It was suggested that this is predictable given that an election requires participants to rhetorically



define the national in-group while simultaneously projecting an image of openness and tolerance, appropriate for a democracy.

This investigation provided evidence in support of Law (2001) and Higgins' (2004a and 2004b) call for Billig's (1995) account of banal nationalism to be augmented in light of Scottish examples. In Scotland, politics (as well as the media) plays an important role in mediating between national and state identities, which are clearly not conflated as they appear to be in Billig's (1995) analysis. McCrone asserts that, 'actors have considerable capacity to construct and negotiate national identities' (2001: 153) and goes on to suggest 'issues of identity are essentially comparative ones, strongly influenced by context' (2001: 160). Comparative and contextual factors certainly appear to be of issue in Scottish devolved elections. Politicians can draw on either level of identity depending on the rhetorical demands of the context.

## CHAPTER 7: NEW SCOTTISH POLITICS, NEW DISCOURSE? CONCLUDING REMARKS ON A STUDY OF A SCOTTISH DEVOLVED ELECTION

### 7.1 Introduction

This investigation focussed on the campaign for the 2003 Scottish Parliament election. The aim of the study was to explore the discursive strategies employed by political parties during the month long campaign: with the aim of elucidating the character of campaign discourse for Scottish devolved elections. The post 1999 political arrangement in Scotland differs from the UK Westminster arrangement. This analysis explored the possible effects of those differences on the discourse of political parties during campaigning. As such, the investigation intended to explicate relations between changes in social practices with changes in discourse practices in the ideological competition of Scottish politics. To conduct this research a CDA methodology was developed and deployed within the study.

This concluding chapter will firstly summarise the results presented in the previous chapters, indicating the conclusions and the contribution of this study to an understanding of Scottish politics and political discourse studies. Secondly, some of the practical and methodological difficulties and limitations of analysis will be explored. And lastly, suggestions will be made for potential future research.

### 7.2 Summary of Observations and Research Contribution

The introductory chapter laid out some of the recent political and historical background to Scottish devolution. Of particular interest was the change in the electoral system which introduced a mixed form of proportionality. Important outcomes of this system, employed in 1999 for the first election of the Scottish Parliament, were: no one party obtained a majority; the first voluntary peacetime coalition government on British soil was entered into; the SNP, for the first time, received representation more in line with their levels of popular support, which they have never been able to achieve under a SMSP system for Westminster; and the minority Green Party and Scottish Socialist Party benefited from proportionality (Paterson et al, 2001: 2-3). Composition of both the legislature and executive differed significantly from Westminster: no longer was there a political polarisation, divided



by the left-right dichotomy. Also, with hindsight, considering the results of the 2003 devolved election, the pattern from 1999 was in many ways repeated and in some ways elaborated. For example, in 2003 Labour again won the most seats but not enough for a majority, the SNP formed the main opposition party, and the Liberal Democrats held the balance of power and entered into a second power sharing executive with Labour. In addition, the minority Greens and SSP won seats but this time in excess of 1999 (where they won only one each) and for the first time achieved the threshold for recognition of party status in the Parliament.

Looking at the ideological composition of the Scottish Parliament the party political dividing lines are no longer drawn between Labour and the Conservatives, as they have been for the best part of a century at Westminster. The Scottish Conservatives were placed third overall in both devolved elections, but are ideologically isolated as the only right-wing party in the Parliament. The two parties of power and the main party of opposition are all centre-left in their ideological leanings. What appear to divide the two main parties of Scotland are not the left and right philosophies of economic and social ordering but the differences of separatism and unionism.

In outlining an analytical approach for this study, chapter one put forward a CDA methodology. Critical discourse analysis affords the analyst an opportunity to relate changes in the social order and its practices to changes in discourse practices (and *vice versa*) through their textual manifestations. According to the critical discourse tradition, relations of power and ideology can be studied through discourse produced by those propagating their ideology in the pursuit or maintenance of power. Of the varying forms of CDA approaches available, this study decided to draw primarily from the frameworks developed by Fairclough (1992; 1995a; 1995b; 2001), van Dijk (1998; 2002; 2006a; 2006b) and Chilton (1996; 2004; 2005). This was in an attempt to combine the strengths of Fairclough's orientation towards the analysis of the social dimension of discourse with the insights of van Dijk and Chilton's work on the cognitive aspects of discourse. In this way, the author hoped to be able to provide productive insights to relations between changes in social and cultural practices (i.e. changes to the electoral system and resulting parliamentary composition), and cognitive aspects of discourse production (i.e. the rhetorical and ideologically motivated strategies used to negotiate the political field).



Chapter 2 mapped the ideological landscape of Scottish politics, with particular focus on the ideological centre, where most elections are fought and won. This was an attempt to look at the content of parties' ideologies and place them within their social and political context. Drawing on previous research and the competing parties' manifestos, this discussion concluded that Scottish political culture was definably different from the, predominantly English, Westminster culture. Scotland was and is more ideologically left of centre than England in terms of popular opinion and party political representation. Labour, the SNP and the Liberal Democrats occupy the popular centre ground, and under the devolved arrangements these parties are the most likely to form a power-sharing executive. It was also suggested, with reference to previous research, that the three parties of the Scottish centre, over the last 40 years, have been able to successfully link left-wing ideology with Scottish national identity. These points have meant that the Scottish Conservative party is ideologically isolated in devolved Scotland. They are currently ideologically incompatible with any of the other centrist parties, and only able to obtain levels of representation because of the proportional electoral system they opposed.

Analysis of previous research and the content of manifestos also confirmed that the main ideological battle in Scotland is not between left and right but separatist and unionist ideologies. This was referred to as the nationalist agenda in Scottish politics, pointing to how Scottish national identity is politicised in ways Englishness is not in England. It was shown that the three centre-left parties have a great deal in common in terms of the detail of their ideological goals and policy preferences. However, the battle lines are drawn over how best to achieve their goals, with Labour contextualising their argument within a 'successful' unionist partnership and the SNP advocating constitutional independence. The federal-unionist Liberal Democrats then hold the balance of power, ideologically compatible with both Labour and the SNP on the left-right dichotomy, and with a constitutional preference different to both. With a crowded ideological centre ground and power sharing the likely outcome of the election, the end of chapter 2 raised issues in relation to how this ideological landscape is negotiated by its participant parties and whether there are tangible effects on their campaign discourse. This then laid the way for the forthcoming investigation.

Chapter 3 continued the analysis of manifestos, focusing instead on how the rhetorical construction of parties' ideological positions was achieved. It was argued, that this approach is necessary because the content of ideologies is not the same as the



methods used to advocate a particular ideology. This chapter employed a cognitive framework for discourse analysis. Van Dijk's (1998) ideological square, as an explanation for the ordering of ideological discourse, was combined with Chilton's (2004) deictic analysis, mapping in and out-group positions in discourse. It was demonstrated that the nationalist agenda played a prominent role in the labelling of political in and out-groups. Unionist Labour and Conservative parties tended to have their out-groups with Scottish locations and both utilised ambiguities of reference to negotiate UK political agents. Labour drew positively on the UK 'partnership' with ambiguities of positive reference in relation to policies, making it possible for them to claim Westminster economic achievements. The unionist Conservatives were ambiguous in the criticism of Labour to avoid criticising the Union. However, the separatist SNP, SSP and federal unionist Liberal Democrats all used locational tokens (Higgins, 2004a) or labels in constructing party political out-groups. For the two separatist parties they identified agents outwith Scotland as political opponents. In contrast, the Liberal Democrats used the UK context to rhetorically contrast government without them as negative, e.g. 'people can't trust Labour on their own'. It was also shown that the two minority parties, the Greens and SSP, also defined non-party political out-groups, such as 'the car lobby' or 'Godfathers of global capitalism'.

Therefore, chapter 3 began to illustrate how parties rhetorically construct their opponents. These rhetorical constructions were shown to be affected by the ordering processes of the ideological square. Opponents are then constructed in discourse on an antithetical basis to the in-group, where the in-group is proximally and the out-group distally located in discourse. Proximal positions relate to positive sides of the ideological square, where distal positions encode the negative sides. However, when applied to a devolved Scotland, van Dijk's (1998) ideological square was found to have insufficient descriptive power. It was asserted that the effects of the electoral system could be seen at play and the ideological square required amendment. Labour did not define the Liberal Democrats as an out-group (as they do at Westminster), and the SNP only label the Liberal Democrats as an out-group in conjunction with their coalition partners, as in 'the Labour-Liberal Democrat coalition'. The Liberal Democrats make no direct criticism of Scottish Labour and only criticise Labour as a UK party, governing alone at Westminster. Also, the Liberal Democrats register only one instance of the SNP as negative out-group, which occurs as part of the UK party leader's comments and not as part of the Scottish leader's critique. The constitutional



arrangements of devolution were asserted to materially affect the discursive negotiation of the political field. Whereas Labour and the SNP remain antagonistic towards each other, those two parties exhibit less adversarial, if not cooperative, discourse towards the Liberal Democrats, and the Liberal Democrats to them. Labour and the SNP are divided by their attitudes to the Union and by their electoral status as the two dominant parties of Scottish politics. However, because the Liberal Democrats hold the balance of power under the proportional electoral system they are constructed in less adversarial terms by their potential coalition partners. The ideological square in van Dijk's initial formulation is unable to account for non-adversarial discourse in competitive scenarios. The square needs augmentation to account for instances of cooperative discourse in competitive contexts which require compromise. As such, a quasi in-group category was suggested to bridge the methodological gap. Under particular circumstances groups may choose discursive compromise for mutual gain. In this case, an allied out-group may be constructed in similar terms to the in-group.

Developing on the previous investigation, chapter 4 explored another facet of ideological negotiation. While chapter 3 looked at how parties construct discursive positions for themselves and their opponents, chapter 4 investigated how the parties of the Scottish centre formulated their arguments, that is, how the parties rhetorically construct positive in-group and negative out-group's actions, attributes and achievements. This study moved on to examine rhetorical construction in party election broadcasts (PEBs), employing a systemic functional grammatical analysis. This enabled a study of transitivity and modality in rhetorical constructions, to explore responsibility for and commitment to policy achievements and programmes. Conclusions from the previous chapters were reaffirmed by this analysis. As before, the nationalist agenda was seen to play an important role in Scottish electoral discourse. Adversarial discourse strategies continued between Labour and the SNP, who remain divided by this issue. Again less adversarial strategies were employed in relation to the Liberal Democrats. Labour and the SNP failed to criticise their potential coalition partners and likewise the Liberal Democrats did return their criticism. This chapter also focussed on how the Liberal Democrats negotiate responsibility for the same policy programme, while campaigning on separate tickets. When representing policy achievements the two parties represent achievements as their own and omit mentioning the other's role. Labour, however, do not discuss the



abolition of tuition fees in their broadcasts; whereas the Liberal Democrats do not refer to law and order. As these were significant policy areas for both parties, it was mooted that omission could well be another instance of leaving a rhetorical space for each other or tacitly cooperating. It was observed that the Liberal Democrats tended not to encode strong degrees of obligation or commitment to future policy goals (i.e. through the use deontic or epistemic modality). Instead, their broadcasts exhibited the boulomaic system of modality, encoding the leader's desire to achieve policy goals. It was suggested this rhetorical strategy reflected the Liberal Democrats as a minority coalition partner, where they would have to selectively negotiate which policies were included in a partnership agreement. Such examples of rhetorical strategies, therefore, supported the previous chapter's call for a redrawing of the ideological square.

The subsequent chapter departed from looking at the texts of campaigning parties, turning its attention to mediated forms of political discourse. As such, chapter 5 investigated press reception of PEBs, critically examining the language used and the trajectories of party messages. Examining a corpus of newspaper articles, analysis suggested that a pervasive cognitive schema manifested in the discourse of politicians and journalists alike. Based on the characteristics of three intersecting political metaphors (politics is war, politics is pugilism, and politics is argument) the schema was described as 'the conflict schema'. The schema demonstrated a pervading common sense effect on the representation of political campaigns, reproducing them in terms of a competition between two sides. The metaphors and language of the conflict schema perform a regulative function of the discursive representation of the political field: privileging certain meanings to the exclusion of others. The cognitive ordering of the political field in this way explains why only the SNP and Labour broadcasts featured in newspaper comment on the PEBs. This representation of the political field benefits the two main parties, Labour and the SNP, as they are cast as the two competing protagonists of the campaign to the exclusion of others. Other political agents of differing hues had discursive contributions included in campaign reportage; however, these were ordered in terms of comments on the two main parties and not in representing their own policies. Smaller parties struggled against the hegemony of two party politics. This study critically questioned the appropriateness of representing devolved Scottish elections in this way. This is particularly so as a multi-party system was clearly in operation and neither of the two biggest parties were likely to achieve an outright majority. The representation of a two party conflict



also appears inappropriate in light of the less adversarial discourses which co-occur with adversarial discourses. The reportage of Labour and the SNP was, therefore, asymmetrical in their favour and an inaccurate characterisation of the political system. Latterly, the chapter compared the recycling of SNP and Labour Party messages through reportage of the PEBs. Labour appeared to be the more successful of the two parties, who both had to communicate their messages through ostensibly hostile coverage. Labour's message was reproduced more often and accurately; and their success was put down to their ability to stay 'on message' in subsequent media interactions and because of their use of another culturally salient metaphor (independence is divorce).

The final chapter of analysis addressed a key political issue which featured prominently in each of the previous chapters: that of the nationalist agenda. Specifically, the chapter sought to explore the discursive representations of Scotland and Scottish national identity in campaign discourse of politicians. As such, an overview of both the manifestos and PEBs was taken. The investigation also attempted to tackle some of the methodological problems of previous research on nationalism in general and Scottish nationalism in particular. In the current political science and sociological literature on Scottish national identity the pervading paradigm is one which asserts that Scottish national identity is essentially civic in nature. The social science research focuses mainly on explicitly political referents (i.e. elections and referenda). This conception of national identity equates to the institutional or *Staatsnation* concept referred to in the critical discourse work of Wodak et al (1999) and de Cillia, Reisigl and Wodak (1999). Chapter 6 suggested that voters and politicians perhaps evoke differing versions of national identity dependent on the context. In an election they are asked to make a democratic and civic choice, so those conceptions of national identity are the most prominent, but not at the exclusion of other conceptions. The analysis demonstrated that civic and non-civic, and inclusive and exclusive forms of national identity intertwine in the discourse of all Scotland's politicians. It was also suggested that this mixing was entirely appropriate, as the context of a democratic election requires participants to discursively define the bounded national in-group but also advocate an open, tolerant and inclusive democracy.

Chapter 6 then built on the work of Billig (1995), Higgins (2004a; 2004b) and Law (2001), and their accounts of banal nationalism. This analysis supported the call



of the latter two researchers for the adaptation of Billig's original theory, in light of the case of a sub-state nation: Scotland. There was evidence presented here to support the claim that Scots make a clear distinction between their state (UK/British) and national (Scottish) identities. It has been evident that this distinction is at the crux of ideological competition in devolved Scottish politics; however, whether separatist or unionist the distinction between state and national identities is still made clear. Where differences arise they are over the positive or negative characterisation of the union and its associated state identity. This analysis has demonstrated that Scottish politicians utilise either identity depending on their discursive requirements.

In further summary, this investigation has demonstrated evidence that the composition of devolved Scottish politics defers from the English centred Westminster political context. These differences are due to regionally (or rather nationally) specific socio-political characteristics and because of the new devolved constitutional arrangements. Correspondingly, there is a material affect on the construction and negotiation of political discourse in devolved Scottish elections. While aspects of the British tradition of adversarial politics continue, new cooperative discourses are evident. These less adversarial rhetorical strategies involve the Liberal Democrats in relation to the two largest parties: rivals SNP and Labour. These cooperative rhetorical strategies are due to potential patterns of coalition, which are determined, in large part, by separatist-nationalist ideological leanings. The mediation of state and national identities was, therefore, demonstrated to play an important role in the discursive production of party political ideologies in Scotland. In addition, the role of the media was explored in relation to the press reception of party broadcasts. In this instance, media discourse was shown to order and reproduce the political field in terms of adversarial discourse. This casting of Scottish electoral politics as a two sided competition runs counter to both the multi party character of devolved Scottish politics and the illustrated examples of cooperative party political discourse.

Methodologically, this thesis has productively integrated social and cognitive approaches to CDA, in line with recent calls from critical discourse analysts to do so (Hart, 2005; Koller, 2005; van Dijk, 2006a and 2006b; Wodak, 2006). Chapter 1 laid an initial foundation for the forthcoming analysis through employing quantitative social science approaches, which explored the socio-political background of political ideology in Scotland. Subsequent chapters then expanded on initial observation by employing cognitive approaches. Ideology was then investigated from the perspective



of cognitive strategies of negotiating the political field. The analysis considered particularly metaphor and schemata (Lakoff, 1987 and 2002; Lakoff and Johnson, 1980), the ideological square (van Dijk: 1998) and proximal deixis (Chilton, 2005) as cognitive structures affecting the ordering and representations of discourse.

### 7.3 Difficulties and Limitations of the Study

External observation has its advantages. In terms of reception of contemporary political messages from politicians and the media, the researcher's stance mirrors that of voters; however, the researcher is undoubtedly more immersed in the campaign, than the average voter. There is, therefore, a risk of over-reading the meaning of texts, making stronger inferences than actually might have been intended. Also, the researcher lives with the texts of the election campaign for long after it is over. Subsequent events occur, and there is the risk that hindsight informs and colours one's interpretation. However, not to use hindsight when it is clearly available would also be remiss, especially when trying to determine both the motivation and meaning of discourse. For example, this study observed that more than two years after the 2003 election the Scottish Green Party discussed the possibility of coalition with the SNP, as a third party of coalition, should the post electoral conditions arise. This adds further weight to the assertion that the political conditions in Scotland lend themselves to coalition.

I am neither a journalist nor a politician and, therefore, infer from second hand sources and deductions what potential motivations and particular social and discourse practices they use. But other researchers, embedded and familiar with the practices of these professions have published their insights (Bell, 1991, 1994; Bell and Garrett, 1998; Bruce, 1992; Ingham, 2003; Pritcher, 2002a, 200b; Venables, 2005).

In using linguistic tools of analysis, such as systemic functional analysis, cases were not always clear cut as to the correct way of interpreting syntax and lexis. And in, for example, the rhetorical analysis in chapters 3 and 4 one was often interpreting what was implied or even left unsaid. Again in the study of rhetorical strategies there was an awareness of the weight of the rhetorical tradition which was not being drawn on in any great detail. In another study, one might wish to explore the contributions of Cicero, Quintilian and the great sophist Gorgias in relation to modern political rhetoric. This study reconciled its neglect of these past intellects by attempting to link



the production and reception of ideological discourse with an account of the motivations of social agents (that is the application of the ideological square and Social Identity Theory and Self Categorisation Theory). Also, whereas classical rhetoric stops at the text, CDA looks beyond it to the social context of its production and reception. This study did not consider political text in isolation but intertextually related (Fairclough, 1992) as part of a wider discourse that both constitutes and is constituted by the social environment in which it arises.

Due to time restraints and limitations of space, much more data was collected during the election campaign than could be analysed. For example, to support this investigation's claim of a new dynamic for negotiating potential and actual coalition partnership between Labour, SNP and Liberal Democrats a study of televised election hustings would have been useful. Both Scottish BBC and Scottish ITV ran a number hustings involving individual party leaders and panel discussions, which were recorded as part of this study's data collection. Conversational analysis would have been a particularly useful tool in studying how the party leaders negotiated questions about the coalition. I began making transcriptions of the panel discussions with party leaders but time constraints prevented a complete analysis. Anecdotally, I would assert that the strategies analysed above were at play in these discussions, but their further analysis will have to wait for a later date. Similarly, there was a great deal of ephemera available through the ASPECT project at Strathclyde University, which collected constituency party leaflets during the campaign. Again, a systematic analysis was not possible for the above reasons. Comparing local and national campaign in terms of content and approach could be a fruitful area of study.

A more direct comparison could have been made between devolved and Westminster elections. However, several reasons pointed to why this was not practical. First, the problems of one researcher dealing with the amounts of data involved in one Scottish election were difficult enough, let alone including an even bigger UK general election. Secondly, it was possible to draw on secondary sources to support claims for the adversarial strategies involved in Westminster elections. However, these possible flaws are to confuse breadth of study with focus. This investigation sought to identify the salient themes and issues which related to the new governing arrangements in devolved Scotland and in particular how these are negotiated in the discourse of an election campaign. Occasionally, the study would widen out to include all the main campaigning parties (e.g. chapters 4 and 6) but in



general it remained focused on the centre-left parties and their relationships. Again this was partly to do with managing data but also because, as chapter 2 indicated, the centre-left parties were where the new (distinctively Scottish) fulcrum of power lay in the devolved Parliament.

CDA has not been without its critics and detractors of its methodological approach (Pennycook, 1994; Stubbs, 1997; Tyrwhitt-Drake, 1999; and Widdowson, 1995, 1996). The main criticisms are that CDA is circular in approach, that it is not so much linguistic as sociological and political in character, and that it is fundamentally politically biased in approach. In large part responses to these accusations have already been discussed in the introductory chapter but more in the guise of explanation than justification. These indictments will be dealt with in a direct fashion. Stubbs (1997) takes issue with CDA's assertion that ideologies cannot be read directly off texts, and, therefore, if this is not possible then it is the analyst who is 'reading meanings into texts on the basis of their own unexplicated knowledge' (1997: 298). Similar criticisms are levelled by Widdowson (1995). Fairclough (1996) responds to these criticisms by suggesting they conflate interpretation and explanation. All readers, analyst or otherwise, are involved in an active interpretation of texts, bringing to bear their different personal resources in making meanings. Interpretation is, therefore, a necessary element of explanation of text. The critical discourse analyst not only visits features of the text in the explication of meanings, but also the social context from which readers draw their resources for interpretation. Text is in a dialectal relationship with discourse production and action and analysis of the latter two is an essential part of CDA but not of everyday interpretations of text. It is accepted practice in the fields of pragmatic and semantic studies to look beyond the surface structure of text in the explication of meaning. In exploring ideology and power, which are necessarily manifest in discourse (in its CDA triadic definitions), CDA is hardly behaving extraordinarily, in terms of linguistic analysis, when looking beyond texts to social structures and practices. From the perspective of this study, some ideological meanings can be directly read off texts; but when dealing with political texts this is hardly surprising. However, when trying to explain certain aspects of discourse, particularly the absence of certain adversarial strategies and national identity, looking beyond texts was a necessary and imperative part of analysis and explanation.



Accepting the above explanation, the criticism may still stand that the analysts' interpretation is still based, in part, on their own unexplicated knowledge. Mitigation of this is found in the triadic approaches to analysis and CDA's stance on truth. First, discourse is visited from three perspectives, each informing the other, and like other approaches, analysis is based within a wider tradition. In addition, CDA tends to draw on empirical traditions, in political science, sociology and psychology. Secondly, CDA is not an analysis of truth but of ideology, where meanings are not a matter of empirically verifiable truth but of interpreting vacillating positions in the production of meanings.

Is CDA not really linguistic analysis, but social and political analysis, and is it fundamentally ideological in itself? Firstly, it should be clear by now that CDA is socio-political and linguistic in nature, and again this comes back to the dialogic account of discourse and the triadic approach to analysis. Nevertheless, as indicated in chapter 1, the vast majority of people working in the tradition have backgrounds in linguistic analysis. In this investigation, I certainly found it extremely beneficial to draw on previous work done in political and social sciences. Equally, the linguistic tools provided ways to view data which those other empirical traditions could not. For example, previous empirical analysis on manifestos has elucidated a great deal about the trends in policy preferences over time, but the approach is unable to tell one about how these issues are framed and used for political advantage by political parties. Previous manifesto analysis might tell one that 'devolution' appeared X number of times in manifestos, but not how that policy was projected. It was noted in this investigation that the SNP maintain their policy of independence but in certain election material decided to marginalise the issue. Similarly, empirical data analysis has been very good at divining people's attitudes to nationalism, but poor at illustrating how national identity is mediated in day to day life, in differing contexts. On the second point, as a study of ideology and power, critical discourse analysts feel it is impossible to escape one's position of analysis, and therefore commit to explaining as fully as one can their methodological background. Analysis is certainly political in its challenging of common sense belief; in fact maintaining a perceived position of objectivity is to perpetuate inequalities of power and the supposed 'naturalness' of certain pervasive beliefs. Also, CDA is not myopic in its explication of meaning because of this oppositional stance. In any analysis there are at least two alternative readings suggested, the analyst's, and the conventional reading which is



being questioned. Readers are not forced to accept the analyst's account. That CDA has greatest sway with practitioners with more left-wing leanings does not preclude the use of the approach in exploring left-wing discourses. Fairclough has commented 'these political positionings and priorities are not inevitable: a CDA of the left is quite conceivable, directed for instance at left-wing or feminist texts' (1996: 52).

Admittedly, if employing CDA, right-wing theorists might find it difficult to reconcile the aims of their analysis with the theoretical premises which the analysis is based on. With respect to this analysis, much of the discourse analysed was that of the centre-left. In addition, not all relationships of power and ideology exist between left-right; as this thesis demonstrated, nationalist and unionist ideologies are equally amenable to critical analysis.

#### 7.4 Suggested Future Research

From the observations of this investigation more work needs to be done in two areas: firstly, on how institutional and cultural forms of nationalism coexist and occur in differing contexts; and secondly how state and national identities interrelate when a state is made up of several sub-state nations. On this note, one might see a productive line of enquiry taken in exploring the reaction of Englishness (conflated with Britishness) to the peripheral Celtic countries' different relationship with Britishness. At the time of writing there was particularly vocal reaction in the English press to various ('rebellious') Scots in the public eye such as Jack McConnell who said they would not be supporting England in the world cup. The West Lothian Question has taken on a new post-devolutionary form, with the Conservative Party and sections of the popular English press calling for a ban on Scottish MPs voting on allegedly English issues. This call is not matched by a similar determination to ban London MPs voting on issues devolved to the London Assembly and Mayor.

Chapter six might cause one to reflect that if nation and state identities can be differentiated, constructed and negotiated in different ways, then does this apply to any other 'big identities? Benjamin Disraeli once proclaimed 'London: a nation, not a city' (1870: chapter 27), which illustrates the point that some 'world' cities like New York and London have strong senses of identity. Equally some Yorkshire and Cornishmen might sometimes give primacy to their regional identity over state and national identities. In other instances individuals might make no distinction between



state and national identities and their national-state identity may be always hierarchically superior to their regional or city identity. Questions which may be asked then are what contexts and circumstances make certain identities more important than others? And how are these 'big identities' constructed and negotiated in relation to each other? The work from Scottish empiricists covered in chapters one and six makes a distinction between state and national identities, not least because in Scotland they are distinct. Scottish empiricists also make a distinction between civic and non-civic forms of nationalism. De Cillia, Reisigl and Wodak (1999) and Wodak et al (1999) make a similar distinction between institutional (civic) and cultural (non-civic) forms of nationalism, which this thesis' evidence also supported, but they conflate state and nation.

This thesis mainly focussed on the centre ground and in doing so is probably also reproducing existing hegemonies concerning the constitution of the political field. Future analysis might begin to look further into the discourse of minority parties in Scottish politics and how as peripheral agents they struggle with existing structures of power.

Having developed a framework to account more fully for the discursive negotiation of ideological conflict, it would be pertinent to apply this framework to other instances of discursive competition and conflict. These may be other political but equally social or industrial contexts. As such, it would be interesting not just to look at antithetical positions of domination and resistance, as CDA has tended to do, but also of compromise and accommodation in the mediation of ideology and power.

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## APPENDIX I

### (Party Election Broadcast Transcriptions)

#### TEXT A: LABOUR PARTY ELECTION BROADCAST

[Jack McConnell]

I'm sure like me your thoughts at this time are with our troops in the Gulf and with their families back home, here in Scotland. But on the 1<sup>st</sup> May Scotland faces a choice, a choice between two futures. And I believe we need to build on what we've started, build on the achievements of our young Parliament, build on the lower class sizes in primary schools, to have lower class sizes in secondary too, build on the lower waiting times for cancer and for heart disease, with lower times for all operations and the local GP's surgery and build on the tough action we've taken against sex offenders, with tougher action against drug dealers now. So I believe that on the 1<sup>st</sup> May you should vote Labour to help us build a better Scotland.

You might think the Scottish Parliament has been a disappointment. You might think it's achieved nothing. Setting up the Scottish Parliament hasn't been without its challenges but in just four short years Labour has laid strong foundations. Whether it's a nursery place for every three and four year old or free nursing and personal care for Scotland's older people, whether it's free local bus travel for all Scotland's pensioners or guaranteeing jobs for all new nurses and midwives, Scottish Labour has worked everyday to build a better Scotland.

Labour is also committed to helping Scotland's hard-working families to build safer communities, that's why tackling crime and drugs is one of our top priorities. Whether it's toughening the Sex Offender's Register or new powers to seize the assets of drug dealers, Scottish Labour has worked every day to make every Scottish community safer for our children and families.

In four short years, forty real achievements making a real difference to people across Scotland.

## TEXT B: LABOUR PARTY ELECTION BROADCAST

[Tony Blair]

Thursday's elections are a massive choice for Scotland. On May 2<sup>nd</sup> people will wake up either to divorce and separation under the Nationalists or to partnership and stability under the Labour Government. It's a choice for the economy, between the low inflation, low mortgage rates, low unemployment we've had in the last few years or all the economic risks of separation. It's a choice of public services, between the investment and reform under the Labour Government or cuts under the Scottish nationalists. And it's a choice about leadership. It's a choice between a leadership that wants Scotland ripped out of the United Kingdom or Labour's leadership under Jack McConnell and his team, who will work in partnership with the Westminster Parliament to get the best out of the UK for Scotland. Thursday's elections matter. Come out and vote and vote for partnership and not divorce.

[Jack McConnell]

Winning the election is important not because of some sense of achievement for ourselves but because of what I believe we can achieve for Scotland over these next four years. And I know that sometimes it seems that in Scotland nothing has changed but there have been real achievements in the first four years of our young Parliament. We have delivered a nursery place for every three and four year old in Scotland and over a thousand extra teachers in our schools and we've also delivered free personal care for our senior citizens and free local bus travel for Scotland's pensioners too. And in the first four years of our young Parliament, tougher sentences for sex offenders, a drug enforcement agency that is catching the dealers and action on youth crime too. So in the second term of our young Parliament we will build on what we've started and in the next four years reduce class sizes in our secondary schools, bring down those waiting times in the health service and take action to do with youth crime and disorder, that takes place in far too many Scottish communities every Friday and Saturday night. That's government that's on your side, a government in Scotland acting for the people of Scotland, a government that puts schools and hospitals first and takes action to tackle crime.

[Text]



Vote Scottish Labour on the 1<sup>st</sup> May.

## TEXT C: LABOUR PARTY ELECTION BROADCAST

[Unseen narrator]

If Scotland votes SNP on May 1<sup>st</sup>, on May 2<sup>nd</sup> the Nationalists will begin the process of breaking up Britain. Last month the nationalist leader John Swinney said that 'independence is very, very close'. And if he gets his way then what? What would be the real cost? The Nationalists won't admit that breaking up Britain will threaten jobs, cause economic instability, cut investment to our schools and hospitals and increase our taxes. In Scotland today there are more people in work and unemployment is at a record low, but Nationalist plans for a separate Scotland will put apprentices and jobs, in places like Govan, Scotstoun and Rosyth under serious threat.

Britain has a strong and stable economy; Scotland has the lowest mortgage rates ever. Hardworking families and businesses can plan with confidence. But the Nationalists would cause instability and uncertainty; they would put all that at risk. In Scotland we are building new schools, cutting class sizes, investing in education. But schools and education would be neglected while the Nationalists gave priority to their obsession with an expensive divorce. Our children only have one chance at school; the nationalists will put this at risk.

Pensions are now rising. Pensioners in Britain have a £200 winter fuel allowance, we have introduced free personal care for all older people but the Nationalists plan to create a separate Scottish pensions system would put all that at risk. All that we have worked so hard for would be at risk. And most worrying of all, the nationalists' divorce would leave Scotland isolated in an uncertain world.

On May 1<sup>st</sup> there is a choice. Don't let the Nationalists put Scotland's future at risk.



## TEXT D: SNP PARTY ELECTION BROADCAST

[On screen text]

Labour said they'd reduce waiting lists.

They haven't.

Labour said they'd deal with bed shortages.

They haven't.

Labour said they'd tackle staff shortages.

They haven't.

How long can you wait?

[John Swinney]

On May 1<sup>st</sup> you have a simple choice. Vote Labour and you'll wait and you'll wait.

Despite what they tell you, nothing has changed and nothing will because Labour's interests are not in the people of Scotland. Labour's interests are in Labour in London.

At a time when the wealth gap between Scotland and the UK is increasing and we're languishing at the bottom of the European growth league, Scotland is not Labour's priority. Vote for the SNP on the 1<sup>st</sup> May and you'll see a difference. Increasing nurses' pay means more nurses and more nurses' means we can drive down waiting times. One thousand more police officers on our streets mean safer communities. And reducing class sizes means that Scotland's children will have the best start to their education.

And as for independence, I think it will be good for Scotland. I want it but it's not for me to decide, that decision lies with you. Our priority as a party is to prove ourselves to you that we can make a difference to your lives, here in Scotland.

So on the first of May, you have a simple choice. Vote Labour and you'll wait.

## TEXT E: CONSERVATIVE PARTY ELECTION BROADCAST

[Male 1]

So law and order, ah?

[Male 2]

Or the lack of it.

[Male 1]

Where's the bobby on the beat these days?

[Male 2]

Aeh, exactly.

[Male 1]

One minute they've caught the criminals, put them in gaol, the next minute they're out, walking about the street.

[Male 2]

Aeh, you're right there.

And what about these drug dealers, ah?

[Male 1]

That's another one.

[Male 2]

Something needs to be done about that.

[Male 1]

What?

[David McLetchie]

Scottish Conservatives know that crime and drugs ruin far too many communities in Scotland. We need more police officers on the streets. We need fast track prosecution and stiffer sentences for drug dealers. We need to take persistent young offenders off the streets and make sure that the sentences handed out in courts are the sentences actually served.

We can do something about it.

[Male 1]

So, I went to the hospital a few days ago.



[Male 2]

Oh aeh, have you still got that problem that you had?

[Male 1]

Aeh. It took me ages to get an appointment as well. I was actually getting quite worried.

[Male 2]

Well, so you should.

[Male 1]

It's been nine months since I'd first seen the doctor.

[Male 2]

Nine months?

[Male 1]

Yep, ridiculous!

[Male 2]

Mind you, it's not the fault of the doctors and the nurses, you know?

[Male 1]

Well, I'm not saying that, as far as I'm concerned they do a good job. It's just that there's something wrong there.

[Male 2]

Yeh, I know but what can we do about it?

[David McLetchie]

Scottish Conservatives believe in the National Health Service but we need a health service that puts patients first, gives them real choice and trusts doctors and nurses to do the job at local level, without constant interference from politicians.

We can do something about it.

[Male 2]

And what about that new Scottish Parliament building, Holyrood?

[Male 1]

Follyrood more like. How much has it cost them now?

[Male 2]

About three hundred million at the last count.

[Male 1]

Three hundred million?

[Male 2]

Three hundred million and rising.

[Male 1] And who's paying for that then?

[Male 1 & 2]

We are.

[Male 2]

It's our taxes.

[Male 1]

That's a right waste of money that is.

[Male 2]

I know but what can we do about it?

[David McLetchie]

The money wasted on the new Scottish Parliament building at Holyrood could have built one hundred new primary schools or twenty five new secondary schools or three brand new state-of-the-art hospitals. We don't need a palace for politicians. We do need to cut government in Scotland down to size, that means fewer ministers, fewer spin doctors, fewer bureaucrats, better value for money.

We can do something about it.

[Male 1]

So you watching the game tonight?

[Male 2]

No.

[Male 1]

No?

[Male 2]

I've got to do my paperwork tonight. You know, I sometimes wonder why I even bothered setting up on my own. It's just rules and regulations over and over again.

[Male 1]



I know, it's frustrating. I mean, I would love to take on someone else but I just can't afford to do it with all this tax and red tape.

[Male 2]

What can we do about it?

[David McLetchie]

Scottish Conservatives know that it's the people and not the politicians who create jobs and wealth and pay the taxes that finance our public services. That's why we are determined to reduce rates and taxes, cut red tape and get Scotland moving again by investing more in roads and transport. We can do something about it. Four years on and there's not much to show for the Scottish Parliament. We need a change of approach. We need a government that trusts the people. We need a government that backs up our doctors and nurses, teachers and police officers. We need a government that stops wasting money and instead spends it wisely on the public services, for the benefit of us all. That's what I stand for, that's what the Scottish Conservatives stand for.

Together we can do something about it.

## TEXT F: LIBERAL DEMOCRAT PARTY ELECTION BROADCAST

[Unseen narrator]

Jim Wallace has been Scotland's Deputy First Minister for four years. Living in the beautiful Orkney Islands he knows the values of a strong local community. And he knows too the importance of clean air and water. People here are very conscious of the need to protect the environment.

[Jim Wallace]

Are we prepared to invest in jobs and our environment by backing the development of renewable energy technology? My answer and that of the Liberal Democrats is yes.

[Unseen narrator]

Jim Wallace takes particular pride in what the Scottish Liberal Democrats have done for older people. If they are no longer able to wash feed or dress themselves they no longer have to pay for care. It's a big worry lifted.

[Jim Wallace]

It seems very odd that if you were, say, suffering from cancer there are certain care packages that you got free but if you were suffering from Alzheimer's you didn't. And that seemed to be totally arbitrary and that's what we've addressed in what we did by making personal care free for the elderly.

[Unseen narrator]

With teenage daughters Jim Wallace knows the importance of education, he was determined to get university tuition fees abolished and he succeeded.

[Female 1]

As a first time voter I'm going to vote Lib Dem because I feel that they have done a lot for the students by abolishing tuition fees.

[Female 2]

They've increased coverage by GPs. They've sent a huge number of pre-school children into nursery education.



[Male 1]

Jim Wallace, of course, has been the guiding force behind all these changes.

[Male 2]

He does nae turn his head when somebody asks him a question, he'll listen and take note and he'll act on what ye ask him.

[Male 1]

Well, overall I think the achievement of the Lib Dems in Scotland has been so significant it has changed our country.

[Female 2]

The Liberal Democrats in Scotland have made a big difference.

[Unseen narrator]

In the next Scottish Parliament there's much more Jim Wallace wants to achieve, free eye and dental checks for a start.

[Jim Wallace]

It is the Liberal Democrats who have the ideas, the energy, the credibility and the track-record and a great opportunity lies before us and there should be no limit to our ambition.

[Unseen narrator]

On May 1<sup>st</sup> people all over Scotland will have the chance to support the Scottish Liberal Democrats. You have three votes, for your constituent MSP, for your regional MSP and for your local councillor. The more support you give us the more we really can make a difference.

## APPENDIX II

(Corpus bibliography of newspaper articles covering party election broadcasts, in chronological order)

- Mcgarvie, L. 'Nats in dirty tricks row over shock new TV film: battle for Holyrood set to hot up' *Sunday Mail*, 13<sup>th</sup> April 2003
- Fraser, D. 'The election's tough new phase: SNP say Labour let patients die' *Sunday Herald* 13<sup>th</sup> April 2003
- 'Fear and loathing as SNP and Labour go head to head in television showdown' *Scotland on Sunday*, 13<sup>th</sup> April 2003
- 'McConnell attacks SNP 'deceit'' *BBC News online* 14<sup>th</sup> April 2003
- MacDonell, H. 'La-la-land advert team switches sides' *The Scotsman*, 14<sup>th</sup> April 2003
- MacDonell, H. 'SNP accused of bad taste in broadcast' *The Scotsman*, 14<sup>th</sup> April 2003
- MacDonell, H. 'Morbid SNP film 'crosses line of decency' *The Scotsman*, 14<sup>th</sup> April 2003
- 'Negative campaigning does not always work' *The Scotsman*, 14<sup>th</sup> April 2003
- 'Election broadcast 'shocking'' *BBC News online*, 14<sup>th</sup> April 2003
- 'John sounds alarm bell for Jack' *Daily Record*, 15<sup>th</sup> April 2003
- 'Jim's clean fight plea' *Daily Record*, 15<sup>th</sup> April 2003
- 'SNP are telling a pack of lies' *Daily Record*, 15<sup>th</sup> April 2003
- 'Dying pensioner ad sparks furious row' *Evening Times*, 15<sup>th</sup> April 2003
- 'Blair launches attack on SNP' *BBC News online* 15<sup>th</sup> April 2003
- Scott, D. 'McConnell: SNP deceiving voters' *The Scotsman*, 15<sup>th</sup> April 2003
- Scott, D. 'Parties clash over hospital waiting lists' *The Scotsman*, 15<sup>th</sup> April 2003
- Denholm, A. 'Labour plays on independence 'horror'' *The Scotsman*, 15<sup>th</sup> April 2003
- Ritchie, M. 'Swinney defends 'negative' campaign' *The Herald*, 15<sup>th</sup> April 2003
- Currie, B. 'Don't vote for 'divorce' says Blair' *Evening Times*, 15<sup>th</sup> April 2003
- McNeil, R. 'May the dark force be with you in TV election' *The Scotsman*, 16<sup>th</sup> April 2003
- Mitchell, J. 'Nationalists' brutal broadcast takes leaf out of Labour's book of negative campaigning' *The Herald*, 16<sup>th</sup> April 2003
- 'McLetchie calls for end to 'phoney war' *The Scotsman*, 16<sup>th</sup> April 2003
- 'Clear choice for Scotland' *Daily Record*, 16<sup>th</sup> April 2003



Sinclair, P. 'How low can SNP go? They use dead wife in sick new TV stunt' *Daily Record*, 17<sup>th</sup> April 2003

'Deterioration in Labour debate on home rule' and 'Labour resorting to tired old rhetoric' (letters page) *The Herald*, 17<sup>th</sup> April 2003

Swanson, I. 'Parties have agreed to scare and scare alike' *Evening News*, 17<sup>th</sup> April 2003

Crawford, A. 'Divorce talk 'wrong'', says anti-abuse campaigner' *Sunday Herald*, 20<sup>th</sup> April 2003

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